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Ihis dissertat ion has been prepared in l i eu -o f four 
courses f o r the requirement o f the M.A»Final Examination in 
Po l i t i c a l Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. 
This dissertat ion i s a modest attempt to discuss and 
analyse India's att i tude towards the problems of Security and 
regional co-operation with the group of states knawn as South-
East Asia, Many eminent scholars have explained various aspects 
o f the Security and the regional co-operation in South-East Asia. 
But the precise impact of India on this region,has not been thorou-
ghly examined. 21ie present relationship between India and the 
vast and resourceful regions o f South-East Asia has been des-
cribed in this dissertat ion. Various aspects o f Regional Co-opera-
t i on have also been examined. An attempt has been made to explain 
the extent to which the interests o f big Powers l i k e the United 
States o f America, the Uaion o f Soviet Soc ia l i s t Republic, the 
People's Republic o f China have played their part in shaping the 
destinies o f this region. Ideological con f l i c t s have created grave 
problems in this region. Hierefore, the security and regional 
co-operation in this r e g i o n « are of great concern to India now 
than ever before f o r geo-po l i t i ca l , ideo log ica l and ecommic 
reasons. The h i s to r i ca l background and the geo-po l i t i ca l factors 
as wel l as the tradi t ional cultural t i es o f these states with 
vi -
India have been described at length in the Introduction, Chapter 
I deals mainly with the newly emerging forces o f the region, 
l i k e Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and 
the Philippines, as also their individual struggles f o r inde-
pendence; the recent politico-economic developments taking place 
in these countries have been thoroughly examined. "Die chapter 
has, therefore, become too long but i t could not be summarised 
further without decreasing i t s value. Chapter I I describes • 
Vietnam's po l i t i c a l issues and mil i tary solution. Chapter I I I 
with 
deals/the interests of the U.S.A. in the region Ideological , 
Strategic , Economic and Commercial, Chapter IV describes the 
Chinese Phantom - the struggle between Expansionism versus 
containment. Chapter V deals with Posi t ive attempts at the 
problems of security and regional cooperation between India and 
South-East Asia. At the end a br ie f conclusion sums up the itile 
o f India - both present and prospective - in this region with 
i t s other international involvements consequent upon i t s asso-
c ia t i on with the regional security and mutual co-operation, 
I am grate ful to Professor Syed Anwarul Haque Haqql, 
Head o f the Department o f P o l i t i c a l Science f o r h is kind per-
mission to prepare this d issertat ion and his l i v e l y interest in 
the progress of my work. express my sincere gratitude to 
Syed Nasir A l l , Reader in P o l i t i c a l Science, f o r suggesting 
th is valuable topic ard his able guidance, encouragement and 
- v i l -
which 
in te l l ec tua l stimulation/en^t)led. me. to take up this study and 
whose co-operation greatly f a c i l i t a t e d the preparation and 
completion of the work. I am beholden to Mr.A.F. Usmani f o r his 
valuable suggestions. I owe much to other members o f the 
Department f o r their encouragement and advice, and to my fe l low 
students f o r their help and co-operation. Special thanks are 
due to the co-operative competent s ta f f of the Maulana Azad 
Library, A.M.U., Aligarh f o r providing me a l l possible f a c i l i -
t i e s and guidance in the' preparation of the dissertat ion. 
I am extremely obl iged to Mr. Amatullah Qureishi f o r 
typing out the manuscript; i t i s due to his untiring round the 
clock e f f o r t that made i t possible fo r me to submit the disserta-
t i on in time. As the typing had to be rushed throu^, some 
typographical errors might have crept in. E f f o r t s have been 
made to correct them but arjy or mistaJses l e f t over due to over 
sight may be condaned. 
ALIGARH ABDUL HAMEED 
August : 1969 

I N T R O D U C T I O N 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
ITS GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND 
I N T R O D U G T I O N 
SOUTHEAST ASIA ~ ITS GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND 
South-East Asia, is a term which came into general use 
during the second world war to describe the t e r r i t o r i e s o f the 
eastern Asiatic mainland forming the Indo-Chinese Peninsula and 
the immense archipelago which includes Indonesia and the Ph i l i -
ppines} Therefore, South East Asia i s the portion o f the conti-
nent that l i e s between India on the west and China on the north, 
and also includes the islands in the adjacent part the Pac i f i c 
Ocean. Po l i t i c a l l y the area is divided between Burma, French 
Indo China, Siam, Malaya, Indonesia (Formally known as the Dutch 
East Indies) , and Philippines, Geographically, India, China, and 
Australia l i e outside Southeast Asia, but because o f their stra-
teg ic , economic and po l i t i c a l interests in the area i t is impossi-
2 
ble to ignore them. 
South East Asia today i s an anthropologist 's paradise. In 
i t s mountains and jungles, l i v e the remnants of a great var iety 
o f peoples representing early stages o f i t s ehtnological history, 
pigmy Negritos l i v ing as primitive nomads, people, akir^ to the 
Australian aborigines, and others that would appear to be Indo-
nesians in more backward stages o f development. There has obvious-
ly been a great deal o f inter-mixture between the ear l i e r 
Hall , D , G . E . , '^ A History o f South East Asia» j London 1955,p,3. 
2. Lennox A Mil ls and Associates, ''"The World o f South East Asia'* 
London I960, p,3. 
«* 2 
inhabitants and la ter comers. The whole area, indeed, has been 
3 
described as a chaos of races and languages. 
In 20th century. South east Asia has r e f l e c t ed the 
dominant forces of the times in international po l i t i c s which i s 
nothing but struggle for power among nations. At the beginning 
o f this period, almost the entire area o f southeast Asia was 
divided among the western powers under various types of d irect 
and indirect colonial rule, the region was subject to decision 
in v i t a l matters from distant metropolitan capitals . Imperialism 
of 19th century, even with i dea l i s t i c aspects, produced a po l i -
t i c a l and in many respect an economi,social, and cultural 
pattern that did not possess the elements of permanence. The 
greatest foe of imperialism was the nationalism o f the 20th 
century, reaching i t s climax in the creation o f Sovereign States 
with many untried approaches to domestic and international 
problems. 
A l l South East Asia except the Netherlands Dutch East 
Indies was o f f i c i a l l y involved in the F i rs t World War. But in -
the Second World War, Southeast Asia was i t s e l f in a state o f 
war, the Japanese over-running the entire area in the months 
fol lowing their attack on Pearl Harbour and the forces o f the 
A l l i ed Powers la ter driving them out in certain countries, 
notably the Philippines and Burma. This region was considered 
3, Hall, o p . c i t . , p. 6, 
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v i t a l among the nations. In the words of Professor f i f i e l d , 
"•after the end o f war Southeast Asia came to be v i t a l region 
in the struggle between the communist and western Forces o f 
4 
the world," 
The countries of Southeast Asia constitute one o f the 
most strategic areas of the world. Geography and poliitics have 
made this region very important in the international sphere. 
i s 
The s t ra i t of Malacca between Sumatra and IMal-^ysi'a/ a strategic 
gateway between the Paci f ic and Indian Oceanr# The s t ra i t o f 
Malacca i s a natural gatev/ay in contrast to the Panama, and 
Suez Ganalc. Singapore i s located at the Southern and of Malaya, 
a 
become base/of considerable importance in the ''^geostrategy" o f 
South east Asia. Professor F i f i e l d opines ''although i t s 
(Singapore) s igni f icance has been reduced as a result o f the 
events of the Second Vforld War when the Japanese captured the 
base and as. a consequence of the development o f nuclear and 
thermo-nuclear weapons, Singapore i s s t i l l an important key 
to the defence of the region. In another respect, the land 
and sea pattern in South east Asia, peninsular and insular, 
has provided the natural f a c i l i t i e s for movement from continental 
Asia to Australia. The "Near Nbrth*^ ^ i s an expression o f t en 
used by Australian writers to describe the geographic re lat ion-
ship of their commonwealth to Southeast Asia. The peninsular 
4. F i f i e l d , Russell H., '*The Diplomacy of South east Asia"^ 
1945-1968 N.Y. 1968, p. 1. 
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Is very important i n 
part o f the Asia/an age when the strategy o f a i r warfare has 
assumed great importance. Bangkok, f o r instance,has one of the 
most strategic and modern a irport i n Asia^ 
This reg ion as a whole is under-populated although ce r ta in 
areas l i k e Java in Indonesia, centra l Luzon in the Phil ippines^ 
and the Red River delta in Vietnam su f f e r from over population. 
The t o t a l population o f Southeast Asia i s about 225 mi l l i an 
people increasing by over 20 m i l l i on each decade. The reg ion 
i s f u l l o f languages and r e l i g i ons . In the words o f Professor 
F l f l e l d , Malayo-Polynesian languages are general ly spoken i n 
Indonesia, the Phi l ippines and Malaya; Burmese and Siamese belong 
to the Tlbeto-Ghlnese Family; i n parts o f Burma, Malaya, Thailand 
and Indo-Chlna the people speak Austro-Asiatic languages^ Indians, 
Chinese, Arabs, and Europeans have obviously added to the Linguls-
6 
t i c complexity. Engllsl^ now the language o f diplomacy and the 
large number o f government o f f i c i a l s are f luent i n th is language 
apart from the states o f Indo-Chlna. 
In Indonesia and the Malaysia Muslims are in a major i ty^ 
the Phil ippines Christian^and Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and 
Laos Buddhist,Vietnam is basical ly Buddhist^ though l i k e China 
with strong Taoist and ^onfusl^n elements. In the f i e l d o f 
internat ional re la t ions the various r e l i g i ous groupings in 
5, Ib id . , p. 2, 
12, Ibid., p. 4. 
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Southeast Asia, espec ia l l y the Muslim, Buddhist and Roman 
Catholic, h a v e ' ^ e s with states outside the area pursuing s imi lar 
r e l i g i ous f a i ths . 
Hie reg ion was influenced by Indian,'Arab-Srand European 
ctilturesy Bie Indian cultural impact was expressed i n the 
/ 
propagation of Buddhism and Brahminism in Southeast Asia, in the 
Flov;ering o f art and ar'^ajitecture as revealed today i n the 
monumental ruins at Angkor i n Cambodia and Borobudor i n Java, 
i n the extension to the region o f Sanskrit, and i n the applica-
t i on o f the Hindu concept o f Kingship, law, and administration 
at a number o f roya l court;^, At the same time i t should be added 
that the Indian cultural impact tended to be centred i n the 
cap i ta l o f the kingdom around the group that i s sometimes'called 
todaj^^he e l i t e j 
Bie Chinese inf luence, i n contrast to the Indian wa^more 
p o l i t i c a l and commercial, l ess r e l i g i ous and cul tura l . The 
in teres t^ ,o f the Chinese in the reg ion was c l o s e l y - t i e d to the 
expansion of trade through or around the area to India, the 
Middle East, and Europe. M^st o f the Chinese, s e t t l i n g i n 
Southeast Asia during the past, were merchants who toofe l i t t l e 
part in Po l i t i c s . Only i n Tbhkin when Chinese rule was d irect 
over a long period of time the people became Sinic ized. 
12, Ibid., p. 5. 
- 6 -
Islam had become a s ign i f i cant cultural factor in South-
east Asia by the end o f the 14th century A.D. The Arabs and 
Persians used to come for trade along the coasts jof Malaya and 
the East Indies. They had carried the new r e l i g i o n with them 
but wide spread Cdrwersi6ni to Islam in the area did not occur 
unt i l l Indian merchants, especial ly those from Gujerat, became 
active in the propagation o f the Faih. I t was much easier for 
Indians than for Arabs and Persians to convert the people, for 
the former, as indicated had a long record of experience in 
cultural expansion, Malacca, s t ra teg ica l l y located in South 
west Malaya across from Sumatra along the s t r a i t o f Malacca, 
became not only the centre of trade in Southeast Asia but also 
a great and Important spearhead in the expansion o f Islam by the 
end o f 16th century. 
In 1611, the Portuguese captured Malacca and the po l i t i c a l 
history of Malacca took a new turn. The demand for spices in 
Europe and their ava i l ab i l i t y in the East Indies had increased 
the interests of the Europeans in Southeast Asia. The search 
f o r a sea route both spice Islands or Moluccas became increas-
ingly more urgent with the coming to power o f the Ottoman Turks 
in 
who captured 'eonstantli]ojpl&/ 1463. The period o f Vasco da Gama 
in Asian history began in May, 1498, with ar r i va l of the Portu-
guese is^uadjpoji at Calicut i n western India. In 1508, R>rtuguese 
0 
became masters o f Indian Ocean and secured the sea route from 
the cape of Good Hope and made Malacca as their main base in 
Southeast Asia under the Portuguese Viceroy Affanso d'Albuquerque. 
- 13 -
The Portuguese main motive i n Southeast Asia was commercial 
expansion and rot o f t e r r i t o r i a l aggrandisement. They developed 
those s t ra t eg i ca l l y located areas or bases facing the sea to 
command key markets and trade routes. Therefore, the Portuguese 
were not primarily interested in the areas other than their m i l i -
tary the 1taca-j®s and the masses o f Asians f o r the i r part were not 
deeply influenced by the newest invaders i n South east Asia. 
A f t e r the 19th century, the European interests began to increase 
and, more and more nations then began to take interests i n 
Southeast Asia and the Portuguese pattern were adopted by other 
European nations. 
to 
Spain began/take interest i n East Indies o f the Spice 
Islands. In the words o f Professor F i f i e l d , "European r i v a l r i e s 
were transferred to Southeast Asia which in turn provided fue l 
f o r the controversies. Spain adopted new route to the East 
Indies, the Spanish under Ferdinand Magellan sa i l ed westward 
across the At lant ic , through the s t ra i t s near the t i p o f South 
America, then across the Pac i f i c where they discovered the 
Phil ippines in 1521. Though Magellan l o s t his l i f e through 
intervent ion i n a l oca l c o n f l i c t on the shores o f Mactan o f f 
Cebu in the Central Phi l ippines. The Spanish expedition,however, 
sa i l ed on to the Jsfeluc'css, then across the Indian Ocean, around 
the cape o f Good Hope and back to Spain, Spain and Portugal 
became r i va l s i n the as we l l as fo r Spanish settlement 
i n the Phil ippines, 
12, Ibid., p. 7. 
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In 1629 the Treaty o f Saragossa between Spain and Portugal 
was signed and Portugal interest over M^lucca.a was accepted as 
a f a c t . But in 1545, the Spainish directed the ir e f f o r t s to the 
Phil ippines where i n 1565, they established a permanent s e t t l e -
ment in Cebu. Latter on^the Spain expanded north west and made 
Manila six year l a t e r the head-quarters o f the i r regime in Luzan 
and the Phi l ippines. Following Portuguese, the Spanish were 
interested i n the spread o f Christ ianity and i n r e s t r i c t ing the 
propagation of Islam. Professor F i f i e l d , r i gh t l y observes 
*^since Islam was more f i rmly entrenched i n the Indies and was 
only expanding into the Southern Phi l ippines, the Spanish had 
a Considerable advantage i n converting the F i l i p inos to Boman 
Catholicism. Ifir.thissA^iAm country the European impact i n terms 
o f r e l i g i o n and administration came to be strong?" 
In the meanwhile, the Dutch secured a foothold in Java 
and got Control o f the Sunda s t r a i t between Sumatra and Java i n 
1602 and began threatening the Portuguese in Southeast Asia both 
i n the Maluccas and Malacca. At the same time the Dutch had to 
face the English who sought to establ ish and maintain a commercial 
empire in the Indies. European po l i t i c s involv ing the Spainish, 
Portuguese, Dutch, and English was c l ear ly r e f l e c t e d i n the 
r i v a l r y of the Dutch and English East India Companies i n South-
east Asia, The Dutch emerged as v ictors in the Spice Islands 
a f t e r establishing footholds at the expense o f the Portuguese and 
9. Ibid. 
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successfully challenging the English. In 1623, the execution 
by the Dutch o f ten Englishmen at Imboyna quickened the end 
of English power in the Indies and encouraged the concentration 
o f coMnercial e f f o r t s in India. In 1641, the Dutch acquired 
Malacca from Portuguese and began to control the s t ra i t o f 
Malacca. The Dutch came to exercise e f f e c t i v e rule oxer.ira^a 
and to Control a large island empire from their headquarters 
at Balavia, renamed from the o ld Jacarta, that lasted for some 
three centuries. 
The English established their factory - at Bencoolen in 
South-western Sumatra in 1683. With the help o f Francis Light^, 
the English company in 1786 found a settlement at Penang, a 
strategicisland on the s t ra i t of Malacca o f f northwest Malaya. 
Therefore, i t was not unti l 1824, that the Br i t i sh and the Dutch 
defined in a treaty, the sphere of influence of the former in 
the Malaya Peninsula ©fid o f the l a t t e r in the Indies, The Dutch 
accepted the Bri t ish claim to Singapore and exchanged Malacca 
f o r Bencoolen. Therefore, the interests of the English East 
India comparer in Malaya were now concentrated in Singapore, 
Malacca, and Penang, a l l strategic positions on the trade route 
to China, 
Agriculture i s the basic ecoromy of South East Asia, In 
the Philippines and Indonesia, this area of r i c e cu l t i vat ion i s 
extended on to mountains slopes by banks of terraces thousands 
o f years old. Therefore, r i ce i s the basic cul t ivat ion. In 
- 10 -
addit ion to r i c e , Southeast Asia 's major products Include rubber, 
t in , o i l , tunsten, ziuc, iron, coal, sugar, hemps, copra, kapok, 
quinine, s t i c lac , teak, forest products and f i sh . 
This region industr ia l ly is under developed. There are 
domestic industries in the v i l lages for family requirements. 
There were some encouragement o f loca l industries a f ter second 
world war. The desire to manufacture at home instead of importing 
from abroad is strong^'/* Therefore, the road to industr ia l i zat ion 
in Southeast Asia is paved with d i f f i c u l t i e s but r ea l i s t i c ana-
l ys i s and careful adaptation w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the process. 
In the international po l i t i cs o f Southeast Asia the most 
in f luent ia l neighbours are the People's Republic o f China and 
India followed by Japan and Australia in much weaker positions. 
Great Bri tain, France, the United States and the Netherlands are 
also interested and their influence are weighty. But the in f lu -
ence of Soviet Union is a factor of importance in this region 
which is expressed indirect ly rather than d i rec t l y , Pakistan's 
impact is growing but is s t i l l l imited. The influence o f f o re ign 
powers on the newly developing countries of South East Asia is 
rot uniformly stable or permanent. I t varies from time to time 
in according to the changing circumstances, 
China, which is one o f great neighbours o f Southeast 
Asia i s potential ly the most in f luent ia l country and has great 
impact. Therefore, China through her large miriDrities in various 
countries of SouthaaSt^ :.Mia,^ pheri..eo.ffi6Por3(rbQpjnd :^y with Vietn^igj 
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Laos and Burma as wel l as proximity to Thailand and her active 
ro le in support o f the DeiODcratic Republic o f Vietnam, Communist 
China exerts her pressure. In the f i r s t decade o f Mao Tsetung's 
Government, the Soviet Union supported Mao Tsetung but la t t e r on, 
there began a r i f t on implimentation of communist ideology and 
therefore, the future is unpredictable. But China's influence 
i s very important in this region. They are basical ly involved 
in an evaluation of the capabi l i t i es and potent ia l i t i es of the 
Chinese communists as wel l as o f their short and long range 
intentions in Asia and the world. 
India's cultural and h i s to r i ca l Influence is manifest 
throughout Southeast Asia. Through Burma, Eiailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, Malaya (Tfe-w Malaysia) and Indonesia ample evidence Exxsfc 
exists o f the strong impact o f both the ancient and present Hindu 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . From the geographical and strategic stand point. 
Southeast Asia is o f prime importance to India. On the north, 
India enjoys some protection from the Himalayan range which 
serves as a barrier and separates her from Tibet and China. But 
barrier ex ists to protect her from any v i t a l 
to the east, no such formidable/change in the status of the 
Southeast Asian States. In the ecoromic sphere, i t i s evident 
that India aspires to a more prominent ro l e in Southeast Asian 
trade, one she has t r i ed not to jeopardise through allowing the 
s izable overseas Indian conmiunities which ex ist i n Burma, Malaya, 
and Ceylon and in whose welfare she is deeply concerned to become 
sources o f f r i c t i o n to her Southeast Asian neighbours}^ 
10. King, John Kerry, 'Southeast Asia in Perspect ive ' , N.Y. 1454 
p. 66, 
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In comparison to China, indiS.'a impact on this region i s 
much less. Indian minorities are the considerations o f importance 
in Burma, and >Ialaya and the common boundary between the Union 
o f Burma and the Republic o f India. The personal structure o f 
la te Prime Minister Jawahar Lai Nehru was especial ly important 
who made his close t i es with U Nu of Burma, Sukarno o f Indonesia 
and Norodom The international posit ion o f 
the late Prijae Mnister Nehru vas further strengthened tjy India 's 
Chairmanship of the important armistic supervisory commission 
set up for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos at the Geneva Conference 
11 
on Indo-China. 
The concept o f Japan as the workshop of Asia i s generally 
opposed by the national leaders o f the new states but the impor-
cot 
tance of Japan can/be denied in this region. At the same time, 
the Japanese are the only Asians who have considerable techrolo-
g ica l s k i l l f o r export. Therefore, present Japanese diplomacy 
in the area is economic, f o r the countries o f the region could 
make a de f in i t e contribution in helping Japanese solve their 
economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Strategical ly Southeast Asia is a very important one. In 
the words of Professor F iF ie ld , "although Australia i s n^t an 
Asian country, she is making every e f f o r t to exert her influence 
in Southeast Asia. The Secin-ity o f the Australians, i t i s 
11. F iFie ld, o p . c i t . , p. 13, 
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rea l i sed , i s c lose ly re la ted to developments in the *Near North". 
The great interest of the commonwealth government at Canberra in t 
the Colombo Plan i s an ind icat ion o f concern fo r the area. The 
so ca l l ed "White Australia"' po l icy however, i s a detriment to 
c lose t i e s with the peoples of the "Near North"". The west New 
Guinea question has s p e c i f i c a l l y impovered f r iendship between 
Indonesia and Austral ia. Although the ove ra l l impact o f Austral ia 
12 
i n the region i s l imited, the future can wel l bring changes. 
United States and Great Br i t a in are the most important in 
Southeast Asia -among the western powers. Although, Great Br i t a in 
had l os t her prest ige and power pos i t ion in Asia a f t e r each o f 
world wars of this century but s t i l l exerted her inf luence among 
the new states o f South and Southeast Asia. I t ' I is because o f '"her 
timely recogni t ion o f Asian nationalism leading to the independence 
o f India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and the Federation o f Malaya 
now known as Malasia with the establishment o f the state o f 
Singapore, hisr stress on economic u p l i f t adapted to the needs 
and conditions of the peo|)le, her carefi£L attent ion to the 
view points o f Asian leaders l i k e Nehru and U Nu and her contacts 
on a personal bases with the Asians through people l i k e Makoim^ 
Macdonald, former commissioner-General in South East Asia. Br i t i sh 
diplomacy in the region was we l l r e f l e c t e d in the ro l e o f Anthony 
Eden, Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , at the Geneva 
12, Ibid., p. 13. 
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Conference on Indo-China. At the same time, i t i s c lear that 
United Kingdom suf fered a loss of prest ige through mi l i tary 
intervent ion in the Suez c r i s i s i n 1956. 
The united States has a rea l concern over the develop-
ments i n Southeast Asia. I t i s proved twice in th is c^entury. 
In 1941, United States was annoyed when Japan attacked 
(Harbour) Pearl and the Japanese were expanding the i r foothold 
in the region, part icular ly i n French Indochina, The second 
occasion was the Chinese communist v ic tory i n 1949 and her 
inf luence on Southeast As ia ,espec ia l l y Indochina,were r ea l i sed . 
According to Professor F i f i e l d , '••^ American diplomacy i n the area 
has been r e f l e c t ed in mi l i t a ry , economic,informational and 
c\3ltural programmes. Yet only i n the Phil ippines are American 
t i e s deeply rooted. To some Asians, unfortunately the United 
States stands f o r imperialism and mil i tar ism. To them she i s 
also the personi f i ca t ion o f a twentieth century Metternich. 
The termination o f American inf luence i n Southeast Asia,however 
would be a major factor in the possible o r i en ta t i on o f the area 
towards the communist bloc o f Nations, 
A f ter 1945, the French and Dutch Impact had declined 
i n Indochina and Indonesia. The par t i t i on o f Vietnam in 1954 
at the seventeenth para l l e l between the," Democratic Republic 
o f Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh to theTifcrth and the state o f 
Vietnam under Bao Dai to the South represented a mi l i ta ry and 
12, Ibid., p. 14. 
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diplomatic defeat for France. Netherland also l o s t her prest ige 
in Indonesia. 
So fa r as the Soviet Union i s concerned which i s nat 
d i r e c t l y l inked with Southeast Asia but her iaiportance can not 
be ignored because People 's Republic of China i s a great neigh-
bour of Soviet Union which has a great impact on th is region. 
Moreover, both these great pov/ers beli§v@ in communist ideology 
and the home o f communism. A l l the communist a c t i v i t i e s in th is 
reg ion had been directed by these powers in the struggle fo r 
independence in this region during r the second world war. 
long as 
Professor F i f i e l d r i ght l y observes, "as/the Soviet Union and the 
people 's Republic o f China cooperate in world a f f a i r s the former 
w i l l have a strong influence i n the communist a c t i v i t i e s of the 
reg ion but the weakening o f the two between the Peking and Moscow 
governments would probably work to Soviet disadvantage?"^ The 
r i f t soon appeared between the Peking and MDSCOW on the impl i-
mentation o f communist ideology in world p o l i t i c s . But s t i l l 
Soviet Union i s interested in Southeast Asia and th is was ind i -
cated by the v i s i t in 196D's^ and promises of Nikita Khrushchev x 
and Mkolaift- A Bulganin to Burma and declared that i t could not 
be expected to l e t communist china have a completely f r ee hand 
in South East Asia, The inf luence o f U.S.S.R, would,however, 
decrease further and with the decl ine of her inf luence, the 
14. Ibid,, p, 15. 
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communist movements in these countries w i l l be sponsored, led, 
and secretly or openly supported by China. The Geopol i t ical 
factors vrita. make i t impossible f o r any other big power to con-
tinue to exercise influence over th is region. The two big coun-
t r i e s which w i l l necessary be interested in the economic progress 
and the po l i t i c a l patterns in this region would be commiHiist China 
and democratic India. India lLass«.^therefore,been t rad i t iona l ly 
interested in this region and a clear pattern o f regional coopera-
t ion between India and South Eas t Asia w i l l have to emerge, i f 
this region as a whole i s to prosper. I f i t goes communist, the 
Chinese influence would elbow out India 's manoeuvres in this 
region but i f the forces of l i b e ra l democracy persist India w i l l 
make a headway and might, make use of i t s resources in winning 
over these developing countries. 
AS has already been said, South-East Asia i s the portion 
o f the continent that l i e s between India on the West and China 
on the north and also includes the t i r y islands in the adjacent 
part of the Pac i f ic Ocean. ' P o l i t i c a l l y the area divided 
between Burma, i-'rench Indochina, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. Geographically, India, China and Australia 
l i e outside South East Asia, but because of their s t rateg ic , econo-
mic and po l i t i c a l interests, i t i s impossible to ignDre them. As 
Professor Hall observes, "South-East Asia is a term which came 
into general use during the second world war to describe the 
t e r r i t o r i e s of the eastern Asiat ic mainland forming the Indo-
Chinese peninsula and the immense archipelgo which includes 
- 17 -
Indonesia and Philippines. In using this term American writers 
have staji(iardlze44-the form "Southeast"' and have been fol lowed 
by Victor Purcell and E.H.G.Dobby, But there seems to be no 
va l id reason for coining a new form in preference to either 
'"South-East" or "Southeast"", both o f which have the sanction 
15 
of long usage/* 
The present work includes the mainland states o f Burma? 
Thailand Laos, Cambodia, Ibrth and South Vietnam and Malaysia 
together with the t\^ o great island, groups comprised in the 
Republic o f Indonesia and the Republic o f the Philippines 
Professor Hall says, "The Philippines do mt came c lear ly into 
South-East Asian history unti l their conquest by Spain la te i n 
the sixteenth century. And as Spain linked them up c lose ly 
with Mexico, and the United States o f America acquired them at 
the end of the nineteenth century, their part in South-East Asian 
history was s l ight , especial ly a f te r the middle o f the seven-
teenth century, when Dutch e f f o r t s to wrest them from Spain f ina-
l l y broke down. The rest o f this vast area i s one upon which 
from very early times Chinese and Indian influences had been 
brought to bear, and in one part of which, Annam and Cochin 
China, there was for mary centuries an intense struggle between 
them for supremacy. I ts cultural history i s of marked interests . 
15. Hall , D.G.E., A History o f South East Asia, p.3, 2nd 
ed i t ion N.Y. 1966, 
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there fore , espec ia l ly dioring the period of the Middle Ages in 
Europe, when under the stimulus o f Indian inf luences,art and 
architecture developed to a pitch which bears comparison with 
anything the rest o f the world can show. By the end o f the 
Middle Ages, when the Ptortugjaese appealed on the scene, South-
East Asia was divided into two main cultural areas : one ca l l ed 
by the French Scholars Inde exter ieure , where Indian Influences 
predominated and the other, consist ing o f TangKing, Ajajnaaffi and 
Cochin China, where with the f a l l o f the "'Hlnduized Kingdom o f 
Champa in the f i f t e e n t h century, Chinese inf luences had the 
16 
mastery,'* 
Professor Hall further points out, '•''Indian Influences 
which unlike Chinese, had no p o l i t i c a l Implications, was in the 
process of absorption by the native soc ie t ies i n South-East 
Asia, transformed JtisiJit; as much as, for. example, that o f ancient 
Greece was in i t s impact upon western Evirope. For the people, 
who f e l t the stimulus o f Indian culture were, as George Coedesput 
i t , mt" ' wildmen'^' but communities with a r e l a t i v e l y high c i v i l i -
zation of the ir own. Andeven the vletnamees who were under 
Chinese rule from 111 B.C. to A.D. 939, and under the Han were 
subjected to intensive s in izat lon, developed a culture which, 
while owing an immense aiiDunt to China, nevertheless preserved 
17 
i t s own Ident i ty , with i t s roots going back to pre-Chinese pftittfc," 
16. Hal l , D.G.E., Ib id . , p. 3. 
12, Ibid., p. 18. 
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The reg ion of South-East A?ia is an anthropologist 's 
paradise. In i t s mountains and jungles l i v e the great var ie ty o f 
peoples representing early stages of i t s e thro log ica l h istory : 
pigniy Negritos l i v i n g as pr imit ive nomads, peoples a kin to the 
Austral ian aborigines, and others that would appear to be Indo-
nesians i n more backward stages o f development. There has 
obviously been a great deal o f inter mixture between the e a r l i e r 
inhabitants and la ter comers. Hie whole area, indeed, has been 
18 
described as a chaos o f races and languages. 
South-East Asia has been over shadowed by India and China 
both p o l i t i c a l l y and cu l tura l ly , which were great power with 
established c i v i l i z a t i o n s long before her own h i s t o r i c a l period 
begins. In the words of Professor Hal l , "And i t was only through 
the f e r t i l i z i n g impact o f their cultures that her own began to 
develop and achieve greatness .For obvious reasons, when European 
scholars became aware of i t , Ihe i r attent ion was concentrated 
upon rulers , coucts and temple, where the external inf luences 
were strongest while their approach had necessarily to be made in 
19 
the f i r s t instance through Chinese or Sanskrit wr i t ings . " 
He further mantains, "The evidence of the l i f e o f the 
comnion people has been much harder to come by, and .so far a l l too 
l i t t l e has been discovered what does ex i s t , however, points 
18. Ib id . , 5. 
19. Ibid., 5. 
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indubitably to the fact that in the so cal led '^Hinduized"' states 
the great mass of the people was for long either untouched by 
Indian culture or in absorbing i t changed i t by bringing i t into 
l ine with indigenous ideas and practices. Thus the structure of 
society was largely unaffected by Indian influences. The caste 
system, which i s fundamental to Hinduism, has had notably l i t t l e 
influence, and woman has largely maintained the high place accor-
ded her before the ear l i es t impact o f Indian culture, a fa r higher 
one than she has evern occupied in India during recorded history . 
MDreover, a f ter the introduction of Hindusim and Buddhism the 
re l i g ious ideas and practices of ea r l i e r times perished with 
immense v i t a l i t y and in coming to t-erm with them both re l i g ions 
20 were profoundly changed. " 
The struggle for independence in South East Asia i s the 
result of mahy complex forces. Professor F i f i e l d opines, "the 
independence movement in Southeast Asia i s the result of many 
Complex forces found in the matrix o f the colonial period. I t was 
the western powers who brought to the region the concept of 
21 
nationalism, which in most cases precipitated their ov/n withdrawal^' 
But professor Hall thinks, "The nineteenth century brought a new 
phase in the European impact with a f ^ more dangerous threat to 
the jeolousy guarded independence of the South-East Asian states. 
20. Ib id. , p. 5. 
21. Russell, H .F i f i e ld , The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia ; 1945-
1958, p. 16. 
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I t was a period o f rapid western po l i t i c a l and t e r r i t o r i a l advance, 
when Britain, France and Holland acquired colonial empires in 
South-East Asia. The whole situation changed. The great compa-
nies of commerce, the directors of European enterprise in the 
ear l i e r period, disappeared from the scene. Governments o f f i c i a l s 
took the place of merchants, t e r r i t o r i a l revenues of trading 
p ro f i t s , and at home control by ministers of state was substituted 
22 
for that of "ooard of d i rec tors . " He further points out, "^ "^ there 
extensive exploration of natural resources; fore ign capi ta l , not 
a l l o f i t European, was invested on an ever-increasing scale; 
economic development, part icularly that of inter iors , was rapid 
breathlessly so in some cases. The e f f e c t s upon native were 
revolutionary. Producers became dependent upon external market 
and the heart breaking problem of agricultural indebtedness came 
to assume gigantic proportions. Foreign immigration, not only of 
Chinese and Indians, on an immense scale caused deep resentments 
and acute problems. For some time the indigenous peoples of the 
"colonial"" t e r r i t o r i e s looked on helplessly as the ir economic 
subjection became more and more complete. Their growing rea l i za -
t i on o f their pl ight gave impetus to the movements for national 
independence which characterized the f i r s t half of the twentieth 
23 
century.'* 
22, Hall, o p . c i t . , p. 688. 
23. (Hal l ) Ib id . , p. 688. 
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The west was sympathetic to the nationalist challenge. In 
the words of Professor Hall, "'The response o f the West to the 
nationalist challenge v/as rot unsympathetic. As early as the year 
1900 the Dutch publicly proclaimed their adoption of the **New 
course'% whereby government o f the Indies was to be for the 
Indies. The French defined their function as a mission c i v l l a -
t r l c e . The Bri t ish, in response to po l i t i c a l developments in 
India, promised to t ra in the native people for se l f government 
according to Western democratic methods, and to introduce i t by 
gradual stages. A l l three powers expanded and l i be ra l i z ed their 
Colonial administration by adopting methods o f socia l wel fare 
similar to those they were developing at home. 111 three fostered 
the spread o f European education. Save in the case of Br i t i sh 
Malaya, however, where there was no strong national movement untl-
11 a f t e r the second world war. The new policy f a i l e d s ignal ly to 
24 
arrest the growing discontent with western domination.'-'' 
The nationalist movements to which attained such a pitch 
of intensity in Burma Indo-Ghina, (Cambodia, Laos, South and North 
Vietnam) and Indonesia were powerfully influenced by developments, 
e lse where in Asia. The Boxer Rising of 1899 in China, the 
emergence of Japan and her spectacular defeat o f Russia in 1905, 
the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the establishment o f the 
Kuomlntang Party by Sun Yat Sen, the increasing dominance o f the 
24. (Hall^ Ib id , , p, 689, 
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Swaraj Party in the Indian National Congress the r i se o f lt»handas 
Karam Chand Gandhi and the launching of his non-cooperation move-
raent against Br i t ish rule In India, aroused their enthusiasm with 
26 
the r ight of Asia casting o f f her chains." 
The nationalist movements were not conl'ined to Asia at 
that time. As Professor Hall r i ght l y observes." The ^upsurge 
of nationalism, however, was at this time by no means confined 
to Asia. The Peace conference at Versai l les at the end of the 
F i rs t World War had taken the l i d o f f boiling cauldran of natioru 
a l i s t claims in Europe i t s e l f . In remaking the map of Europe 
the nation state was accepted as the guiding principle, though 
with the rather fl imsy safSguard of a League of Nations to res-
t ra in what the more penetrating thinkers o.nmiouily described as 
i t s "'giant equfttism."" Nationalism, and the rights of small 
nations in particular, became the main topic of discussion and 
the increasing numbers o f Burmese,Vietnamese and Indonesians who 
reached the higher grades of European education in the ir own 
countries or proceed to famous centres of learning in Europe 
26 
inevitably imbibed the heady wine o f western po l i t i c a l thought." 
He further says, "From their study of western history they learnt 
of Britains constitutional struggles, the American war of 
Independence and the French Revolution. They read John Stuart 
M i l l ' s Essay on Liberty, they caught the t h r i l of Shakespeare's 
26. (Ha l l ) Ib id. , p. 689. 
26. (HallJ Ib id . , p. 689. 
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ardent patriotism when they read: 
This England never did, mr never shall 
Lie at the proud foot o f a conqueror, 
and the flame of freedom scordhed their souls. They were the 
people who became most acutely sensi t ive to the rac ia l discrimina-
t i on practised by their western rulers, for they suffered most 
from i t . I t was from their numbers, therefore, that the p o l i t i c a l / 
agitators and eventually the national leaders, were recruited. 
Thus the nationalist movements acquired both means of expressive 
27 
and technique through western education.'^ 
The upsurge of nationalism was not result of European 
domination. I t has cultural roojts behind i t . In the words 
Professor Hall, ''-'Nationalism, however, was not born of the revo l t 
against European domination. I ts cioltural roots go as f a r back 
in South East Asia as in Europe. Kbtwithstanding the strength 
o f influences coming from India on the one side and China on the 
other, the more advanced peoples who absorbed them showed marked 
individual i ty very early in their history. The great cultures 
which flowered so r ichly , especial ly in art and architecture 
during the Middle Ages - Man, Khmer, Ch^m, J^ lgWHas-® and Burmese -
not only r e f l e c t that individuaiiby but even in their ear l i es t 
expression are quite dist inct from Indian. And even in the case 
o f Vietnam, v;here i t may be contended v/ith reason that Chinese was 
27. Op.c i t . , p. 684. 
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the parent culture, the di f ferences are s ign i f i cant , for the 
Vietnamese, struggle for po l i t i c a l independence, which came to 
a successful issue in the tenth century, was also a react ion 
28 
against the intense s in izat ion systematically enforced by China." 
The peoples mentioned above were producing their own vernacular 
l i teratures- long before the ar r i va l o f the European. Some-notably 
Burmase, Mdh, Javanese and Balinese - exhibit a great variety 
o f forms and l i t e rary qual i t ies of a high order, 
Ihere can be no doubt that much of the opposition the 
European powers had to meet in their t e r r i t o r i a l expansion during 
the nineteenth century had a strong nationalist content. "All 
the nationalist movements gained some of their driving force from 
an awareness of a histor ic paei; before the European intrusion. 
I t was a sedulously cult ivated awareness, as was only to be expec-
ted, of a g l o r i f i e d jjasifc bearing l i t t l e resemblance to sobar 
history. And the situation was not without i t s irony for it: . 
was discovered the rea l achievements of the past and rescued the 
29 
histor ic movements from decay and, in not a few cases, ob l i v i on . " 
Ttie nationalists movement pursued a large ly independent 
Course in each countries. Pract ica l ly , there was no l iason betw-
een the leaders in one country and those in an other. They were 
much closer with l e f t wing movements in the European countries 
28. Op.c i t , , p, 690. 
29. (Ha l l ) Ib id , , p. 640. 
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under whose sway they l i ved . There was much divergence of opinion 
regarding aim® and methods among the peoples themselves. Some 
were for gradualness, others for revolution. There were peoples 
who were anxious not to break the po l i t i c a l t i es with the west. 
And, unlike in India, there were extremely few opponents of 
western techniques and s c i en t i f i c methods. Traditionalism, how-
ever, showed i t s influence in Buddhist and Islamic revival ism 
and in Burma "Wielo'-ung Men's Buddhist Association'o and in Indo-
nesia Sarekat Islam played important ro les . Buddhism became 
closely ident i f i ed with national sentiments in both Burma and 
Siam (Thailand) and patriolism of those who belonged to other 
religio'Yis was iim punged. Partly for this reason communism f a i l e d 
to appeal to the great majority o f people. Only in French Indo-
Chim did the communist gain control over the Vietnamese nation-
30 
a l i s t movement, and then only because of French intransigence," 
The region of South East Asia was considered very impor-
tant among the Western Powers and the western impact was the 
greatest during 1870 to 1940, Atsout western interest Professor 
F i f i e l d observes, '"'•As,.a result o f the Industrial Revolution o f 
the use o f faster methods o f water transformation in and o f the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Southeast Asia became impor-
tant as a production center of raw materials needed out side the 
region. Although the coastal areas were valuable in previous 
30» (Ha l l ) Ib id . , p. 691, 
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commerce, the inter ior of the countries mw acquired great impor-
tance. The increase in trade between China and the European 
powers also added to the interest in Southeast Asia. The search 
for raw materials and markets for manufectured goods had wide^--. 
pread ramifications in the p o l i t i c a l , economic and social develop-
31 
ment of the region. 
The western powers l e f t behind them a western © l l t^ , 
probably less than 10 per cent, which took over the reins of 
government. These powers were responsible to a large extent for 
the consolidation of the geographic areas found in the present 
patter of states in South East Asia. In the words o f F i f i e l d , 
""the concepts of national sovereignty and o f the equality of states 
under inteEnational law in the west were opposed to the time-
honoured practice of vassalage in Southeast Asia, some times 
extending nDt to one but to a number o f neighbours. The transfer 
of the formation of fore ign policy from western to loca l capitals 
coupled with the necessity o f making numerous decisions, especial ly 
at meetings of international organisations, has brought heavey 
/ 
responsibi l i ty to the leaders of Southeast Asia in the inter-
32 national f i e l d . " 
31, F i f i e l d , Russel, H. : The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia. 
1946-1968, p. 16. 
32. ( F i f i e l d , Russell, H.) Ib id . , p. 17. 
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The largest country in the region i s Indonesia which 
occupies 760,000 square miles and has a population o f about 103 
mi l l ion persons. Burma i s the second biggest state t e r r i t o r i a l l y 
but with a t o ta l land area much smaller than Indonesia'^s (more 
than 260,000 square miles) , the Philippines the country with the 
second largest population (3o mi l l i on ) . The other countries are 
even smaller. Although Southeast Asia as a whole exceeds 1.7 
mi l l ion square miles Inhabited by more than 226 mi l l i on persons, 
there are three times as many people in China as in a l l the South-
east Asian countries combined. And the China's land area i s 
twice as great as that o f ^ the eleven lands which are i t s 
33 
Southern neighbours. 
33. Vanden bosch & Richard But wel l : The Changing face of 
Southeast Asia, p.5. Lexington 1966 (USA). 
C H A P T E R I 
THE EMERGING FORCES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
ANB 
WORLD POLITICS 
C H A P T E R I 
THS EMERGING FORGES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
AND-WORLD POLITICS 
In order to get a microcosmic view of this region and 
the interest i t generated not only in the neighbouring collosus 
China but also in the far f lung states l ike U.S.A., Great Br i ta in, 
France and U.S.S.R., i t would be niore purposeful to study the 
freedom struggle o f these countries. In the turmoil' which was 
/ 
the outcome of such a struggle, the basic t ra i t s of these nations 
Came to l i gh t . India's interest in these countries' struggle 
fo r existence and emancipation was both id i o l og i ca l and pract ical . 
India, as a country emerging.-^ from serfdom desired the same for 
these counti-'ies and when they acquired freedom India wished them 
s tab i l i t y , progress and freedom from secret machinations o f the 
fore ign powers to re-establ ish their hegemor^ y through diplomacy 
and economic aid. 
B u r m a 5 
fi 
Burma had experienced a democratic government from 1948 
to 1958, the Country's f i r s t ten years o f renewed independence 
a f t e r , l ibera t ion from Br i t ish colonia l rule . Burma under the 
leadership o f U Nu Sought the e f f e c t i v e democratization o f the 
country, the l ibera t ion o f i t s people from poverty a^d in just ice 
through socialism and the r i v i v a l o f Buddhist values as the basic 
governing force in Burmese l i f e . There occured a ' 'several 
sided ins urgencywhich had to be put down by the army. The 
army led by General Ne Win became discontent with the way in 
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which U NU and the other po l i t i c ians were running the country. 
'^ And so the soldiers took over from the po l i t ic ians in 1958, 
restored them to power in 1960, and then toppled them again in 
1962. Thus were U NU and his men of Buddha replaced by Ne Win 
and his men of Mars?"" •H, 
At i t s longest, from North to South, Burma is about 1,200 
miles; near lat i tude 21°N. j i t s widest, i t . stretches from East 
to West for 576 miles.Lying between lat itudes 9°56« to 28°30«N. 
and longtitude 92PlO' to 101°9'E., i t has an area o f 261, 289 
square miles, with a population of 18,610,000. On the North 
i t is bound by China, i t s North West Frontier touches Assam and 
Bengal, on the West l i e s the Bay o f Bengal and to the South West, 
the Gulf of Martaban. In the East, i t i s bordered by Yunnan, 
Laos and Thailand. 
Biorma as po l i t i c a l entity began with the great ruler 
Ana-Wrahta who established the Burmese Kingdom of ,1'Pagan in 1044. 
The state r e l i g i on was Buddhism. Then Burma experienced the 
invasion of Kubla Khan from China. Alaung-Paya established las t 
Burmese dynasty in 1764. But even then, Burma was not a state 
in a modern senee, but i t was su f f i c i en t l y United to serve as 
the nucleus for the development o f the present Bui'mese national 
state. 
1. Vanden-bosch and Butwell : The Changing Face o f Southeast 
Asia, U.S.A. Lexington 1966, p.240. 
- 43 -
In 1627, the Brit ish and the Dutch East India Companies 
started their fac tor i es in Burma. In 1824, the Br i t ish al leged 
that some Burmese troops had entered their t e r r i t o ry in Bengal, 
Br i t ish warships reached Rangoon, a f i gh t ensued and the Treaty 
of Yandabo in 1826 led to the cession o f Arakan and Tenas'serim 
to the Br i t ish. The second Burmese war was fought in 1862 and 
on 20 December 1826, Pegu v/as annexed by the Br i t ish. Ten years 
later the Bri t ish Indian Government, which had taken over from 
the East India Company, constituted the Burmese t e r r i t o r i e s into 
the province of Burma. The Br i t i sh quarrelled with king Thibaw 
who had signed contracts with the French for building a railway 
and a f l o t i l l a on the Irrawaddy. He had also f ined the Br i t i sh 
owned Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation for an al leged breach o f 
contract. In November 1886 Br i t ish troops defeated the king. 
On 1 January 1886, the whole of Burma became a Br i t i sh dependency. 
Br i ta in ' s greatest mistake in dealing with Burma was to 
attach the country t o r the Indian empire. I t was a natural thing 
to do, seeing that each stage of the conquest was organised and 
carried out by the Government of India. But i t s inevi table result 
was the standardization of Burma's administration according to 
2 
the Indian model. Br i ta in adopted a new policy which was set in 
motion by "the Upper Burma v i l l a g e Regulation of 1887 and Burma 
v i l l a g e Act of 1889, which applied in throughout the country. 
2. Hall, D.G.E., "The History of South East Asia. " p. 692, 
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Thege two measures imposed statutory duties concerning the 
maintenance of order and the co l l e c t i on of revenue upon the 
headmen and v i l l ages . As a resul t of their enforcement the 
myp-thugyis and talk-thugyis were gradually eliminated. The 
largest indigenous socia l and p o l i t i c a l unit of the previous 
period was thus destroyed and a stereo-typed direct administra-
t ion imposed, with the v i l l age tracts placed under the chai'ge 
3 
of c i v i l servant the myo-ok or township o f f i cer . '^ The new system 
was f u l l of e v i l because the myo~ok as a c i v i l servant was 
subject to frequent transfer and rarely stayed long enough in 
place to learn a l l that was necessary for good administration 
whereas the myo-thugyl. was a loca l man whose ancestors had 
held the o f f i c e before him. 
There was another factor which is relevant. The Indian 
connection imposed upon Bri t ish administrators in Burma a 
negative attitude towards the r e l i g i o n of the country. Now 
Buddhism was not merely the r e l i g i on of the people but also the 
state re l i g ion , and had been so ever since the re ign of Anawratha 
o f Pagan (1044-77). Hence the abo l i t ion of the monarch raised 
the important question o f the posit ion of the Buddhist organi-
zation under the new regime. The men with long service in Burma 
especial ly colonel (Later Sir Edward) Sladen who had known 
Mindon intimately urged that the new government should support 
the lawful authority ofji bhe heads of the Buddliist Church, as 
3, Hall , D.G.E., "The History of South East Asia, " p.694. 
N.Y. 1966. 
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the Burmese kings had done. And responsible Burmese leaders 
added their pressure. The head of the Buddhist ecc les ias t i ca l 
organization, the Thathanabaig, headed a deputation to Sir 
Ecederlck.Eober.ts, the commander-in-chief, asking for confirmation 
of the jur isd ic t ion of,-' the ecc les ias t i ca l commission which had 
4 
operated under the kings."' Br i ta in under took other schemes for 
revenue in 1900, Agriculture in 1906, Sanitory Commission and 
Health Department in 1908 and bureaucratic government was the 
order of the day. Burma was made a Lieutenant Governor is. pro-
vince in 1897 and was raised to a Governorship in 1923. Burmese 
national sentiment v/as worked up to fever pitch, boycotts were 
organized, and a vociferous demand for home rule went up. There 
was a desire for separation Burma from India. The desire f o r 
separation was natural, for the increasing Indian immigration 
and economic competition made the Burtaanfear that his country 
might one day become a vassal state of an Indian commonwealth 
'governed'^ by Indians. 
While describing the o r i g i n o f Nationalism, Vandenbosch and 
observe, 
Butwell^ 'The precise or ig ins of nationalism in any land are 
d i f f i c u l t to date and Burma i s no exception. Nationalism did not 
emerge as a p o l i t i c a l force in Burma unti l a f ter the F i rs t World 
War, but the seeds for i t s development were sown wel l before that 
time. Bri t ish abol i t ion of the loca l o f f i c e of Ghieftain a f ter 
4, Hall, op .Gi t . , p. 595, 
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the rebe l l ion that followed the third Anglo-Burmese war created 
a vecuum into v/hich some new allegiance inevitably had to niDVe. 
The introduction of commercial rice cult ivat ion, upsetting tra-
di t ional v i l l a g e economic se l f suf f i c iency , necessitated a nore 
broadly, focused po l i t i c a l or ientat ion. Increasing fore ign 
domination o f the country's economic l i f e , including the growing 
str§.nglehol4 over the land possessed by Indian immigrants, was 
also a major factor s t i r r ing the Burmese to protest. And Br i ta in 
with drawal of governmental support of the Buddhist r e l i g i on 
made the government more remote and fo re ign then i t had ever 
before seemed. Something had to take i t s place as a focus of 
5 
l oya l t y . " They further maintain "these events within Burma were 
matched by other outside the country such as Japan's victory over 
Russia in 1905, which provided v i v id evidence that the while man 
was not in v ins ib le . The protest ac t i v i t y of the congress Party 
of Gandhi and Nehru in India, of which Burma was a part unti l 
1937, was another important factor encouraging the emergence o f 
a v i t a l Burmese nationalism." This also shows the natural interest 
which Indian leadership had developed in the Burmese people, as 
Compatriots in India's freedom struggle. 
The Cultural nationalism was predominent. As Vandei%)sch 
and Butwell observe, "'Cultural nationalism preceded po l i t i c a l 
nationalism in Burma as else where in Southeast Asia. The Young 
Men's Buddhist Association modeled a f te r the Y.M.C.A. was an 
6, Vanden bosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. 243, 
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early ins t i tu t i ona l r e f l e c t i o n o f th is . The step that bridged * 
the gap between cultural and p o l i t i c a l nationalism was taken i n 
1921, when the General Council o f Burmese Associations sought 
to d i rect mounting nat ional ist sentiment into p o l i t i c a l channels 
and openly declared home rule as I t s goal. But Burmese nationa-
lism did r]ot achieve the assert ive and demanding character that 
was to carry the country to independence unti l the middle 
t h i r t i e s , when young f i r e brand agi tators l i k e Aung San, the 
Communist Than Tun, and NU Game together in the Dobama Asiayone, 
or "we Burmese Associat ion," to advocate immediate and complete 
p o l i t i c a l freedom and rac i a l economic measures." Foliov/ing the 
Government o f India Act of 1935,on 1 Apr i l 1937, Burma was separa-
ted from India and given a Governor and a l e g i s l a t i v e indepeddent 
o f the Indian Government. 
But p o l i t i c a l pressure, o f t en attempted before 1937, 
became f o r more e f f e c t i v e with the establishment of the new 
const i tut ion for Burma in that year, and inev i tably the high -
standard bhat had been bui l t up against great d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
the ea r l i e r period began to deter iorate . The students Union 
also became a happy hunting ground for the less responsible type 
o f p o l i t i c a l ag i ta tor , and d isc ip l ine was under mined. The 
forc ing o f a new const i tut ion upon the University i n 1939 was 
inspired by not a s ingle honest educational ob jec t . The inten-
t i on was to i:ise i t to produce p o l i t i c a l agi tators against the 
6, Ibid., p. 244, 
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British, infortunately, however, for too much attention has been 
directed to this aspect of the question,so that the rea l value 
o f the work done by the University during this period h&s tended 
to be obscured. The babble of i l l - in formed cr i t i c i sm is s t i l l 
7 
too loud for a true appraisal o f the fac ts , 
The Japanese invaded the country i n December 1941 and 
Rangoon f e l l in March 1942, By June, the Japanese had occupied 
most of the Burmese t e r r i to ry and the Br i t ish Government o f 
Burma withdrew to Simla in India, In Burma the Japanese spon^ 
sored a government under the premiership o f Dr.Ba Maw. In 1944, 
the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League was established under 
U Aung San's leadership, who built up a Burma National Army which 
played a s igni f icant ro l e in the expulsion of the Japanese, In 
the words o f Hall , "The Burmese had at f i r s t allowed themselved 
to hope that the nominal independence accorded them by the 
Japanese in 1943 might turn out to be the genuine a r t i c l e . They 
were soon dis i l lusioned. Hence the return of the Bri t ish was 
hai led with joy, ( i n September 1945, the Br i t ish returned to 
Burma). But while they welcomed l ibera t ion from the Japanese 
tyranr^j their experiences during the occupation period made 
th,em impatient of any form of fore ign rule . At the end o f the 
war Aung San, the commander of the Burma National Army, became 
the focus o f national ist aspirations, which found expression in 
the broad-based po l i t i c a l organizations known as the Anti-Fascist 
8 People's Freedom League, the A.F.P .F.L . " when the Bri t ish returned 
7. Hall, o p . c i t , , p, 704. 
8. Ib id , , p, -792, 
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i n September 2946, Ba Maw f l e d with the Japanese into Thailand, 
leaving Aung San and the A.F. P.F.L. the nost potent p o l i t i c a l 
force with which the Br i t i sh "mi l i t a ry government had to deal and 
the c i v i l government was restored i n October 1945 and the e f f e c - -
t i v e measures were taken to dis%rm the population, Br i ta in 
declared i n a statement issued on 17 May 1947 o f her po l i cy . 
This rea f f i rmed the intent ion to grant f u l l self-government 
within the Br i t i sh commonwealth. Aung San and his party began 
to demand complete independence a^^ dominion status did rot 
appeal to them because they had a deep distrust o f Br i t i sh 
motives and feared that once Br i t i sh business interests regained 
their pos i t ion i n the nation's economy, self-government would 
prove i l l uso ry . When the Governor formed his f i r s t ministry and 
o f f e r e d the leaders o f the A.F.P.F.L. places in i t they demanded 
a majority o f seats and the r ight for the i r representatives to 
accept guidance from the supreme council o f the party. This was 
not accepted and the party formed opposit ion. 
In 1946, A.F. P.F.L. came into power and the f i r s t act was 
to exclude communist from their ranks. The maintenance o f law 
and order, the achievement o f economic s t a b i l i t y , and the estab-
lishment o f public confidence were now Aung San's r espons ib i l i t y , 
and he found th§t the Sole aim o f the communist was revolut ion. 
This made i t possible for Br i ta in to view his demands with great 
sympathy, and v/hen in January 1947 he led a delegat ion to London 
9 
to confer with A t t l e e ' s Labour Cabinet agreement was eas i ly reached. 
Ibid.T p. 744. 
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But there occured a tragedy on 19 July 1947 when Aung San and 
six of his colleagues in the cabinet were murdered by hired 
assaslns in the pay of the ambitious U Saw, Thakin NU, v ice-
president of the A.F.P.F.L. succeeded Aung San. He was deeply 
re l ig ious man and assumed the d i f f i c u l t task of holding his 
party together and saving the country from confusion. I t was 
under his leadership, the Burmese constituent Assembly drafted 
and unanimously passed the new constitut ion on 24 September 1947. 
" I ts decision" v/as for complete independence and in mid October 
Thakin NU came to London to negotiate Burma's secession from 
the comioonwealth. The outcome was the signature on 17 October 
1947 of a treaty recognizing the Republic of the Union of Burma 
10 
aa' a fu l l y independent state on a date to be f i xed by Parliament." 
On 4 January 1948 Burma became independent and Br i ta in recognised 
the independence of Burma outside the Br i t ish Commonwealth. 
After independence Burma had to face numerous rebel l ions 
and a fo re ign invasion. Soon a f te r the independence, the commu-
nist revolted and dislocated the economy and the po l i t i c a l system* 
A Karen rebe l l i on broke out in January 1949. To save Burma from 
f inancia l d i f f i c u l t i e s , the Governments o f Britain^India,Pakistan 
and Ceylon advanced to her a loan of £ 6,000,000 in 1951. In 
1949, Rimlnfen^ (KMT) troops f l e e ing from China entered Burma 
and established themselves in the country, causing havoc in the 
10. Hall, o p . c i t . , p, 796, 
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northern and eastern parts o f the country. In l^rch 1953, Burma 
Complained to the United Nations. Burmese Government partially-
succeeded in gett ing liiemout, A» F. P» Jj** L« dominated over 
Burmese po l i t i c s for about a (3ecadfeW- under the EfU's leadership-
NU and his government experienced several c r i s i s from 1948 to 
1958 and never yielded in c r i s i s . There were economic and po l i -
t i c a l factors which led to the sp l i t the long-ruling Anti-
Fascist People's Freedom League in 1958. The A.F.P.F.L. soon 
became a coa l i t i on mainly o f member of the Soc ia l is t party, 
ra— party within'a party led by Kyaw Negein and Ba Swe and 
independents.- The soc ia l i s t Party was also divided into r i v a l 
factio'ns o f "'educated"'" and '*uneducated*^ soc ia l i s ts the d is t inc-
t ion between them over the implementai o f programmes. 
There were changes in government in 1956 and in 1958. 
The A.F.P.F.L. openly sp l i t in Apri l 1958 and the Communists 
began to take advantage and several incident were reported. This 
alarmed the Army which seized power in Sept ember-October 1958 
and established a care—taker government to restore Lawir^and 
order to the country under the leadership of General Ne Win, 
The f i r s t Ne Win government which took o f f i c e on October 28, 
1958 and restored the reigns of government to the c i v i l i a n in 
on Apri l 1, I960, was not a revolutionary regime. I t sought 
no major changes. Rathor i t devoted i t s attention to ordering 
the exist ing apparatus and programmes o f government. In the 
words of Vanden bosch and Butwell, "Ne Win himself was not 
a professional soldier but a minor nationalist po l i t i c a l f i gure 
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turned soldier as a result o f the unplamed circumstance o f 
1 1 " 
the'war time Japanese invasion.'^ They further maintain-;, ' Ne 
Win^moreover, was a const i tut ional ist who had accepted the 
Bri t ish notion of the subordination of the mi l i tary to the 
policy-making c i v i l i a n branch of government." General Ne Win's 
government brought back normalacy to the country and the law and 
order was restored, Rangoon became again a c i t y o f beauty : 
General Ne Win announced the date of e lect ions that would be 
held in February 1960 and at the same time U NU plotted a 
nation-.wide Gandhian-style c i v i l disobedience movement •NU's 
supporters were scattered throughout the country and i t was 
believed that the masses would have TaXL^ e^^ a to his support. The 
movements became calm when the date o f elections reached and 
NU and his party emerged victorious and denocratic government 
once again was restored but his lieutenants Ba Swe and Kyaw 
Neyein were both defeated at the po l ls . 
NU's second government in February 1960, inaugrated a 
new sixteen^year plan for Burma's national income and renamed 
the Union Party and the Union Party po l i t i c i an ' s began to 
quarrel and scheme among themselves. '3Lt appeared that Union 
Party was never United in anything but name. The Budhists also 
began to demonstrate that Budhism should be declared a^ State 
11. Vandenbosch and But wel l , o p . c i t , , p. 263, 
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r e l i g i o n and. NU was reluctant to do so. There appeared sus-
picions in the army about NU. The Karens and Kachins, the two 
Communities over re l ig ious dispute became rebel ls but the most 
dangerous challenge came' from the shans who were re lated 
rac ia l l y to the Thai and inhabitants of that part o f Burma 
adjacent to Thailand. The Burmese constitution declared the 
G. 
Shans the r ight of sjiiecession af ter ten years of independence 
and the people of this community were threatening to in voke 
this r ight . NU was thinking interms of o f f e r of concessions 
of greater autonomy to them. The army was not pleased to these 
developments which were taking place and declared that i t could 
not allow the dismemberment of the Union and seized power on 
March 2, 196 2. 
Second General Me Win's government was in no sense a 
care taker government and has avowed intention o f revolution-
iz ing the basic economic and social order. This time the coup 
was wel l conceived and executed, and mary o f his chief l i eu te -
nants have also been detained with the result that there i s 
pract ical ly no overt opposition to the Army regime in the country 
12 ( 
except of course the xaaiTy and diverse in surgent g r o u p s . A l l 
p o l i t i c a l part ies, at f i r s t , were allowed to function but la ter 
on baned except the government's Burma Soc ia l i s t Programe Party, 
Ne Win's Government began to solve immediate problems within the 
12. Ibid. T p. 259, 
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country and t r i ed to arrange peace terms with the communists, 
there came an under-standing with Karen and Shan communities 
were 
which/major miror i t ies in Burma. Ne Win attempted in 1966 to 
reorg^a-nizeBurma's Budhist clergy but the scheme f a i l e d because 
of the great opposition of the c lergy. Then there came economic 
programme in the name of whole sale nationalization and to allow 
the private sector to share the distr ibution o f consumer goods 
with state shops. According to Vandenbosch and Butwell, the 
government's rapid expansion of the public sector of/economy 
had i t s roots in two considerations!an intense desire to el imin-
ate fo re ign control of the ecorx)my and the aspiration to fos ter 
a soc ia l i s t order based theoret ica l ly on just ice. Thousands 
o f Indians have been forced out o f business and so out o f the 
Country. These Indians have been denied the r ight to take 
some their most persorial /^possessions with them even their 13 
chi ldren's toys,"' The schools which were country's private 
tt 
schools run by missionaries^Chinese and Indians. With nationa-
l i za t i on , however, no fore ign instructional personnel w i l l be 
retained. The rac ist as well ideo log ica l conformism of the 
soldier regime is now here more evident than in this dimention 14 
o f i t s education politics,>^ Ne V/in end eavoured to establish 
socialism in Burma, a more thorough going and rapidly e f f ec ted 
13, Vandenbosch and Butv;ell, o p . c i t . , p, 264, 
14, Ib id , , p, 266, 
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socialism than that of NU as a matter of fact . Ne Win did not 
avoid traditionalism and today he i s introducing new ways by 
tradit ional means. The face of Burma w i l l never again be the same 
Burma pursues a neutral fore ign policy in the realm of 
po l i t i cs , Vandenbosch and Butwell r ight ly observe, ''"^ Burma's 
Foreign Policy has been neutralist almost from independence, but 
i t has nevertheless under gone important changes in subsequent 
16 
years,"' With regard in International Relations, Burma was a 
strong supporter of the United Nations throughout the t\io NU 
governments and the Army care—taker regime. The Burmese also 
approved the UN intervention in Korea in 1950, supported prac-
t i ca l l y a l l disarmament moves attended and took an active part 
in the 1955 Ban dung Afro-Asian conference, cooperated with the 
Colombo Plan group of nations in furthering regional economic 
development, and,as the years passed^became increasingly ident i-
f i e d with the neutralist blod; of nations such as met at 16 
Belgrade, Yogoslavia, in 1961.®' Therefore, Burma's neutralism 
is as newtralist as i t ever was, from technical point of view. 
General Ne V/in i s not pro-Paking nor has he sought in amy known 
way to undercut American pol ic ies in Southeast Asia. Burma 
has certainly not taken side with either the communists or 
western camps in international a f f a i r s generally. The Ne Win 
15. Vandenl:tosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p,272, 
16. Ibid., 276, 
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regime agreed in 1965 to buy ^ 5,000,000 vrorth of t e x t i l e mi l ls 
from China under a 1961 loan pact, negotiated by UTJU, but one 
fourth of a l l fore ign loans contained in the 1965-1966 budget 
were from Japan. Ne Win v is i t ed the Soviet Union in 1966, but 
he also v is i t ed India and Pakistan and in 1966 he t rave l l ed 
to the tftiited States. The Burmese soldier-leader also continued 
to pursue pol ic ies supporting general and nuclear disarmament 
a "'Geneva-type"- settlement of the Vietnamese problem;, and 
reconc i l ia t ion of feuding Indonesia and Malaysia. Burma and 
United States signed an agreement for Ajnerican financing o f 
construction o f modern teak mi l l , but relat ions bet^ r^een 
17 
V/ashington and Rangoon remained coo'?." Though Ne Win d@es not 
j o i n any bloc but he has diminished western influence in his 
Country. I t isbecause of this China has types of influence, i t 
geographical nearness and the Chinese minority which can bring 
dangerous consequences to Burmese independence.Burmese neutra-
lism, i t seems, favours the communists, special ly than i t does 
to the west, 
India i s mainly concerned with the po l i t i c a l climate 
o f Burma as ar^ ideological or p o l i t i c a l changes in Burma would 
be greatly influenced by the Chinese minority. The growing 
influence o f China or subversive a c t i v i t i e s of ^he grou$)s 
supported by the Chinese communist would create a state of 
17. Ib id. , p. 277. 
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po l i t i c a l ins tab i l i t y . This ins tab i l i t y w i l l have i t s direct 
repurcussions on India 's external security and internal po l i t i c s . 
The North Eastern regions of India are po l i t i c a l l y unstable 
and any host i l e machinations of Chinese communists on our 
border w i l l encourage the separatist tendencies o f the h i l l 
o f 
tr ibes in this region. The Qontlguityythe Burmese boarder with 
that of Pakistan and China w i l l necessarily remain vulnerable 
and ary ins tab i l i t y in Burma would mean increased vulnerabi l i ty 
of this region in case of internal subversion or external 
invasion. With both China and Pakistan being unfriendly to 
India, they can cause trouble to India through ithis border. 
Besides many matters of common interest , the t e r r i t o r i a l inte-
gr i ty of t h i s , region depends upon po l i t i c a l developments in 
Burma or the slant of fore ign interests in the hyphen that 
connects India with the rest o f South East Asia. 
- 46 -
I n d o n e s i a j j ^  
Indonesia In the 4-9-st tv;o decade, came to te known as 
"Sukarro's Indonesia."' During theffe years, Sukarno dominated 
over Indonesian po l i t i cs and Indonesia moved from a so-cal led 
democracy of appointed l eg is la tors and other leaders to a f r e e l y 
and f a i r l y elected cabinet, then to an increasingly pro-communist 
1 
— dictatorship. Sukarno was unrivaled ruler of Indonesia for 
over two decades but i t was the third decade o f Sukarno's 
presidency saw a decline in his Influence; the Indonesian army, 
reaching to an abortive coup attempted by Sukarno's communist 
a l l i e s , appealed to be seeking to reduce him to a f igure head 
and f i na l l y forced him to step down. A new po l i t i c a l order 
was established. The new regime under took great tasks to 
to 
remove mismanagement and/develop the country in economic and 
Social f i e l d s . General Suharto i s the leader o f government 
now more than any one else. 
The Indonesian archipelago contains over 3,000 Islands 
spread over a vast and far- f lung a^ea ly ing between lat itudes 
6°N- l l °S. and longtltudes 96°-141°E. Indonesia is most import-
ant equatorial country in the world and the largest insular 
state. Its area i s atout 735,268 square miles and to ta l popu-
la t i on is now wel l over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . I n terms of population 
Indonesia i s the f i f t h largest country in the world today. In 
1. Vandenbosch and Butwell, Kie Changing Face o f Southeast Asia, 
p. 21, Lexington, 1966, (U .S .A . ) . 
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October 1961, when the f i r s t census in 3o years was taken, i t s 
population stood at 97,086,000. Since i t s people are increasing 
at the rate o f over two mi l l i on a year, i t s t o t a l population 
i s now we l l over 100,000,000* Irfhether or not th is rapid growth 
i s a source of strength, a people who const i tute a t h i r t i e t h 
of the human race must play an important ro l e in world p o l i t i c s . 
And when they occupy a t e r r i t o r y s t ra t eg i ca l l y located athwart 
important sea and air routes, the i r potent ia l r o l e in in ter -
- 2 
national p o l i t i c s i s great ly erihanced.''* The Indonesian t e r r i t o r y 
includes Jav®, Sumatra, South Borneo, the Celebes, Ba l i , Lambok, 
F lores, part o f Timor and the Molucca islands and the t e r r i t o r y 
of west New Guinea which Indonesia got a f ter a long struggle on 
May 1, 1963, Most o f the islands are amountainous, but the 
va l l eys and plains have f e r t i l e we l l - cu l t i va ted lands, Java i s 
the most densely populated areaij. about 70 per cent o f the 
population o f the country resides there. 
The people of Indonesia are mainly descendents o f the 
Malaya Polynesian race with a mingling o f several other r ac i a l 
stocks. The Hindu cultural contacts began round about the 4th 
century A.D. and the Budhist in the 8th, while the Islamic, the 
Chinese and the Arab traders reached the:se islands between the 
12-15th centuries on pursuit o f spices. Islam began to spread 
from the coastal areas in the f i f t e e n t h century and gradually 
12, Ibid., p. 47. 
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spread to the In te r io r o f Java and Sumatra. The beginning o f 
the 16th century saw the a r r i va l o f the Portuguese, The Dutch 
came a hundred years l a t e r and ended the fbrtuguese rule in 
Moluccas. The Dutch East India Company ruled over Indonesia 
f o r about a century. On 31 December 1799, the compare's rule 
was ended and the East Indies, former name of Indonesia, came 
under the control of the Dutch Government. 
The Indonesian had to f i g h t a long bat t l e f o r the i r 
freedom. Between 1806 and 1907, twenty f i v e in-surrect ions 
took place. The longest and most v io lent f i gh t was waged in 
i t j e h from 1872 to 1904. Boedi Oetomo, the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l 
organizat ion o f Indonesia was founded in 1908 and attracted a 
good number of in te l l e c tua l s and government o f f i c i a l s . In 1916 
the Sarika.t Islam became p o l i t i c a l party with self-government 
f o r Indonesia as i t s goal. Gradually i t became a radica l 
organisat ion and developed l e f t i s t leanings and s p l i t into t^ r^o 
part ies . In 1912, the East Indian Party was formed, which under 
the name, Insulindej turned into a revolutionary organizat ion. 
A Communist led revolut ion i n 1927 was suppressed. A f t e r th is 
revolut ion, the Partai Nasian a l Indonesia was organized by 
Dr. Sukarno. In 1939, a new federat ion of p o l i t i c a l part ies 
known as the Gobungan pQl i t ik Indonesia was formed. I t demanded 
the for-mation o f a bicameral parliament and the t ransfer 
o f l e g i s l a t i v e and executive powers to the Indonesians, 
- 49 -
National self-consciousness began to show themselves in 
Java early in the century. Such external influences as the 
Boxer Rising in China, the F i l ip ino revo l t against Spain, and 
the r i se of Japan undoubtedly played their part, f o r they had 
a marked e f f e c t on the minds of l i t t l e groups of l i t e r a t i in 
the various countries of South-East Asia, who were worried by 
the in f e r i o r status accorded to them under western domination. 
I t was s igni f icant that in 1899 Japan claimed, and received, 
equal r ights with Europeans in the Netherland Indies. But in 
each country the nationalist movement took on a special charac-
3 
ter of i t s own. A native movement began in 1900 when Raden 
Adjeng Kartini emerged or a champion of education for wmen 
and Dr. V/aidin Sudira Usada began to spread western education 
as the means of solvation and advancement of Java in 1906, 
Usada founded f i r s t nationalist and po l i t i c a l organization, 
known as Boedi Qetono. I t took inspirat ion from the Indian 
poet Habindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi. In 1911 Sarikat 
Islam was formed for sound economy, the in te l l ec tua l and material 
well-being o f Indonesia and the promotion of true r e l i g i o n o f 
Islam. In a short period, i t became a .popular movement and 
within a quarter of a century had a membership o f the two 
mi l l ions. I ts f i r s t nation wide congress v;as held in 1916,when 
representatives of 80 local soc iet ies with a membership o f 
360,000 attended and passed a resolut ion demanding s e l f -
3. Hall, D.G.E. i "P ie History o f South East Asia". N.Y. 1966, 
p. 707. 
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government on the basis o f Union with the Netherland. The 
Russian Revolution o f 1917 had immediate e f f e c t s upon the 
s i tuat ion in Java. The Indian Social Democratic club was 
formed by Hendrik Sneer l ie t , with revolutionary aims and some 
o f i t s members t r i ed to tucci Sarikat Islam to communism. But 
th is movement was unsuccessfid. and Semam formed a new party 
known as "Persert ikatan Komunist India (K. P. I , ) and joined 
th ird International o f Moscow. The Communist Movement was rot 
a mass movement and t r i ed to gain support from the leader o f 
Sarikat Islam. After the f a i l u r e to gain support from Sarikat 
Islam, the communists formed another party Sarikat»s o f the i r 
own for revolutionary of aims. In the words Hal l , '^In 1922, 
under the influence o f Young Indonesians graduates from Europe 
who were discontented with the ir status in the government 
services^Sarekat Islam establ ished re lat ions with the Indian 
4 
National Congress and adopted the pol icy of non-co-operation.** 
He further maintains, "The years 1923-26 saw a ser ies o f revo-
lut ionary, attempts. The post war depression, with i t s crop 
o f industr ia l disputes, presented the extremists w i th-exce l l ent 
opportunit ies for Dringing about maximum dis locat ion o f p o l i t i c a l 
and economic l i f e in the hope that i t would enable them to se i ze 
power. Moscow at the time regarded Java as a s t ra teg ic centre 
of the highest importance. Through agents in Singapore contact 
was made between the P .K. I , and the Chinese comjnunist party. 
For the time being the communists became the most v i t a l f o rce 
4. Ibid., p. 709, 
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i n the Indonesian movement, and lawlessness and int imidat ion 
were the order of the day. Against this Sarekat Islam became 
increasingly hos t i l e and turned more and more to r e l i g i o n as a 
means ot combating communismf"* The P .K. I , became dominant 
force in 1925 and Indonesia experienced several s tr ikes but the 
revolutionary movement col lapsed and the communist party was 
baned and a chapter was closed. 
Now Sarikat Islam was the main organ o f nationalism and 
the party began to pay more attent ion to education and economic 
conditions. Professor Hall observes, "This kind of work, how-
ever, did not sa t i s f y the aspirat ions o f the discontented 
students o f the Indonesia club i n Holland. Through their in f lu^ 
ence, and under the leadership o f Djipto Mangun Kusuma, the 
leader of the Bandung Study Group, and o f Sukaro, a popular 
young demagogue o f i n corrupt ible character, a nev; p o l i t i c a l 
party, Perserikatan National Indonesia, came into being in 1927. 
I t sought to r a l l y a l l the ex is t ing nat ional is t organiazations 
behind a big non-co-operation movement on the Gandhi model. But 
when SukarjjD began to show revolut ionary tendencies he and two 
o f h is helpers were j a i l e d in December 1929, and once m r e the 
extremist attempt to capture the nat ional is t movement f a i l e d 
as a p o l i t i c a l force i t came to an end fo r the time being." 
5. Hall , o p . c i t . , p. 710. 
12. Ibid., p. 316. 
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The Gabungan Po l i t i k Indonesia was formed in 1939 and before that 
Dr. SukarnD organized the Partai Nasional Indonesia, 
In the mean while, when the struggle was going on in 
December 1941 war broke out in the Pac i f i c . The Dutch, v/ho 
had been defeated in Europe ear l i e r , could not re ta in the East 
Indies and in March 1942, the East Indies (Indonesia) passed 
under Japanese rule . After the defeat of Japan, the Indonesian, 
under the leadership of Dr. Sukarro v/as made the f i r s t President 
and Dr. lybhammaed Hatta the Vice President. Between October 
1946 and March 1946, as the Dutch troops arrived in large 
numbers, they clashed with the Nationalists. Now Netherland was 
prepared to grant self-government under the comiEonwealth of 
Netherland. Indonesia was to be a partner in a BCingdoji) . o f the 
Netherlands so constructed that the national se l f -respect o f a l l 
i t s participating peoples would be assured. President Sukarno 
re jected the proposal. On 14 November, Sultan Sjahrir became 
the head of the republican government o f Indonesia who declared 
on 4 December 1946 that his government's basic demand was for 
Dutch recognit ion o f the Indonesian Republic. Meanwhile the 
Br i t ish and Dutch forces went ahea.d with the occupation of the 
islands, while the Republic on i t s side expanded i t s forces. 
There were clashes and ugly scene and heavy f i ght ing also took 
place and General Mallaby was k i l l e d by the national ist at 
Surabaya. On 10 February 1946, the Dutch government made a 
proposal to set up a common wealth o f Indonesia and the d i f f e r en t 
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regions of Indonesia would be linked together in a federal 
structure and Indonesia v/ould become a partner in, the Dutch 
kingdom and o f f e r ed to discuss i t XAfith authorised representatives 
of the Republic, Sultan Sjahrir represented the republic at 
Geneva but the agreement v/as not reached with the Dutch govern-
ment. 
In June 1946 a c r i s i s occured in the government of the 
republic. The communists, under Tan Malak, made an attempt to 
over throve the cabinet by kidnapping Sjahrir and several of 
his Colleagues. The mdve^jJiowever, was defeated by the prompt 
action of Sukarno as president of the republic. He proclaimed 
a state of emergency and for some weeks exercised d ic ta tor ia l 
7 
powers. On 14 October 1946, a truce was e f f e c t ed bet\Areen the 
Dutch and the Indonesians and on 15 November 1946, the Llngga-
d i j t i agreement was In i t ia ted which was f i n a l l y signed on 25 
March 1947, I t l a i d down that by 1 January 1949 the whole o f 
Indonesia would be granted self-government. I t recognised the 
defacto Republican administration over Java, Sumatra and J^dura, 
The Dutch government began to accuse the republic o f rot keeping 
i t s world and on 27 Kay 1947 served an ultimatum in the form o f 
demands and, when a sat is factory reply was not for th coming they 
proceeded to "restore order"' by "'police act ion, " against the 
Indonesians on 21 July 1947, On Sq July, the Governments o f 
7. Hal l . , o p , c i t , , p. 807. 
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Australia and India addressed l e t t e r s to the Security Council 
about the disturbing situation in Indonesia. On 1 August, the 
Security Council ca l led for a cease f i r e and peaceful se t t l e -
ment, A Committee o f Good Of f i ces was established with Belgium 
Australia and the United States as i t s members. On 17 January 
1948, the second Truce Agreement was signed for the establish-
ment of a demil itarized zone. There were violat ions o f truce 
and Good Of f ices committee reported that the rmfones-^I» complaints 
were true. And mm the Dutch asserted that the republic was 
in corrimunist hands and the Dutch government was not sa t i s f i ed 
with the republic o f Indonesia. In December 1948, negotiations 
broke do\-jn completely and the Dutch again restored to "pol ice 
ation.'^ On 24 December 1948, the Security Council cal led for 
an immediate cease f i r e and release o f po l i t i c a l prisoners. 
The Dutch "act ion caused serious ag i tat ion not only in the ranks 
o f the United Nations but also throughout Asia. The Asian 
conference, which met at New Delhi composed of f i f t e e n nation 
brought into action, the Security Council, The international 
diplomatic pressure from the Americans and the Bri t ish together 
with the demand of the f i f t e e n nations' New Delhi conference 
on Indonesia, forced the Dutch to negotiate with the Nationalist 
leaders. After talks at the Hague, last ing from August to 
October 1949, on 27 December 1949 the United States of Indonesia 
became independent state, as partner in the Dutch Indonesian 
Union. Mr. Sukarno became i t s President with HCoMohammad Hatla 
as i t s Vice President, 
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On the eve of Vforld War I I the Indonesian national ist 
movement was re la t i ve l y mild and immature and seemingly under 
control . The Social convulsian produced by the war and Japanese 
8 
occupation had wrought a profound change. Java and certa in 
areas of Sumatra were the centres o f Nationalist Revolution or 
movement and the constitution of 1949 gave a democratic set up ^ of 
federa l structure. There occured con f l i c t s between the federa-
l i s t s and i t s opposition peoples. I t appeared too cost ly and 
the chief motivating force for i t s destruction was Psychological 
because islands are so marsy and federal constitution was consi-
dered iinworkable and the Dutch xjq. could intersrene when they got 
a s l ight change. So federal constitution was abondoned and 
unitary system was adopted provisional ly on August 17, 1960 and 
coa l i t i on government was formed, Mohammad Natsir was i t s 
f i r s t premier, the leader of Masjumi party v/hich was largest in 
the parliajnent. But the l i f e o f the Natsir cabinet was short 
and i t resigned on Karch 20, 1951 because o f international p o l i -
t i c a l development over the question of west New Guinea. Then 
Sukiman,the leader of Masjumi, formed the coa l i t i on government 
and Nationalist parties came closer to Kasjumi. The Sukiman 
cabinet made various agreements with other states and over the 
question for Mutual Security Agency with United States which 
was regarded by the people the vague Commitment as a departure 
from country's neutral fore ign pol icy. The government had to 
8. Vandenbosch, Amry and Butwell, Richard : The Changing Face 
of Southeast Asia, Lexington 1966 (USA), p. 30. 
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resign on February 23, 1952 and the third coa l i t i on was formed 
on Apr i l , 1952 hedded by V(/ilopo, the nat ional ist leader. The 
major parties in coa l i t i on became deeply divided on many issues 
and moreover, certain army elements began to i n t e r f e r e in the 
decision to the c i v i l i a n leadership. The Wilopo cabinet f e l l 
on June 3, 1953. The next coa l i t i on government was formed'by 
A l i Sastroamidjojo, composed of Nat ional ist and Marxist part ies , 
a f t e r 58 days, p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . The A l i Cabinate remained in 
o f f i c e f o r two years and the cabinet f e l l in 1955 because of 
corruption in administration, economic i n s t ab i l i t y and internal 
insecur i ty . The re lat ions between A l i and President Sukarno 
was good and President Sukarno enjoyed a l l the advantages and 
did not have to accept the blame f o r any f a i l u r e s . Then 
Burhanuddin Harahap, formed another coa l i t i on , the chairman of 
the Masjumi Party and the main opposition were the National ists 
and communists, 
Indonesia in 1955, passed through two general e lect ions, 
one in September f o r Parliament and the other in December fo r 
constituent Assembly. Vandenbosch and Butwell are r ight in 
saying that, "The two national e lect ions seemed to indicate, a 
strong trend toward extreme nationalism, radical economic 
9 
po l i c i e s , and mi l i tant , orthodox Islamism." A l i Sastroamidjojo 
formed another coa l i t i on composed of the Nat iona l i s t , the 
Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama or Muslim teachers, on March 16,1956. 
12. Ib id. , p. 316. 
- 57 -
Soon, Indonesia came under the grip of Martial Law because of 
the corruption in administration and the army o f f i c e r s took 
advantage of this development and Indonesia experienced a series 
of mil i tary revolts in Sumatra. In this the chapter o f democracy 
was ended. President Sukarno publicly declared that ""the forma-
t i on of parties in 1945 as a great mistake'^ and began to c r i t i c i s e 
the concepts o f western democracy and emerged as a champion o f 
a new po l i t i c a l system, known as "guided Democracy/'" President 
Sukarno "'proposed the creation o f a cabinet which would compro-
mise a l l the major parties, including the communists, which had 
seats in parliament as a result of the 1955 e lect ions. This 
cabinet would represent parliament, and a second body, a national 
council. Composed of a cross-section of the people, would 
represent Indonesian society. The la t t e r body jpresided over by 
the president himself would "advise" the cabinet. I f his '^plan" 
were adopted, Sukarno said, there would be an end to the opposi-
t ion which had paralyzed Indonesian governments; instead, there 
would be only brotherly discussion. The communists greeted the 
proposal with joy and immediately began a campa.ign to whip up' 
in 
enthusiasm for it."^ 
S u k a r n o p l a n for " p o l i t i c a l centralism'^ w^ as opposed 
and soon i t led a mi l i tery regime in East Indonesia and an u l t i -
ina±,um was served v/hich demanded "the dismissal o f A l i Sastramid-
jojo" ' and warned the President Sukarno that rebe l ls \';ould not 
10. Quoted Vanden bosch and Butwell, p. 4l , 
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to lerate coramunists in government. There occured a r i f t between 
President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta over the po l i t i es o f 
government. Professor Hall r i gh t l y observes, '"until the coming 
o f independence in 1949 there was close-t-cooperation between 
the cabinet and the working committee, as also between President 
Sukarno and the Vice President, lybhammad Hatta. Af ter indeperu 
denee,however, di f ferences began to-, appear. Cabinets were 
unstable there were seven between 1949 and 1958, and the g^^asii^ Eid 
President, taking advantage o f the vagueness of the constitution 
regarding his position, tended to assume a ro le beyond the 
intentions of the constitution-makers and in public speeches to 
appeal to the people above the heads of both cabinet and l e g i s -
lature. ^breG^ver, re lat ions between hini and Hatta, whose work 
and po l i t i c a l wisdom v/ere in valuable, gradually deteriorated 
unti l breaking point in December 19S6, and the Vice President 
11 
resigned.'^ 
There was discontentments in the outer island and dis-
sidence increased and A l i Sastroamidjojo cabinet resigned in 
March 1967. President Sukarno declared state of emergency and 
assumed d ic tator ia l authority. In Apri l , President Sukarno 
appointed cabinet headed by Djuanda and this cabinet contained 
a number of extreme l e f t i s t s , was more presidential than parl ia-
mentary and various steps v/ere taken to advocate "guided 
11. Hatl, op . c i t . , p. 844, 
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democracy'^' president Sukarm assumed the power to establish 
the'''nation council?^ for the part of his plan. The moderates 
t r i ed to "'campromise between Djakarta and the dissident a;reas 
in the outer island and to bring about a reconci l ia t ion between 
Sukarno and Hatta throughout 1957. Professor Hall observes, 
"This sort of thing did rot make for e f f i c i ency and the welfare 
o f the country suffered. Professor Kahin, a highly sympathetic 
student of Indonesian a f f a i r s , stresses Suiarrio's view of him-
se l f as a revolutionary nationalist leader rather than a cons-
t i tu t iona l President, and makes penetrating comments upon his 
weakness as a head of state. He f a i l ed to understand regional 
sentiments, was unwilling to head the advice of qua l i f i ed 
leaders once his fr iends, and had l i t t l e sense of economic 
12 
r e a l i t i e s , writes Kahin. His attitude towards communism was 
also unsound, he says, for he was wi l l ing to use the support o f 
the Indonesian Communist Party in order to combat the major 
Islamic Party, the Masjumi, and he developed a tremendous admi^". 
tat ion for communist China. Incidental ly, i t was his hos t i l i t y 
tov/ards the Masjumi that brought the f i na l r i f t with Hatta. 
Kahin also comments that in making the West I r ian question one 
o f personal prestige Sukarno neglected for more pressing matters, 
and tended to judge people and states by their attitudes towards 13 
Indonesia's case.'" 
12. Kahin : Major Government of Asia, pp. 539-40. 
13. Hall , o p . c i t . , p. 844. 
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In the mean-while, the tension arose against President 
Sukarrx) and opposition came in power and revolutionary council 
was set up. The council served an ultimatum to President 
Sukarno and Prime Minister Djuanda on February 10, 1958 which 
demand. . that Hatta and Sultan Hamengku Buwono of Djokjakarta 
be included in the cabiret and the constitutional posit ion of 
the President of the country. The ultimatum was turned down 
and the rebe l l ion took place which v;as put down e f f e c t i v e l y by 
the government. President Sukarm began drast ica l ly to reorga-
nise the government along v/ith the l ines of his concept o f 
"guided demcracy in July 1959. The President gathered together 
immense powers around him and abolished a l l prevai l ing inst i tu-
tuions l ike abol i t ion of Prime Ministership, parliament and more 
over the Masjumi and Social ist . Parties were banned. A National 
e lect ion 
^was launched and Sukarno was e lected President for l i f e i n 1963. 
Now communist influence was v i s ib l e and increased in the govern-
ment and in August 1964 a communist was included in the govern-
ment and the communists wanted to dominate over the whole 
Country, 
Lieutenant Colonel Un.tungj Commander o f President 
Sukarno's guards led the caup that was attempted the might o f 
September 30-October 1, 1965 and untung's collaborators within 
and outside the armed forces were pro-communist. But the 
take over f a i l ed and the army under the command of e f f i c i e n t 
soldiers saved the country from communist's domination and Suharto 
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became chief spokeman of the government and emerged the single 
most important f igure , Sukarno's posit ion was diminished. In 
February, Sukarno dismissed General Abdu]. H^ris Nasution and 
massive student demonstrations which forced Sukarno to turn over 
even greater power to the country's mil i tary leaders in March 
1966 and in 1967 Sukarro gave way to General Siiharto who emerged 
as national leader in 1965 and saved the country from communist 
domination and became President o f the country in 1967 a f ter 
Sukarno who dominated Indonesian po l i t i c s from 1946 to 1967. 
Indonesia's relat ions with Netherlands constituted the 
chief fore ign policy problem. Indonesia made an insistent drive ^ 
to obtain control over West New Guinea. For over a decade, 
Indonesia has been trying to transfer West New Guinea. In 1962, 
Indonesia succeeded in getting her aim and on May 1, 1963, West_ 
/ 
New Guinea was turned over to Indonesia f i n a l l y . Af ter the 
settlement relat ions with Netherlands improved. Subandrio, 
f o re ign minister o f Indonesia, v i s i t ed Netherlands in Apri l 1964 
and in Julyj Foreign Minister Luns made a week's v i s i t to 
Indonesia and Netherlands agreed to guarantee export credits for 
the years 1965 to the amount o f one hundred mi l l ion guilders. 
With regard Malaysia Indonesia's policy was one o f 
"'Confrontation"' which was launched in 1963. Malaysia was anti 
communist country and the expansion of this country to include 
Singapore and Br i t ish rorthern Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s o f Sarawak 
and Sabah alarmed the communists in Indonesia and moreover 
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Malaysia was econoraically stable in camparison with Indonesia. 
Indonesians were suspicious about Malaysia which, was under 
western influence. I t was means of retaining Br i t i sh influence 
in Southeast Asia. Indonesia had a tradi t ional claim over 
Sarawak and Sabah in northern Borneo. In 1966, the new govern-
ment in Indonesia took steps towards reconc i l ia t ion with 
Malaysia. 
Indonesia joined the United Nations on 28 September 1950 
and participated in the San Francisco conference for the Japanese 
Peace Treaty. In January 1954, Indonesia accepted the inv i ta t ion 
of the Ceylon Government to part icipate in a South I s ian Premiers' 
conference at Colombo. Prime Minister A l i Sastroamidjojo not 
only attended the conference but also in i t i a t ed the proposal 
o f a large Afro-Asian Conference to be held sometime l a t e r . 
In September 1954, Premier Sastroamidjojo v i s i t ed India. He 
and Prime Minister Nehru issued a jo int communique expressing 
their comjiDn anxiety to further the cause of peace in the world 
and more especial ly in South East Asia. They agreed that a 
conference of the representatives of Asian and Afr ican countries 
was desirable. Af ter Delhi, Sastroamidjojo \risited JRangoa, and 
a similar statement by him and Premier UNU was issued on 28 
September, 1954. In December the Colombo Powers met at Bogor, 
in Indonesia, to discuss the preliminaries o f the Afro-Asian 
Conference. I t was agreed to hold this conference under their 
sponsorship in Indonesia in the las t week of Apr i l 1955 with 
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the purpose of promoting goodwill and cooperation among the 
countries, invited. In the beginning, Indonesia pursued a 
neutral policy but af ter 1959, i t became more pro-communist 
than pro-western. In 1965, on March 1, Indonesia with drev; 
from the United Nations when Indonesia observed that the United 
o 
Nations was sympathetic towards Malaysia and the Western 
powers were act ive ly supporting Malaysia in and outside the 
United Nations, After the withdrawal Indonesia came out M t h 
the idea that Indonesia would seek to organize a counter-world 
organization composed of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) as 
Sukarno cal led the ant i -co lonia l , underdeveloped countries of 
the world. Sukarno, in his Independence Day speech on August 
17, 1965, proclaimed that his country was joining China, North 
Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea which vrould be an "ant i -
imperial ist axis" , and put pressure on the Western powers "to 
get out of the whole of Southe^ast Asia a l together , " But he 
was unsuccessful to his plan because the Indonesians fear that 
the Country would be a -satellit-e, state in that organization 
against China and China would dominate over the whole region 
of South East Asia. But the communist coup of 1965 deteriora-
ted the relations cf Inddnesia with China. And relat ions with 
United States in 1966 when United States agreed to s e l l r ice to 
Indonesia, Again Indonesia adopted neutral attitude in inter-
national po l i t i cs as in the past a f ter 1950, " I t has i n ^ s t e d 
14 
upon maintaining an "independent f o re ign policy.'^ IMder 
14. Holland, William L, edited "Asian Nationalism and the West," 
Kahin, George Mc T, "Indonesian Po l i t i cs and Nationalism," 
p,171. New York 1953, MacMillon, 
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General Suharto, Indonesia began her second journey in inter -
national po l i t i cs a f ter the downfall o f Sukarno and neutralism 
i s fundamental of Suharto's policy in International Sphere. 
For a l l their d ivers i ty , the varied national ist move-
ments of the East have in common certa in qualities_ and problems. 
They a l l assert their ab i l i t y and r ight to prevent or shake o f f 
a l i en po l i t i ca l , economic, and cultural domination; establish 
for their people a posit ion of equality ( l ega l i f not economic 
and mi l i t a ry ) in the world; and to construct forms and conditions 
r 
of national l i f e that w i l l meet the people's needs and withstand 
fore ign attack. They claim, in other words, that they can solve 
M the^ crusial problems of l iberat ion , survival and growth, 
raised in modern times by a f o r e i gn mil i tary conquest or ideo-
l og i ca l and economic penetration. I t is a famil iar f ac t , that 
as Asian nationalist movements have attained p o l i t i c a l power, 15 
socia l and ecommic problems came to the fore« ' 
In view of India's centuries old cultural and re l i g ious 
contacts with Indonesia dating back to the hoary past, and the 
p o l i t i c a l support that Indian leadership always gave to the i r 
struggle against the Dutch explo i ters , India's present re lat ions 
15. Holland, William L. "Asian Nationa;'. and the West." 
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are also Intimate, With the exception of a br ie f interlude 
* 
during and a f ter the Indo-Pakistan con f l i c t when under 
tvKttfi, 
President Sukarm/Indonesia seemed inclined towards Pakistan 
and subsequent phase o f recovery^jpolit ical s t ab i l i t y under 
General Suharto, India's relat ions-with Indonesia have always 
been cordia l . The recent v i s i t of the Prime Minister Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi to Indonesia and the exchange of views on matters 
o f Common interest have demonstrated the urge to have closer 
regional arrangements with Indonesia in multifareous f i e l d s . 
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M a l a y s i a 0 
i) 
Malaysia came into existence on September 16, 1963, 
I t Came about by the incorporation into the Federation o f 
Malaya, North Bori^o, Sarawak and Sabah and the is land o f 
Singapore. On August 7, 1966 Singapore was separated from 
Malaysia. Actually Federation o f Malaya was granted indepen-
dence in 1957 but the Malaysia was the extension o f that 
Federation. 
]M&laysia''s area i s ' o v e r So,©90 sequare miles, Malaya 
const i tutes, a part from the is land of Singapore, a Peninsula 
that stretches almost to the equator. The only land boundary!-
i s with Thailand to the North but some o f the islands o f 
Indonesia across the Singapore s t r a i t are very c lose , Sumatra 
on the opposit shore of the s t r a i t o f Malacca, extending north-
ward almost to the same extent as Malaya, i s not f o r distant 
from the l a t t e r . East of Malaya i n the South China sea are 
is land groups belonging to Indoaesia, in part icular Kepulauan, 
Anambas, Kepulauan Bunguran Utara and Ke.pip.auan Bunguran Selatan, 
Further east i s Borneo divided aioong Indonesia, Sarawak, Burnie, 
and North Borneo. In f a c t , the northward extension o f North 
Borneo i s comparable to that o f Malaya. From Kata Bharu in the 
Federation across the Gulf o f Siam i s the Republic o f Vietnam. 
Thus Malaya i n the family o f nations has an immediate neigh-
bours, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam^!" 
1. F i f i e l d , Russell H. '^ The Diplomacy o f Southeast Asia**, 
1945 1958, p. 397. 
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Malaysia or Malaya escaped European penetration until 
l a t e of nineteenth century and was not known long western 
administration. In 1786, the B r i t i sh East India Company 
obtained the island of Penang but l a t e r on Br i t a in obtained 
province of Wel leslay, Malacca another portion o f land which 
occupied a s t rateg ic geographic pos i t i on had been under the 
Control o f Portuguese, and the Dutch wrested i t from them ,in 
1641. B r i t a in got Singapore from the Dutch i n 1819 and Malacca 
was acquired i n 1824. Professor F i f i e l d r i gh t l y observes, 
""Although 80 per cent o f Malaya is jungle, the area is one o f 
2 
the greatest sources o f t i n and rubber i n the world.** He 
further maintains, '*Malaya has had to import large supplies o f 
r i c e to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population,®'But 
Vandenbosch and Butwell observe, "^the opening of the Sxaez 
Canal in 1869, the introduction o f the rubber t ree from South 
America i n 1877, the rapid development o f t i n mining and the 
in f lux of western cap i ta l and Chinese and Indian labor great ly 
stimulated the commerce of Malaya. The internal s i tua t ion i n 
among the petty states was not conducive to economic develop-
ment. Br i ta in obtained t r ea t i e s with the SiiLtans, i n accor-
dance with which the l a t t e r agreed to ask the advice o f a 
Br i t i sh resident on a l l matter other than those touching upon 
3 
the Islamic r e l i g i o n or Malay; custom,*^ The population o f 
2, I b id . , p. 398. 
3. Vandenbosch. Aiiry and Butwell, Richard : The Changing 
Face o f Southeast Asia, Lexington, 1966, (USA), p.76. 
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Malaya in 1952 was over 6.5 mi l l i on of which nearly 45 per cent 
Chinese, 43 per cent Malayas, about 6.5 per cent Malaysians 
( ch ie f l y Indonesians) .and about 10,6 per cent v/ere Indians and 
Pakistanis; Europeans and Eurasians accounted for 0,3 per cent 
each. 
I t i s hardly possible to make any general izat ion about 
nationalism in Asia that w i l l not be f a l s i f i e d in Malaya. 
Whether we consider the r e l a t i on o f nationalism to colonial 
rule, or i t s r e l a t i on to r e l i g i on , or i t s r e l a t i on to economics 
4 
we shall f ind that the simple truisms w i l l not work. V i rg in ia 
Thompson and Richard Ado I f f observe, " P o l i t i c a l struggle in 
prewar Malaya were almost ent i re ly confined to the ruling 
groups?"* Professor Hall observes, '•"Before the war (world war i l ) 
the Malays had been the least p o l i t i c a l l y minded o f a l l the 
people of South East Asia. The Br i t ish bureaucracy had been 
just and enlightened, and m^st o f i t s member had tended to 
develope strong pro-Malay sympathies. During the occupation 
period, however, Malay national sentiment had become a r e a l i t y ; 
i t was strongly anti-Chinese, and i t s ra l l y ing cry ^Malaya fo r 
the Malays,'" transcended the particularism of the individual 
states. I t showed i t s e l f in a most unpleasant form at the 
4. Silcock, T.H., and Aziz, Ungku Abdul, ^^Nationalism in Malava" 
p. 269. N.Y. 1963 Edited by Holland, William L, "Asian 
Nationalism And the West.*" 
6. Thompson, V irg in ia and Ado l f f , Richard, ^Malaya"-' N.Y. 1951 
Rosinger, Larencek and Associates ""The State o f Asia.*^ . 
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moment of Malaya's release from Japanese thraldom, when in many 
places Malay'.r began to k i l l ai^ y Chinese on whom they could lay 
hands. The Br i t ish mil i tary administration, which at f i r s t 
took over the management of the country, had to adopt stern 
measures to repress there outbre^ks--of fanaticism.'* But in the 
words of Professor Silcock and Aziz ^The growth of Malays, natio-
nalism in MalayaithadJi)ar<sJ-y begun when the second world war broke 
out. But" l i k e Chinese nationalism, i t s main interests were i3ot 
i n Malaya. I t was spun from two strands, the cultural reaction 
of Islam against the West and the nat ional ist movement of 
Indonesia. There were the conscious in te l l ec tua l forces. But 
anDther strand which has since come to l i gh t may have been there 
a l l along a desire against a l l reason and probabi l i ty , to 
defend against excessive outside intrusion the sky, ar is tocrat ic 
l e i sure ly culture of pre-Islamic custom which ehaEactexisas the 
Malay.'v race in the uncrowded lands o f Malaya and parts o f 
7 
Sumatra and Borneo."' 
A f ter the world war I I , there was s t i l l l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l 
consciousness though the war had brought some changes in a t t i -
tude of the people, Bie people were sharply divided among 
various groups.*'' Whose di f ferences were not only ethnic but 
6. Hall , D.E.G. '*'The History o f South East Asia, p.785, 
N.Y. 1966. 
7# Silcock and Aziz , o p . c i t . , p, 284» 
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ecoromic and rel ig ious, '* In the -words of Vandenbosch and 
Butwell, " Ihe native Malays, who constituted about hal f o f the 
population, f e l t , that the country belonged to them and resented 
the presence o f the Chinese and Indians, whom they regarded a 
temporary residents with permanent interests in the i r home 
lands. Moreover, the Malays were peasants and fishermen, few 
among them had acquired middle class status. By contrast, a 
Considerable number of Chinese and Indians, especial ly the 
former , had amassed considerable wealth or had attained high 
8 
professional status,** The decentral izat ion pol icy, and the 
building up of the influence of the Malay.-, aristocracy in the 
states encouraged the Malay- nationalist in te l l egent ia to 
regard i t s e l f as an instrument fo r preserving an inherited 
culture not strong enough to stand unaided. Influenced by Arab 
pan-Islamism, by Indonesian attempts to absorb them in Indo-
nesia and by Japanese pan-Asianism, they nevertheless saw the ir 
own po l i t i c a l awakening not as any brave now world, but as a 
tardy recoguition o f danger threatening to convert the i r race 
into an ""aboriginal stock® and their culture into a museum 
piece? 
8. Vanden3*feosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. 77, 
9. Silcock and Aziz , o p . c i t , , p, 286, 
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In 1941, there occurred a change in Malaya. According 
to Professor Si lcock and Az iz , '^The invasion o f Malaya by the 
Japanese i n December 1941 produced mai^ y d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s on 
nationalism in the peninsiala. Among the Malays, the important 
e f f e c t s were shock and upheaval, and also the learning o f the 
habits o f v iolence and o f staged mass demohstrations. Among 
the Chinese the occupation meant guarr i l ia a c t i v i t y , a sense 
o f in security and a reversian to habits based on personal 
accommodation to an atmosphere o f v io lence; the Psychological 
e f f e c t on their attitude to the Br i t i sh was also very important. 
Among the Indians,organisation o f the Indian Independence League 
and the Indian National Army was probably the dominant f a c t o r . 
But an a l l the peoples of Malays, brought uj) i n atmosphere i n 
which government had been run by an a l i en people, on the whole 
accepted as f r i end l y , and in which po l i t i c s was d e f i n i t e l y not 
respectable, the sudden change o f master's and the impact o f 
v io lent Japanese nationalism and pan-Asianism was a most inten-
s ive school f o r nat ional ist f ee l ings and thoughts about po l i t i c a l 
11 
questions.® 
Ihough there were mary associations and organisations in 
Malaya but there was not a single large scale national organisa-
tiono By March 1945, mar^ y Malay organisations had been formed 
l lo Ibid., po 289o 
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throughout Malaya, the United Malay's National organisation 
under the leadership of Dat© ONN became a s ingle large national 
organisation. The Malayan Democratic Union was formed on 
December 21, 1945 with democratic ideas but i t was not very 
popular among the Malays because they considered that i t had 
a backing of communists, Malayan Democratic Union had communist! 
iympathfes and para l l e l to th is , Malay National ist Party was 
formed and th i s was l e f t wing Malay party and some Malay women's 
J 
organisations were also formed with the spread o f education o f 
i n 
. g i r l s and the Malay Ladies Association/Johore was formed by 
Dato ONNs'*slster Inche Azizah binte Ja 'a far , i n 1940. In 1946, 
The All-Malaya Council o f Joint Action was formed. I t emb-
raced a number o f organisations l i k e as the Pan-Malayan Federa-
/ 
t i on o f Trade Union, the New Democratic You^ League, and 
several women's organisations, and also the Chinese chamber of 
commerce, the Malayan/ Indian congress, the Malay National ist 
Party and the Malaya Democratic Union, under the leadership 
of Chinese politician. Those who were sympathetic towards M. N. P. 
began to s h i f t to U.H.N.O. Ai^ther Party, Pus at Tenaga Ra'at , 
popularly known as PUTERA came into being in 22 February 1946 
but UMNO had a support o f Malys and UMNO had a big say in 
12 Malaya's P o l i t i c s . 
12. Ibid., p. 316. 
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Jn the words of Professor Hall , "During the war, i t 
seemed obvious to the planners^of reconstruction that the 
great need was to promote a sense of security and common c i t i -
zonship as a preparation for self-government within the Br i t ish 
Common wealth. The intention was excel lent, but the way i t was 
carr ied out caused an explosion of Malay national f ee l ing as 
sudden and unexpected as the one with which a quarter of a cen-
tury ear l ier Burma had greeted the announcement that she was 
to be excluded from the scope o f the Indian constitutional 
reforms of 1921,*^ After the war, Br i ta in experienced d i f f i c u l -
t i e s in adiiinistration o f the country, Now, Br i ta in proposed 
Malayan Union. ""In the new Union a l l nine Malay states, together 
with Penang and Malacca, were to be combined to form one pro-
tectorate , Singapore was to remain a separate crown fcolony. 
The Siiltan in each state would re ta in hiS :throne and l i t t l e e lse . 
He was to precide over a Malay advisory council which would deal 
mainly with matters a f f ec t ing the M)hammedan Rel ig ion. Apart 
from that a l l power was to be concentrated in the central govern-
ment at Kuala Lumpur, the state councils would deal only with 
such matters as were deligated to them and would be presided 
over i n each case by Br i t ish Resident Councillor. MacMichael 
who went to Malaya armed with special powers to invest igat ion 
each Sultan's conduct during theL Japanese occupation and decide 
13, Hall , o p . c i t . , p, 789. 
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on his su i tab i l i t y to occupy M s throne was consequently able 
to negotiate t reat ies with a l l nine rulers, whereby they 
transferred their complete r ights of l ega l sovereignty to 
14 
Britain.*^ I t aroused national f ee l ing in Malaya^ "these 
proposals caused the storm to burst. Under the Prime Minister 
o f Johore, Dato ONN bin Ja 'a far , the United Malay National 
organisation, U.M.N.O.j srang into being with branches every 
where.'" Malaya experienced for a weak a mass non-co$5peration 
movement. Yandenbosch and Butwell observe, ""though the Malayan 
Union constitution was in augrated in Apri l 1945 and nominally 
• 
remained in force for two years^some of i t s more important 
provisions were never given e f f e c t , and negotiations with the 
sultans and the U.M.N.O. fore rev is ion o f the constitution were 
began almost immediately. Out of these negotiations emerged, 
new federat ion constitution which went in to e f f e c t on February 
15 
1,1948.'* The Br i t ish government, then committed the mistake 
16 
o f going too far in the opposite direct ion. The federal cons-
t i t u t i on gave to Malay community a victory over the non-Malay 
communities. It. aroused tension between the Malay and the non-
Malay Communities. According to Professor Hall , "^ The Chinese gave 
campaign against the proposals for Federation in 1947/them a 
14. Ib id. , p. 789. 
16. Vanden bosch and Butwell, o p . c i t , , p. 82, 
16. Hall, o p . c i t . , p. 790, 
- 76 -
good opportunity fo r increasing trouble. Then in June 1948 
wide spread out breaks o f .vlolenc^ccured. European planters 
and ' t in miners and Chinese members of the Kuomintang Party were 
murdered. This form o f terrorism was intended to pave the way 
f o r r evo l t . The i n i t i a l plan was to get a re ign under ter ro-
r i s t control and declare i t an i n i t i a l plan was to get a reg ion 
under t e r ro r i s t and declare i t an independent communist areaj 
then gradually to extend th is over the whole country. Captured 
documents indicated that the declarat ion of a communist Republic 
17 
o f Malaya was timed f o r 3 August 1948.** The government gra-
dually brought the s i tuat ion under control by the middle of 
1949. Later on, some steps were taken f o r the future o f Malaya. 
The f edera l c i t i zenship law was modified to enable more Chinese 
to qua l i f y and the system o f government appointments was 
changed to provide f o r the intake o f one non-Malay f o r every 
four Malays. But the biggest step forward was taken by the 
two major p o l i t i c a l parties themselves. In 1962, the United 
Malays National organization (UMNO) and the Malayan, Chinese 
Associat ion (M.C.A. ) formed an 'a l l i ance* to contest the 
Kuala Lumpur municipal e lec t ions . Success encouraged i t to 
aim higher. In 1964, under the leadership o f Tungku Abdul 
Rahman,son of the Sultan o f Kedah, a graduate o f Cambridge 
University who had served as a d i s t r i c t o f f i c e r in the Malayan 
17, Ibid,, p, 791, 
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c i v i l service, the All iance came forward v/ith a demand for an 
e lected majority in the l e g i s l a t i v e council. In London i t s 
deputation was rebuffed by the Secretary o f State fo r the 
Colonies, Oliver Lyttletoru, Their determined stand on their 
return to Malaya caused the Br i t ish government to change i t s 
mind. An elected majority and a general e lect ions were con-
ceded in 1955, and the high commissioner announced that the 
'emergency' was no longer an obstacle to Malaya's advance 
towards self-government. In the general e l ec t i on the il l l iance 
won 51 out o f the 52 elected seats in the l eg is la ture and 
Tungku Abdul Rahman becajne chief-minister. His demand for 
independence by 31, August 1947 was sympathetically received 
in London, where the policy o f the government had now become 
that o f making the t ransi t ion to independence as smooth as 
18 
possible. In January 1956, a Federation o f Malaya constitutional 
conference met and i t was attended by the representatives o f 
the Malay rulers, the All iance and the United Kingdom. There 
an agreement had been reached on February 6, 1956. The new 
constitut ion was .drafted in the early months of 1957 by a 
Commission composed o f Lord Reid, two Br i t ish Parliament members, 
an Australian, an Indian and a Pakistani. The Federation of 
Malaya became independent on August 3i , 1957. '^ The new federal 
state had an e lec t i ve monarchy, a conference o f rulers, a cabinet 
18, Hall, o p . c i t , , p. 839o 
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responsible to a bicamaral l eg is la ture and a judiciary indepen-
19 
dent of the executive as in Br i ta in, Malaya concluded 
agreement with Br i ta in just a f ter her independence and became a 
member of the commonwealth. I t was admitted to membership in 
the united Nations, shortly a f ter receiving i t s independence. 
T'engku Abdul Rahman became country's f i r s t prime Minister, In 
the words of Professor Hall, "Malayan independence was rea l . 
I t was shown in her re fusal to become a member of SEATO and in 
the i n i t i a t i v e TungKu Abdul Rahman has,- taken in seeking to 
organize better regional co-operation in South East Asia, 
although his proposals, f i r s t i n 1969, for a South East Asian 
economic and Friendship Treaty and next, in I960, for an associa-
t i on of South East Asian states, have not received the support, 
they deserved. On the other hand, his '^Malaysia"' plan for 
expanding the Federation to include Singapore and the Bornean 
t e r r i t o r i e s of North Borneo, Burneil and Sarawak received Br.itl^sli— 
o f f i c i a l support in November 1961. I t aimed at solving the 
Singapore problem and at the same time maintaining the po l i t i c a l 
20 ascendancy of the Malays. 
Singapore, North Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s , Sarawak, Sabah 
(North Borneo^ Brunei were a l l Br i t i sh colonies or protecotrates. 
A l l these protectorates except Brunei wanted to j o in Malayan 
19. Ib id. , p. 840. 
20. Ib id, , p. 841, 
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Federation but Tungku Abdul Rahman was reluctant to Include 
Singapore in the Federation,for Singapore was a centre with i t s 
large Chinese population and i t s strongly l e f t i s t , i f ret 
communist, tendencies. But there occured a change o f attitude 
in 1961 when, Tungku suggested a plan for economic cooperation 
of South East Asian countries. Public opinion was in favour o f 
expanding Federation in the rej^ions. After two years o f consul-
ta t ion , ' negotiation and compromise the stage was set for the 
21 
Federation o f Malaysia to come into existence. Therefore the 
Federation o f Malaysia came into being on September 6, 1963. With 
the establishment of Malaysia, there arose a bi t ter f ee l ing in 
Indonesia. "'President Sukarno derbunced Malaysia as a "^neoclonia-
l i s t conspiracy"' and'as a plot to encircle Indonesia~i mi l i tary , 22 
to ""corner*" Indonesia. He vowed to ^crush** Malaysia.*" Indonesia 
adopted a policy of confrontation against Malaysia and began to 
part ic ipate act ive ly and several countries o f f e r ed to mediate, 
the disput but a l l to no avai l . But the policy o f confrontation 
of Indonesia began to change under President Suharto o f Indonesia 
who adopted a r ea l i s t and neutral ist policy in international 
sphere. I t i s to be nated, before the policy of confrontation, 
Malaya and Indonesia had concluded a Friendship Treaty in 1969 
and in July 1961, Malaya, Thiaiand and the Philippines formed 
the Association o f Southeast Asia (A.S.A. ) f o r the purpose o f 
21. Vanden bosch and Butwell, op » c i t » , p. 96, 
22, Quoted Vandenbosch and Butwell, pp. 97, 
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establishing e f f e c t i v e machinary for d o s e ecoDomic and cultural 
Cooperation and mutual assistance. The Malaysia plan a f f ec ted 
very much on the above mentioned system of cooperation. Though, 
i n the beginning Indonesia did not oppose Malaysian plan but 
the revo l t in Brunei, a Br i t ish protectorate, in December 1962 
which did not want to j o in to the Federation o f Malaysia but 
wanted to remain as independent country with North Borneo, 
Sarawak and Sabah and moreover, Malaysia was considered as 
Br i t ish Sa te l l i t e as a plot to encircle Indonesia m i l i t a r i l y , in 
Indonesia, which led to the pol icy of confrontation. I t i s also 
to be noted that Singapore was a mil i tary base of SEATO in the 
region under Bri t ish supervision which Indonesia did not 
to l e ra te . 
So fo r as, the Philippines was conceived, she claimed the 
sovereign rights over a part of North Borneo because o f the 
claim of the heirs o f the Sultan of Sulu.President Macapagal 
took personal interest dn behalf of the Sultan o f Sulu over a 
part of North Borneo. But she did not go to far as Indonesia 
did. In the words of Vandenbosch and Butwell, **The Philippine 
government was obviously embarrassed by the extreme be l l i g i g -
erance o f Indonesia and sought to dissociate i t s e l f from the 
l a t t e r posit ion and td restore normal relat ions with Malaysia. 
23 
Diplomatic relat ions were f i n a l l y restored in June 1966.** And 
23o Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. 100. 
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A 
more ovey, Philippines feared Indonesian expansionism because 
Indonesia has three times the population of the Philippines and 
at the moment boasts large, well-equipped armed forces . This 
danger brought the Philippines close to the SEATO and in a word 
close to America:i. Any weakening of the t i es with the United 
States may expose the philipplnes to the danger o f Indonesian 
24 
expansionism,**' 
The basic issues of confrontation can be siMmed up in 
these l ines, Malaysia suspects Indonesian leaders o f expansio-
nist aims, o f a desire to rev ive a greater MajapaMt Empite, 
while Indonesians are convinced that Malaysia i s seeking to 
destroy their republic. Dr. Sudjarwo, the Indonesian represen-
ta t i v e before the Security Council of the United Nations on 
September 9, 1964 says, 'we suffered and continue to suf fer 
economic subversion and mafiiipulation, and both Singapore and 
Malaya have provided not only a shelter but an act ive 
25 
base f o r secessionalist rebels against the Republic since 1968. 
Economically, Malaysia was very sound, "^Malaysia enjoyed the 
second highest per capita income in Asia, being surpassed only 
by Japan, I t was the world's largest producer o f rubber and 
t in . Moreover, Malysia, in addition, produced only half o f i t s 
24. Ib id . , p. 100. 
25, QuDted Vandanbosch and Butwell, p. 101. 
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o 
food requirements. The severance o f trade re lat ions ty Indonesia 
and setting up of r i v a l f r ee ports in i t s t e r r i to ry antt the 
economies o f Penang and Singapore, And an important factor was 
that*^ Bi t ter communal r i o t s between Chinese and Malays broke 
out in Singapore in July 1964, and again in September. The r i o t s 
were responsible f o r a score of deaths and several huiidere^d 
wounded. The r i o t s m^ have been provoked by Indonesian agents 
and loca l communists, but they were made possible by basic anta-
gonisms between the two communities the Malay minority, which 
f e e l soc ia l ly 'depressed, and the more energetic and better edu-
26 
cated Chinese. 
to 
prior/June 3, 1969, Singapore, was a Bri t ish colony a f te r 
that Singapore became a 's tate . In the general e lec t ion of 
People's Action Party won 43 out o f the 51 seats, and i t s leader, 
Mr. Lee Kuan-yen became premier. The Party was decidedly l e f t -
wing and contained a communist element, Lee himself was a 
moderate and found himself increasingly doing batt le with the 
Communist, His aim was to bring to an end the separation o f 
Singapore from Malaya, for i t looked as i f Singapore alone would 
never achieve rea l independence. The PAP government, however, 
# 
f o r a l l their anti colonial ordota:*, did not challenge the Br i t i sh 
use o f the island. When in 1963 Singapore entered the Federation 
26. Vandevbosch and But wel l , o p , c i t . , p. 102, 
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of Malaysia, i t was agreed that the basis were to remain under 
the Br i t ish control for the preservation o f peace in South East 
Asia. They could not be used for SEATO purposes, save'by 
27 
Br i ta in alone. The Federal constitution o f Malaysia provided 
the special pr iv i l eges to the Malays which caused d issat is fac-
t i on among the Chinese, These f ee l ing jcan easi ly be exploited 
and the Malay can also fear o f Chinese economic power. Now 
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yen and his party (PAP) 
'^demanded a Malaysian Malaysia** and not a Malaysia in which the 
Malays expected to control the central government inde f in i t e l y 
merely because they were the country's indigert>us inhabitants. 
The Singapore Prime Minister was seeking to form a coa l i t i on 
opposit ion in the national Parliament. He suggested the 
des i rab i l i t y o f ' J-oUher arrangement' for a new federat ion i f 
the Chinese were not to be allowed to share equally i n Malaysiajf 28 
ownership and government. Tungku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister 
o f Malaysia urged moderation on the Malays but Lee's cr i t i c ism 
on the Malays caused a sharp react ion among the Malay ultra-
national ists. On August 7, 1966, the national parliament 
passed a resolution expel l ing Singapore from the Federation 
suddenly and Lee was informed only the day before. In mid 
1966, Foreign Minister o f Indonesia, Adam Malik v i s i t ed 
Bangkok to meet with Malaysia's Deputy Premier and Foreign 
27. Hall, o p . c i t . , p. 843. 
28. Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. loS» 
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Minister Abdul Razak and on June 1, 1966, an agreement was rea-
ched which ended the undeclared war that had been raging between 
their countries for three years, Argr Settlement between the 
two nations, however, must be watched. The basic d i f ferences 
dividing them remain, and Indonesian abondonment o f confronta-
t ion, i f i t f u l l y takes place, w i l l not mean an end to Djakarta^ 
desire to dominate the whole Borneo and to at ta in leadership 
o f the broader Malay world embracing the Malay peninsula and 
even the Philippines, Containment af such i r redent is t aspira-
tions w i l l probably challenge both Malaysia and the Philippines 
29 
repeated in the yeiors and decades ahead. In the words o f 
Holl-and, **The new phase of Asia Nationalism i s to discover a 
body o f national ideals, inst i tut ions, att i tudes, myths, t radi -30 
t ions, history, l i t e ra ture and even language.** 
India's re lat ions with Malaysia have always been cor-
d ia l , Even during the Indo-Pakistan con f l i c t Malaysia stood 
by India even at the cost o f a diplomatic breach. The second 
important minority in Malaysia consists o f Indians. India's 
interests in Malaysia are great and there has been a constant 
attempt to increase the f i e l d s o f cooperation. Any upheaval 
in Malaysia i s bound to have repurcussions on Indian interests 
in Malaysia, 
29, Ib id, , p. 106, 
30, Holland, William L, '"Asian Nationalism And the West,^ 
p,6. 
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T h e P h i l i p p i n e s 0 
fl 
The Philippines Islands occupy strategic locat ion. I t 
l i e s on the outer rim of American mil i tary strength and in f lu -
ence in the Far East, The Philippine archipelago consisting 
o f 7,100 islands i s situated in the Pac i f i c Ocean between 
lat i tudes 40^20' - N., and longtitudes 116°55« -
126° E. The to ta l area of the Islands i s 115,600 square miles, 
' About 90 per cent of the population i s christ ian, 80 per cent 
of these belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, Protestants 
about 8 per cent of the^Fl l ip in i people, Pagons constituting 
some 5 per cent of the inhabitants of the islands and ataout 
one mi l l ion are Muslims. The Chinese formsuthe aost important 
minority. 
The climate of the country can be divided into wet 
and dry seasons which last from June to November in the f i r s t 
case and from December to May in the l a t t e r , Manila i s the 
cap i ta l o f the country, ' 
In the words of Shirley Jenkins, "^Nationalism which 
has been so powerful a force in Asia since world war I I , has 
long been a factor in Phi l ippine 's po l i t i c a l h is tory . The 
struggle against Spanish rule at the end o f the l as t century 
was la te r turned against the establishment o f American sovere-
ignty, During almost hal f a century as a lUited States colony, 
the F i l ip inos never abondoned their e f f o r t s to win independence!!^' 
1. Jenkins, Shirley, "Phi l ippines" ,p,362, »The State of Asia" 
Bosinger, Lawrencek and Associates. A l f red A.KnoPF, New York 
1961, 
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Before the Americans Conquered the islands, they were a colony 
of Spain, During the Spanish rule, there were at least th i r ty 
major revo l t s by the Fi l ippinos. On December So, 1898, Jose 
Riza l , the famous Fil ippino scholar and hero was executed by 
the Spaniards. This was the signal for a great revolution. 
Under Mi l io—Aguinaldo, a revolutionary army was raised which 
struck heavy blows against the Spaniards and almost defeated 
them. A Fi l ippino republic was also proclaimed. On 1 May 1898, 
the Americans landed in the Phil ippines. President Mckinley 
of the United States decided to keep the islands under U.S. 
control . On 4 February 1899, a new revo l t f l a red up which 
was crushed only a f ter sixty thousands U.S. soldiers had been 
thrown into action. General iguinaldo was captured and c i v i l i a n 
government was restored in 1902. The nineteenth century saw 
the grovan sp i r i t of unrest in the Philippines, there were 
r is ings due to the abuses o f the moropoly consciousness and 
2 
also to the rapacity of the re l i g ious orders. 
During the la t t e r hal f of the nineteenth century, a new 
middle class of F i l ip ino fami l ies , o f t en with mixed Chinese or 
Spanish blood, prosperous, wel l educated, becoming increasingly 
westernized, and interested in sending i t s sons abroad to wider 
the i r outlook. I t was through these people that the o ld iso la-
tionism, which had kept F i l ip ino society large ly in communica-
t i on from the outside world, was broken down. And with the 
2. Hal l , D.G.E., "The History o f South East Asia" , p. 683 
N.Y. 1966. 
- 86 -
impact o f nDdern ideas and nineteenth century l ibera l i sm came 
the beginnings o f the p o l i t i c a l awakening o f the F i l i p ino 
3 
people. The opening of the Phi l ippines to w j r l d trade, and the 
r i s e of enlightened middle class o f F i l i p inos , were powerful 
fac tors in preparing the way f o r a nat ional ist movement, and i t 
was th is way f o r a nat ional ist movement, and i t was th is new 4 
middle class which provided the movement with i t s leaders, 
Though( freedom struggle began from f i r s t quarter of the nine-
teenth century but in the beginning i t lacked national cohesion 
and none of the revolutionary leaders was a national f i gu re . 
In the l a t t e r ha l f of the nineteenth century, there developed 
strong national f e e l i ng , sometime revolutionary leaders succ-
eeded i n the ir aim but f i n a l l y defeated by strong Spanish army. 
The Phil ippines experienced several revo l ts in the l a s t decade 
o f the nineteenth century and i n 1899 the country f e l l i n 
America's hands when Spaniard were defeated by the Americans 
i n Manila Bay 1898 and the war ended in favour o f America which 
got Phil ippines by February 1899, agreement. In the mean while, 
the F i l ippino revolut ionaries proclaimed the ir republic and 
General Sfiiilloy Aguinaldo was i t s president,** Attempts had 
been made at peace negot iat ion, but the F i l ip ino were as deter-
mined to assert their independence against America as they had 
3. Ib id , , p. 680, 
12. Ibid., p. 316. 
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18 
been against Spain,® In Apri l 1901, General Aguinaldo surrenp. 
dered himself and c i v i l i a n government was restored and United 
States government took concrete steps for the co-operation 
with F i l i p p i m s . Under the governorship of William Taft, 
l a t e r to become president of the United States, a commissions^-* 
was formed to assist the governor in 1901 which was composed 
of f i v e Americans including the governor and three Fi l ippinos, 
"'This was the chief ruling body of the Philippines fo r the f i r s t 
s ix years of American c i v i l ru le (1901-1907), i t s members serv-
ing co l l e c t i v e l y as a l e g i s l a t i v e body and individual ly as heads 
o f departments.** In the words o f Hall, ®Notwithstanding the 
extremely l i b e ra l policy pursued by the American, contrasting 
strongly with that of Spain the nationalist ag i ta t ion for inde-
pendence became so intense that the government f e l t compelled 
to pass a sedi t ion Act forbidding the advocacy o f independence 
and the use of the Philippine f l a g . The moderate Federal Party, 
aiming at ultimate federal union with America, gained hardly 
any support, and the f i r s t general e lect ion on an e lec tora l r o l l 
r es t r i c t ed by qual i f icat ions of property and langgage the 
ab i l i t y to use either English or Spanish-resulted in a complete 
v ictory for the Nacionalista party, which made independence i t s 
supreme ob jec t i ve . The e lec t ion brought to the f o re two domi-
nating personal it ies, Sergio Osmena, who became the f i r s t 
S. Hall, o p . c i t . , p, 722, 
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speaker o f the assembly, and Manuel Quezon, the leader o f the 
majority party. Both were Mestizos, the former being o f Chinese 
Malayar ;^^  mixture and the l a t t e r o f Spanish-Malay an. Que2Dn, 
who became a delegate to Washington i n 1909, devoted himself 
to the task o f impressing upon Congress that the F i l ip inas were 
p o l i t i c a l l y mature. Through his inf luence F i l i p i m s gained a 
major i ty o f seats on the commission and a number o f min is ter ia l 
posts. He also played an important part i n securing the passage 
o f the Jo]?e Law (1916) which accorded a substantial degree o f 
6 
autonomy to the P h i l i p p i n e s M a n u e l Que2Dn, leader o f the 
Nacionalista Party, l ed special missions to the United States 
i n 1919 and 1924 to ask f o r h is country 's independence. But a 
spec i f i c promise in this conroction was delayed t i l l 1934 when 
the Phil ippines Independence Act was adopted by the U.S. 
Congress, providing f o r the establishment o f a common wealth 
o f the Phi l ippines which was duly inaugrated in Ifovember 1935. 
The Act promised independence f o r the country a f t e r ten-year 
period of t r ans i t l o i i ^ 
In 1932, Osmena and Baxas^ the Phil ippines loaders succee-
ded to secure passage through congress o f the Hara-Hawes-cut t ing 
Independence Act. By th is time i n i l l United States was turning 
strongly in favour o f Fi l ippi iX) independence. But President 
Hoover vetoed the Act, But Quezon succeeded i n approving ^a 
new independence measure, the Tydings-McDuffie Act which was 
12. Ibid. , p. 316. 
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signed by President Roosvelt on 24 March 1934 and subsequently-
accepted by the Phi l ippine l e g i s l a ture . I t d i f f e r e d surpris-
ingly l i t t l e from the re j ec ted measure, but mentioned only 
naval bases. Moreover, Boosvelt gave the assurance that before 
f u l l independence in 1946, the inequal i t i es and imperfect ions ' 
would a l l be ironed out. Under i t s provisions a commonwealth 
of the Phil ippines was to come into being on 4 July 1936, I t s 
const i tut ion was to be drawn up by a popularly e lected conven-
t i on o f 200 members. I t was to function f o r ten years, at the 
end o f which, on 4 July 1946, the independence Republic o f the 
Phi l ippines was to be inaugrated and the American forces with-
drawn. Upto then f o r e i gn re la t ions and national defence were 
to remain under fimerican contro l , and the United States 
President was to r e ta in power to approve or veto ajny const i -
tut iona l amendment, or ary acts a f f e c t i ng currency coinage, 
imports or exports. The United State also reserved the r i gh t 
to intervene i n the Phil ippines in order to presserve const i -
7 
tut ional government. Constitutional convention was held and 
Const i tut ion was drafted which was r a t i f i e d by a national 
p l eb i s c i t e and was put into pract ice on 16 November 1935, 
Manuel Quezon was elected the new commonwealth's f i r s t President 
with Osmena as Vice President, 
Nationalism came f i r s t to the Phil ippines o f a l l the 
Southeast Asia co lon ia l holdings, and i t almost succeeded i n 
12. Ibid. , p. 316. 
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f ree ing the F i l ip inos from their po l i t i c a l l y subjected status 
under Spain, Too much credi t accordingly can be given to 
Americans in this respect which is not to detract at a l l 
from the far sightedness and l iberal ism of the American posi-
t ion . Therefore, the Phil ippine independence act was a part i -
cularly enlightened document, providing as i t did f o r a transi-
t i on period from benevolent colonial rule to f u l l se l f -govern-
o 
ment. But Hall thinks, ^The United State thus within a very 
short period of time introduced an advanced form o f po l i t i c a l 
democracy into Philippines. I t had serious defects . In e f f e c t 
power was conferred upon the property owners and the i n t e l l i -
gentsia, and the men who exercised i t came almost ent i re ly from 
the landed gentry; for notwithstanding the most tramendous 
drive to establish schools, enrol l pupils and t ra in teachers, 
education of the masses could never keep pace with po l i t i c a l 
progress,** 
There was unrest among the depressed classes which gave 
risetoleftwing organizations in the country. In June 1924 
communism made i t s f i r s t appearance when at the inv i ta t i on o f 
the Soviet Government a delegation o f F i l ip inos attended the 
International Conference o f Labour at Moscow. On their return 
they organised the society o f workers o f the Phil ippines. 
8. Vandenbosch, Army and Butwell, Richard, ""Changing Face o f 
South East Asia.^" Lexington (USA) 1966, p. 117. 
9. Hall , o p . c i t . , p. 727. 
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Other le f t -wing groups, which made the tenant-land lo rd re la-
tionship and agrarian indebtedness main items in the i r agita-
t ion, were the Tanggulan, which caused a r is ing in 1931, and 
the Sakdal which caused one in 1935, Communism easi ly made 
converts in the agricultural provinces o f central Luzan 
(Phi l ippine Island), where the worst ev i l s of land lordism were 
rampant. There was no p o l i t i c a l party in the l eg i s la ture at 
Manila i^feich represented the needy classes^^ In the words o f 
Yandenbosch and Butv/ell, " I n 1936, the year the Americas trans-
ferred most of the r « ins of government to the commonwealth l ea -
ders, the Sakadistas, a minor l e f t i s t po l i t i c a l party, staged 
an armed uprising in the provinces around Manila. Their leaders 
charged the Government with indi f ference and in s incer i ty 
toward the demands of the poor and advocated a drastic reduction 
in the taxes paid by the poor, a more equal —— distr ibut ion 
11 
o f property, and a d iv is ion of the large landed estates,** 
President Quezon, by 194o, gathered together immense powers 
around him and he was absolute boss o f the Party. The govern-
ment became highly central ized; the larger c i t i e s had pract i-
ca l l y l os t the right o f self-government. President Que2Dn said 
that po l i t i c a l parties were not necessary to democratic govern-
ment and he had come to espouse what he ca l led ""partyless 
democracy."' But the Japanese attack on pearl Harbour on 8 
10. Ib id. , p. 730. 
11,- Vandenbosch and But wel l , o p . c i t . , p. 123. 
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December 1941 (Phi l ippine t ime) was fol lowed within a matter 
o f hours by the bombing o f mi l i ta ry ob jec t i ves i n the Ph i l i -
ppines from the bases on Formosa, On 10 December the invasion 
began, and a week or two l a t e r two Japanesie armies, one from 
Lingayen in northern Luzan and the other from Atimonan and 
Manban in the South, were converging upon Manila. The American 
and Fi l ippino forces under General Mac Arthur r e t i r ed before 
superior numbers to the Bataan Peninsula and the f o r t i f i e d i s -
land o f corregidor commanding the ^entrance to Manila Bay. lb 
save Manila from d is t ruct ion i t was declared an open c i t y , and 
12 
on 2 January 1942 i t f e l l to the Japanese. Therefore, mai^ y 
defeated American and F i l ipp ino forces f l e d to the mountains and 
beg«in to organise guer r i l l a war f a r e . 
There was less d i s t rac t i on or disruption under Japanese 
rule , i n the Phi l ippines, o f the Social system than in Burma 
and Indonesia. Maqy F i l ipp inos col laborated with the Japanese 
and the i r excuse was that by co l laborat ion they could the better 
protect the people from "Japanese b r u t a l i t y . P o l i t i c a l parties 
were suppressed. They were replaced by an organizat ion ca l l ed 
from the i n i t i a l l e t t e r s from i t s name Kalibapi, the 'Associa-
t i on f o r the serv ice of the New Phi l ipp ines . ' Every members o f 
the administration had to belong i t . I t received i t s orders 
from Tokyo. In June 1943, convention o f the Kal ibapi , summoned 
12, Hal l , o p . c i t , , p. 732, 
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under Japanese instructions chose a constitutional Gomnission 
to draf t a new constitution f o r the*independent republic ' o f 
the Philippines which Japan proposed to establish. I t was 
presided by Jose P.Laurel, the most prominent among the actual 
sympathizers with Japan among the Fi l ip ino ruling ^ciass'es. In 
October 1943, the new republic was formally inaugrated, with, 
Laurel as i t s President, He had absolute power o f neto over 
the National Assembly, but was himself^ o f course, completely 
13 
under 'Japanese cont ro l , ' But at the sametime, the under 
ground guarri l las were e f f e c t i v e that the Japanese were able 
to control only twelve out o f the for ty -e ight provinces, Quezon 
and osmena had established a government in - ex i l e in Washington, 
Quezon's government in ex i l e did a l o t o f worjc f o r the Ph i l i -
ppines, I t became one of the founder members o f the United 
Nations and arised public opinion in favour of the F i l i pp i ros , 
In the mean while, the Americans forces landed in strength in 
the Gulf of Lingayen, and Japanese Marshal lamashitra's attempt 
to keep the Americans out o f Luzon was also frustrated, on 
9 January 1945, "^There was a f r i gh t ru l struggle f o r Manila 
which lasted unti l 23 February and l e f t the c i t y , a mass o f 
ruin. Then came mopping up operations throughout coot the archi-
pelago. IQiey lasted several months, and i t was only on 3 
September, the day a f t e r Japan's formal surrender to General 
Mac Arthur, that Yamashlta. himself surrendered with the real-
l y 
nant of his forces at Baguio^®' 
T ^ Ib id . , p. 733. 
14. Ib id . , p. 734, 
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At l as t , the Fil ippiitos succeeded in the ir alms and the 
independence o f Phillppins was proclaimed in 1946, "'under 
circumstances' quite d i f f e r en t from those anticipated at the 
time of the passage o f the iydings-Mc Duf f ie Act of 1934, 
i^uezon did ro t l i v e to see his country gain i t s freedom. He 
died in August 1944 and was succeeded by his v ice president, 
Osmena. The Philippines had suffered severe war damages 
and was plagued with f inancia l , economic, social and p o l i t i c a l 
problems and the joDSt important issue o f col laborat ion with 
the Japanese. Osmena fai led to take action against the leaders 
o f Japanese puppet government f i rmly . In the words of Hall , 
"'At the f i r s t postwar general e lect ion,held on 23 Apri l 1946, 
the e lect ion saw the sp l i t of the o ld Nacionalista Party, with 
President Osmena leading one wing and Maimel Boxas the other. 
Manual Roxas had the support o f Mac Arthur and a number o f 
important Americans. He declared himself a l i b e r a l , and bu i l t 
up a party machine that was successful in carrying him and h is 
fo l lowers to v ictory a f t e r an e lec t ion campaign notable f o r i t s 
bitterness. He himself won the Presidency ty a narrow margin 
o f :7o%es. His party, however, had a comfortable majority i n 
both houses of congress. His c lose associate Elpidio Quiriaao 
was elected Vice President, so that, on 4 July, when the 
independent Republic o f the phi l l ippines was inaugrated, they 
16 
were the f i r s t heads o f i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , I t was p o l i t i c a l 
16. Hall, o p . c i t , , p. 814. 
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Independence but ecoriomic independence had s t i l l togain f o r 
the countiy. Independence, i t has been said, f e l l l i k e a r ipe 
f r u i t into the lap of the F i l i p inos , f o r the Americans l e f t 
unpleasant tasks to perform. Though independence was 
granted to the F i l i p inos but actually the American retained 
the r ight of missions of every sort i n the country. Professor 
Hal l i s quite j u s t i f i e d in saying that "^ The independence accor-
ded by the ISiited States to the Phi l ippines, was i n i t s early 
days quite unreal. The jtoericans retained missions o f every 
sort in the country, mission f o r the d is t r ibut ion o f war damage 
compensation, f o r the working out of development plans, f o r tiie 
provis ional up keep o f the information and security services, 
f o r the reform o f education, and soon. What caused the grea-
tes t heart-burning to the Fi l ip irtos, however, was the Mi l i ta ry 
\ 
Bases Agreement o f March 1947, whereby America received a 99 
year lease o f twenty-three bases i n the Phi l ippines, with f u l l 
l e g a l ju r i sd i c t i on over them. This included ju r i sd i c t i on over 
F i l i p inos i n the case of a large number o f o f f ences , and gave 16 
r i s e to controversy within a very short time.** President BDxas 
died in Apr i l 1948 and Elpiddo Quirino succeeded him. During 
these years the f inanc ia l and economic conditions became worse 
and corruption was increasing in government. Moreover, public 
confidence in the leadership was rapidly decl ining, Quiriaao 
12. Ibid., p. 316. 
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succeeded in 1949 Presidential e l ec t ion against Jose P Lautrel, 
There was discontent, ®11ie Huks were ready to tap this dis-
content. •''"The Huks were ready to tap this discontent. The name 
"Huk"* was an abbreviated from of Hukbalahap (Huk-bong Bayan Laban 
sa Hapon, which is Tagalog a main F i l ip ino language, for People's 
Anti-Japanese Army). The Huks kad been formed shortly a f t e r the 
invasion and foimght val iant ly against the Japanese. Peasants 
Constituted the base o f the group, whose leader was the communist 
Luis Taruc. When denied their post war demand that-they be taken 
into the armed forces as a unit, the Huks went under ground and 
waged a steadi ly worsening war agairst the national government. 
Efforts of both Roxas and Quirino to contain the rebels whether 
17 
by conc i l ia t ion or force f a i l e d . " The Huks sought to explo i t 
the s.ituation. In I960, the Huks began the ir a c t i v i t i e s on large 
scale and made attacks on towns on the outskirts of Manila. The 
army was reorganised by Magsaysay who succeeded in getting e f f e c -
t i v e control against the Huks and he rooted out in e f f i c i ency 
and corruption. Ramon Magsaysay fol lowed a policy o f fr iendship 
for a l l who surrendered themselves and within a year rebe l l ion 
was crushed and he became national hero. Ramon Magsaysay became 
the Presidential candidate o f Nacionalista Party against Quirino, 
who was the candidate of l i b e ra l party. Nacionalistas named 
iffliaE him their presidential candidate only weeks 
17, Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t , , p. 133. 
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a f t e r he had l e f t the government o f Quirino and his party, 
Ramon Magsaysay revolutionized F i l ip ino electioneering beha-
viour by Carrying the campaign into the v i l l ages (barr ios ) whici 
was something new in Philippine po l i t i c s . Because privioiasly 
the national po l i t i c ians had dealt only with the rural laosses 
who successfully del ivered the 3©fc§g« Magsaysay and his 
Nacionalistas Party won an over whelming v ic tory , receiving 
more than two thirds of the vote cast. Magsaysay then began 
his programme of reforms and rooted out in - e f f i c i ency and 
Corruption in administration. He t r i ed to remove social e v i l s 
and in just ice f o r the betterment o f the common man. He also 
endeavoured to convince the people that the government was the i i 
government by inv i t ing everybody in the land, whatever his 
economic or social status, to bring his complaints to M§tl^eaii§ing 
Palace, the o f f i c i a l resident o f the President, Professor 
Hall r ight ly remarks, "One very interest ing new departure under 
Magsaysay arose from the establishment o f the South East Asia 
Treaty organization throu^ the signature o f Manila Pact in 
1964. T i l l then the Philippines had looked eastwards to 
America rather than westwards to Asia. Ifow i t s membership o f 
the organization made i t more aware o f i t s Asian set t ing . In 
the fol lowing year i t participated in the Bandung Conference, 
Thus i t began to build up s ign i f i cant contacts with Asia, and 
to show signs o f a desire to pursue a policy injK the f i e l d o f 
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international re lat ions f r ee o f guiding strings of Washington,** 
President Magsaysay died in an a ir crash in March 1967. 
Carlos P.Garcia succeeded him. In 1967, Garcia was Naciona-
l i s t a Party candidate f o r Presidency and Maimel Manhan was 
Progressive presidential nominee. Gar4ia was elected President 
but his running mate did not succeeded against Diosdado who was 
l i b e ra l v ice presidential'.cdMliaate.The e lect ion o f a v ice 
president of party persuasion d i f f e r en t from that of the 
19 
president had no precedent in Phil ippine po l i t i c a l h istory. 
The Garcia administration was marked mainly by greater corrup-
t i on than ever before in Fi l ippino po l i t i c s . In 1961 presi-
dential e lect ion, l i b e ra l party candidate Macapagal defeated 
Garcia in one of the most hotly contested Phil ippine elections 
of the post war period. 
Macapagal was hailed by mariy as a second Magsaysay, but 
such claims betrayed ignorance o f the path of h is r i s e to 
prominance within the l i be ra l party. Macapagal made economic 
reforms in the country and noreover, l^capagal took some 
Nacionalistas to his side to carry out or get pass the B i l l i n 
the house of representatives and President Macapagal "ca l l ed 
tliem'"*patriots** but mar^ r others re ferred to these new "Liberals*^ 
as''*turn coats, " But in 1966 e lec t ion Ferdinand E Marcos, 
18. Hall, o p . c i t . , p. 862, 
19. Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t , , p, 136, 
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^fecioxialista Party presidential candidate defeated Macapagal 
and ""turn coats"" became ""return co-ajtsY thoiuigjli l i b e ra l party-
was in majority in horase of representatives but Macapagal l os t 
because o f his economic pol icy, corruption in administration 
and smuggling accounted fo r perhaps one-third o f a l l Phil ippine 
imports, Marcos became the sixth President o f the republic 
on January 1, 1966 and most Fi l ippinos sighed with reliefJK that 
the e lect ion campaign had f i na l l y come to an end - and the 
20 
business o f government could begin again*** There i s dd d i f f e r -
ence basically """between the two major p o l i t i c a l parties in 
the Philippines, the l ibe ra l s and the Nacionalistas, and i t ^ 
i s itaiesa parties that have alternated in power since indepen^ 
dence. The interests represented by the two parties are the 
same, and there i s no d i f ference in the social background o f 
their leaders or their followers,** 
The Philippines i s the only countiy o f South-East Asia 
which is truly modern and seems a part of western world, IS.njaeJL 
Roxas, f i r s t President o f an independent Phil ippine Republic 
once declared in 1946, "we are not o f the or ient except by' 
geography. We are part of the western world by reason of 
culture, re l i g ion , ideology, economies We expect to 
remain part o f the west, possibly as the ideo log ica l bridge 
21 
between the Occident and the Orient,® This was the beginning 
20. Ib id . , p. 139, 
21, Qaoted Vandevbosch and Butwell, ""The Changing Face o f 
Southeast As ia , " , p, 160. 
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of Philippines fo re ign pol icy. Prior her independence, the 
Philippines, rather i t s government hadactively participated in 
international po l i t i c s before that date Quezon signed the 
United Nations— Declaration in 1942 and the Philippines was 
also the member in the Saa Francisco conference which drafted 
the charter of the Itoited Nations and became one of the or ig ina ] 
members o f that organization. President Macapagal t r i ed hard 
to develops a close relations with Indonesia and the F i l ip inos 
became conscious o f their ident i ty with Asian cultural ly, 
economically and ideo log ica l l y . There developed two trends 
side by side, one i s western and the other i s Asian. This 
tension r e f l e c t s i t s e l f in F i l ip ino security po l i c i es . The 
Philippines entered into base and mi l i tary assistance pacts 
with the United States in the wake o f independence. I t signed 
a mutual defence agreement with the Americans in 1961, and i t 
became 'founding member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
t ion (SEATO), in 1954. The r i se to power of the communist i n 
China in 1949 reorietited Fi l ippino fear that the threat from 
the north was mainly Tr.€3ilin©s©. The subsequent expansion o f 
the war in Vietnam in which China i s involved, though less 
d i rec t ly and loore modestly than the United States, heightened 
F i l i p i r o concern in this respect. The impact o f President 
Johnson's e f f o r t s to probe the poss ib i l i t i e s o f a peaceful 
end to the Vietaamese war in 1965-66 was minimized in the 
o f f i c i a l prorxjuncements o f the ranking architects o f Phil ippine 
fo re ign pol icy who feared that the United States mi l^t withdraw 
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in favour of the communists and leave the i r nation iso lated. 
On the other hand, there were some FilipinDS, including m t a 
few journal ists, who vigorously deplored growing American 
22 
mil i tary involvement in Vietnam.'' 
The Hii l ippines wanted security in the region f o r the 
prevention o f Chinese expansion in South Bast Asia. I t has 
"'security in regional se lect ive defence. The ob jec t i ve of 
SEATO, founded at l>p.nila conference o f 1954, was the prevention 
o f communist-meaning mainly Chinese expansion in Southeast 
Asia."' There are only three o f the eight SEATO countries which 
are Asians l i k e Thailand, Pakistan and the Phil ippines. J^ w 
Philippines began to look to her neighbours. The Philippines 
participated in the 1956 Bandung Afro Asian conference and at 
time seemed there might be agreement concerning "Maphilindo" 
( l inking Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia) in August 1963 
but i t did itot take f u l l shape because of the ®confrontation** 
between Malaysia and Indoneisa. The Philippines, Malaya and 
Thailand came closer in 1961 and formed the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA) but soon di f ferences arose when Malaysia 
Plan came into Deing and north Borneo ter r i tory o f Sabah was 
included in Malaysia over which the Philippines had claim. 
22» Vandevbosch and-Butwell, o p . c i t . , p« 152, 
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Because o f the policy of confrontation o f Indonesia with 
Malaysia, the Philippines feared her neighbour Indonesia and 
soon came an understanding with Malaysia. So f a r as the 
relat ions with United States are concerned that the Philippines 
has special re lat ions with America. The lease period o f bases 
in the Philippines was reduced from 99 to 25 years. **The main 
problem was that the United States was the close a l l y of mariy 
state the Philippines o f only one. F i l ip inos expected to 
23 
won as large in America's eyes as Americans did in their eyes," 
23, Ib id . , p. 164. 
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T h a i l a n d ^ 
i 
Thailand is the only country in South-East Asia which 
has long enjoyed at least nominal p o l i t i c a l independence and 
never has lost i t s independence to a lAfestern colonial power, 
"ilven a f ter the Japanese invaded Thailand in December 1941, 
the Thai government managed to preserve i t s nominal sovereignty 
by accepting an al l iance with Japan. Soon afterward Thia 
opposition elements placed — themselves in the other Camp 
by organising to resistance movement, called the Free Thai, 
which rendered valuable service to the A l l i e s during the war. 
Diplomatic successes and close associations with the great 
powers, especia l ly those of the Occident, have incl ined the 
Thai .toward the iftfestern bloc, with which they have now thrown 
in their l o t . " 
o o 
Thailand is situated between 6 -21 N. latitudes and 
97°-106° longitudes, also known as Siam. 'Thailand emerged 
from i ts diplomatic defencse with a t e r r i t o ry of nearly -
200,000 square miles, i t s size today. A small s t r ip of Burmese 
and Laotian t e r r i t o r y separates Thailand from China in the 
North; in the South i t s t e r r i to ry extends almost two-third 
down the Malay Peninsula. Northern Thailand is mountainous, 
and the Eastern part of the country is an i n f e r t i l e plateau. 
1. Thompson and Ad l o f l , "Thailand" in Rosinger, Lawrencek, 
"The State of Asia" , N.Y, 1951, p. 268. 
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The large a l luv ia l plain and rich delta ol the Chao Phraya 
River constitutej; the heart of the country. The population 
of Thailand, which is more homogenous than that of Burma but-
less So than that of Cambodia, numbers about 25,000,000 and 
includes about 800,000 Malays in the iiouth, 3,000,000 persons 
of Chinese ancestry, and, perhaps most troublesome of a l l 
despite their modest number, some 40,000 Vietnamese located 
in the North-eastern portion of the country across the 
Mekong River from heavily communist i n f i l i t r a t e d Laos. 
Repatriation of such Vietnamese to North Vietname - the 
desired destination'of a majority of these refugees from the 
Franco-Vietnamese c o l on i a l - c i v i l war of 1946-1964 - ceased 
in 1964 fol lowing the Gulf of Totokin naval incident between 
2 
the North Vietnamese and the Americans." 
The attack of Kublai Khan in 1250 A.D. forced the 
ancestors of the Thai people to move from douth-Weat China. 
Gradually they occupied the pre;>ent '^'hailand the mainland 
oi liouth-East Asia. In 1350 A.D. Ayuthia became the capital-
ol the l i r s t isiamese Kings. Their dominions extended to 
Moulmein, Tavay, Tenasserim and the i/hole of the Malacca 
peninsula. Siam, at that time attacked Cambodia and took 
Angkor. In the next 400 years, Siam occupied almost the 
whole oi -Cambodia and large parts of Laos also f e l l under 
her supremacy. In the 15th and 16th centuries, iiiam was 
invaded by the -burmese and the Pagans. In 1555 A.D. Ayuthia 
2. Vandenbosch and Butwell,"The Changing of Face of South-
East Asia" , Lexington (U^A) 1966, p. 284. 
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was taken and Siam was made a Burmese dependency. Phra Naret 
I 
the national hero, l iberated Thailand, occupied Laos and 
Cambodia, and attacked Pegu with success. In 1767, Siam was 
again subdued by the Burmese. The Capital was now shi f ted 
to Bangkok and a successful general,Ph^ria Chakki, founded the 
present dynasty. 
In the beginning of the 19th century, Thailand (Siam) 
negotiated commercial t reat ies with Great Britain and the 
United dtates. In 1855 and in 1856, oiam negotiated other 
t reat ies with these two powers. Cambodia accepted French 
protection, which became defacto French Colonialism, in the 
nineteenth century primarily as a consequence of a fear of 
absorption by the expanding Thai and Fraice which conferred 
the right of e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y up on their nationals and 
regulated the Thai custom duties, 
Brit ish entry into Arakan, in 1826, brought Siam in 
direct contact with a Western power. On the eastern side 
i t faced France which soon put an end to the Siamese control 
of Cambodia. At that the Western f ront iers of the French-
control led Annam ranalong the mountains., east of the River 
Mekong. But the French had their eyes on the ancient Annamese 
claims on the areas down the Mekong River . By the treaty 
signed on October 3, 1893, Siam abondoned her claims on the 
t e r r i t o r i e s east oi the Mekong and the islands in the r i v e r . 
- 1C6 -
Therefore, the re lat ions o f colonial powers France and 
Br i ta in improved a f ter the Anglo-French treaty o f 1896, 
Siamese t e r r i to ry was divided into three zones; Siam was to 
have f u l l control o f the Central Sjne, while the Western 
gone was under Br i t ish influence and the Eastern under the 
French, Ifot content with th is arrangement, France put up 
further demands to Slam in 1902 and negotiated a new treaty 
which led to a fiarther cession of 7,800 square miles of 
t e r r i t o ry by Siam. In 1904 two provinces west of the Mekong 
were ceded to French-controlled Cambodia and a large area 
was added to Laos, The same year France and Br i ta in signed 
an agreement not to annex any part of Siam under their 
influence. But in 1907, France secured an additional 7,000 
square miles of Thai t e r r i t o ry for Cambodia. Br i ta in too 
acquired control over 15,000 square miles o f the miles o f 
the Malayan states of Trenggam, Kelantan, Kedah and Per i l s , 
King Phumiphan, the present King, is the ninth o f the 
t ine . The Thai King was an absolute monarch. He was some-
thing above and beyond ordinery mortals. He was in fac t a 
god-king af ter the Hindu-Buddhist model. The King was at the 
heart of Thai l i f e as the holy mountain was at the centre o f 
India cosmology, from which the Thai repl ica was drawn. The 
King»s temporal and spir i tual authority was to be seen in 
his ownership o f a l l land and his direct ion o f the a f f a i r s o f 
2 
the Kingdom's Budhist clergy," ' '^ The Thai King was absolute 
3. Ibid, , po 281o 
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i n theory and more in practice than most o f the other kings, 
Sultans, and Chieftains of South-East Asia. But even Thai royal 
absolutism knew l imits — l imits imposed by geography and l imits 
inherent in the human circiimstance o f a bureaucracy through which 
4 
royal ideas and demands had to filter,^' ' ' Therefore, autocracy 
was the tradi t ional Thai type of government in Thailand. 
Moreover, the Kings or Msnarchs had played^ a dominant ro l e 
in the history o f Thailand.*® The King Mangkut (1851 - 68) 
saw the need o f modernizing his administration i f his country 
were not to f a l l victim to Western imperialism. He brought 
in Westerners as teachers and advisers who in many cases 
actually served as department heads "^ and concluded treaty o f 
friendship and commerce with Br i ta in in 1865. King Ghulalong 
Korm (1868-1910) was a progressive and reformer l i k e his 
father . He abolished slavery, ended the practice o f prostration 
in the royal presence, set up schools for the education o f the 
childern o f the nobi l i ty , modernized the postal system, and 
reformed provincial administration and the administration o f 
5 
justice.** Later on, his son Prince Maha Vajra Vudh fol lowed 
his father footsteps and fostered national pride. Professor 
Hall observes that, ''"Prince® had a great sense o f the dramatic 
and he consciously fostered national pride. He rea l i zed the 
great value of the Boy Scout movement for such a purpose, and 
4. Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. 282, 
6, Ib id . , p. 283, 
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through his encouragement one might almost say 'at his order '— 
I 
the schools of Siam became dcout-minded and produced in 
numerable companies of ' T i ge r ' s whelps', as they were cal led 
f o r they were a f f i l i a t e d to the 'Wild T i g e r s ' . Ai?.d as in 
the contemporancousr national movements in Burma and Indonesia, 
\ 
so in Siam re l i g i on was ca l l ed in as the great unifying force . 
There is a curious para l l e l between Siam and Burma in this 
matter, f o r in both nationalist propaganda asserted that 
only a Budhist could be a true patr io t . Japan's v i c tory over 
Russia in 1905 had stimulating e f f e c t upon Siam's national 
sentiment, and i t seems l i k e l y that in his e f f o r t s to carry 
the process of modernization further Vajiravudh was f u l l y 
aware oi the methods by which Japan had made herself strong 
6 . 
enough to defeat a great European power." Vij iravudh was 
succeeded by his youngest brother in 1925, he l e f t no son 
to succeed him Prince Prajadhipok. He also developed his 
country to every walk of l i f e but in 1931, the government 
got into serious f inancia l crises and Siam f a i l ed in her 
attempts to raise fore ign loans in Paris and New York, she 
was forced to introduce drastic economics involving salary 
cuts, which hit the junior o f f i c i a l class very hard. 
There was discontent every where in the country. At 
this conj'UCttir..e, there occured a bloodless revolution on 
24 June 1932 and the Chief in te l l ec tua l force behind the co;Uf) 
6. Hal l , D.G.E., The History of South East Asia, N.Y. 1966, 
p. 759. 
- 109 -
was layer-teacher Pr id i Boroinyong who took mil i tary «s help 
i n this coup and drafted a constitution in which the King 
occupied a mminal posit ion. He los t his a l l prerogatives 
save the r ight of parden. The Princes were excluded from 
the minister ia l posts and the army, and the People's Party,as 
Pridi and his supporters named themselves, took over the 
management o f the government. But Pridi amd his l ieutenants 
did not take over the actual government. The chose P'ya 
J±>ix»pakorn as President o f the Executive Council. This 
arrangement did not proof a success and no one was sa t i s f i ed . 
More over, there was an atmosphere o f alarm because o f the 
indulgence o f the Communists with their Chinese supports and 
the government had to adopt a policy o f repression. Ifow P'ya 
Mompakorn wanted to f r e e his government from Pr id i ' s 
influence. Pridi prepared a schesie of national economy 
which was declared as Communistic and P'ya government charged 
Pr id i f o r the scheme and by we l l prepared coup he was forced 
7 
into ex i l e . " Pridi subsequently, returned to Thailand, was 
cleared o f the charge o f being communist, and quickly 
8 
recovered much of his former po l i t i c a l inf luence. The King 
Prajadhipok announced his abdication over const i tut ional 
c r i s i s in March 1935. His nephew. Prince Anawda Mahidol, a 
ten year o ld school-boy was proclaimed King and a Regency 
Council of three members was appointed to act during his 
Ibid, p. 764 
8. Vandenbosch and Butwell, op . c i t . , p. 285. 
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minority. In the mean while Phibun who had the backing of 
army, increased his influence and he acquired a favourable 
reputation by re-establishing or^er a f t e r an abortive pro-
roya l is t attempt to regain control of Lhe government in 1933. 
.Now Phibun became a p o l i t i c a l force when the new government 
was formed a f ter the general e lect ion in 1938, Phibun became 
Prime Minister with Pr idi as Minister of Finance. I ts 
prevail ing note was a intens i f ied nationalism. P r i d i ' s new 
Revenue Code, passed in March 1939, was an attempt to l ighten 
the burde.Di of the peasent and f ree him from dependence upon 
9 
the money landers. The o f f i c i a l name of the country was 
changed from Siam to Thailand in June 1939. I t was changed 
back to diam in September 1945 but in 1948 the name Thailand 
became a:ain i ts o f f i c i a l designation. Moreover, national 
sentiment arose against those, t e r r i t o r i e s wnich were snatched 
away in the past. In the words of Hal l , "Siamese irredentism 
was st irred up, particular against French Indo-China, and 
demands were made lor the restoration of the Cambodian and 
Laos t e r r i t o r i e s , which France had ior6ed Siam to y ie ld in 10 
the ear l i e r period." 
^hen the Japanese landin^;s actually took place in 
Indo-China during world war I I , a Thai-Japanese pact was 
signed in December 1940 and Phibun'sj pol icy became more 
and more pro-jspanese. Under Japanese aegis i t succeeded 
9. Hal l , op . c i t . , p. 766. 
-0. I b id . , p. 767. 
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in obtaining the cession of a considerable area from Indo-
china, and with Japanese consent i t annexed four Malay States 
11 
and two Shan States irom Burma. A few days la ter Phibua 
entered into an al l iar&e with Japan and shortly thereafter 
declared War on the United States and Britain on 25 January 
1942. And i t is because of i t s diplomacy, Thailand suffered 
less from the i/Jorld \dav I I than any other South-east Asian 
country. 
lAfhen the World War I I was going on, a Free Thai 
movement was organised among the few Thai abroad which was 
doing underground ac t i v i t i e s or resistance to the Japanese 
but the help oi the United states and Britain and Pr idi was 
the chiei behina this underground resistance movement. In 
August 1944, Phibum's regime was over thrown and the new 
government which was sysmpathetic with the "Free Thai 
Movement" came to power. As Professor Hall observes "Pridi 
now became the real head ol the government, but exercised 
his power through his fr iend Khuang Aphai Vfong, who was 
Prime Minister unti l August 1945. At the end of the war the 
most urgent problem was that of the readjustment of re lat ions 
with the V i c to r i ous 'A l l i e s . KhuangAphai Vfong- f e l l foul of 
P r id i by attempting an independent l ine ol his own. In 
September, therefore, he was dis.-nissed and his place given to 
Seni Pramoj, who had been leader of the Free Thai Movment in 
the United States during the war and was now considered the 
11. Vandenbosch, and Butwell, op.c i t .^ p. 286. 
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most acceptable man lo r bringing about reconc i l ia t ion with 
12 
the A l l i e d . " There were rumors in Thailand, indeed that the 
struggle between Phibun and Pr id i was mere show and that they 
were actually in col lusion. Such a pol icy of diplomatic 
reinsurance did not seem at a l l unreasonable to the Thai 33 1 
mentality though such was probably not the case in actual i ty . 
There was an immense growth of American influence in 
tiiam in postwar years. I t was America alone, which could 
provide loans and had dol lers to o f f e r and wished to act the * 
part of rich uncle, a f t e r the war.Britian was not in a posit ion 
to help tiiam and France was not on f r i end ly terms and 
demanded retrocession oi the t e r r i t o r i e s yielded by Vichy in 
1941. Therefore, soon an agreement was reached between France 
and dlam and the disputed t e r r i t o r i e s were returned to Indo-
china and a conc i l l i a t i on commission was appointed to examine 
the ethnic, geographic and economic questions involved. 
Now Kussia threatened to obstruct her e lect ion to the United 
Nation unless Thailand annulled her law against communism-
and resumed diplomatic re la t ions . As Professor Hall observes, 
"Siam's oppO '^tunian was again equal to the emergency she 
accepted Russia's terms-Russian therefore held her hand and 
aiam was received into membership by the General Assembly 
14 
of 1947." 
12. Hal l , op . c i t . . p. 810. 
13. Vandenbosch and Butwell, op . c i t . , p. 288. 
14. Hal l , oTJ.cit.. p. 811. 
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Pr i d i , there fore , took, over the Premiership in 1946 
and the chief internal postwar problem was the i n s t a b i l i t y of 
the government. The democratic const i tut ion with bicameral 
l e g i s l a tu re , was promulgated the same year. During P r i d i ' s 
Premiership the young 'Kijog Ananda was found dead and he was 
succeeded by his younger brother, the present King phumiphctn 
Adundet. Because of great pressure, Pri f i i handed over the 
premiership to Xhamrpng Nawasawat in August 1:^6, who held 
o i l ice unt i l 8 November 1947 when a mi l i ta ry coup d ' e t a t swept 
away P r i d i ' s authority and Phibun became the Premier once more. 
a l t e r the lapse ol f i v e months. Pr id i and other forces t r i ed 
unsuccesslully to over throw the Phibun regime in the unstable 
three-year period. Phibun abrogated the const i tut ion and 
unicameral l eg is la ture was introduced in 1951. In the mean 
whi le , communist Caina came into being in 1949 and there was 
a threat to Thailand's secur i ty . K-o fessor Hall r i gh t l y 
observes, " the large Chinese community with i t s immense share 
in the country's com,r,erce, had been deeply a f l e c t ed by the 
communist v i c to ry in China, and to many Siamese i t appeared to 
16 
be more than ever a threat to the nation's s ecur i t y . " 
Phibun and his regime took str ick measures against 
communism and communist a c t i v i t i e s . "Pibun's strongest card 
was his intense opposition to communism both at home and abroad 
and his tough nat iona l i s t i c l ine in dealing with the large 
25. Ib id . , p. 314. 
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community in Thailand. The Chinese in Thailand welcomed "Ah 
immense enthusiams the v i c tory of the people's Liberation Army 
in China in 1949. The Chinese communist Party of Thailand 
became a power in the lan^, while communist influence increased 
16 
in the Chinese labour unions schools and Press," In the 
fore ign a f i a i r s P' ibun's anti-communist pol icy took the form 
of refusing to recognise the Peking regime, opposing China's 
entry into the United Nations, and without hesitations espou®--
ing the United Nation^ case in Korea in 1950. As the counter 
part of this policy the bui l t up ever close co-operation vath 
the United States, part icular ly in i ts antagonism towards 
communist China. In 1954, when Dien Bien Phu was besieged and 
Mr. Dulles cal led f o r "United action" to meet the communist 
threat in South £Iast Asia, Thailand responded with enthusiasm. 
ahe became an active participant in the formation of the South-
East Asia Treaty organization (SKATO) at Manila, and welcomed 
17 
the decision to Locate i t s head quarters at Bangkok. Phibun 
wanted stronger mi l i tary guarentees than were incorporated in 
18 
the pact, and in 1955 of lered dEATO bases in his country." 
There!ore Phibun was the master of his gyernment between 1948 
and 1957 and he found his r iva ls in Phao and in General Sarit 
Thanarat, the army chiel and Phao was police Director General* 
16. I b id . , p. 855. 
17. Col lect ive Deience in South-East Asia, Chatham House Report, 
London, 1956, p. 2 (quoted by Ha l l ) . 
18. F i f i e l d , Russel H, "The Diplomacy ol South-East Asia" 
1945-1958, N.Y. 1958,pp. 271-2 (Quoted Hal l , p. 856). 
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Moreover, Ptiihun was successful in malntalrung balance between 
the two chief factions seeking to succeed to his authority. 
Phibun introduced various democratic procedures in the Thai 
po l i t i c a l process during his later period of the regime and 
mobilized mass opinion against his r iva ls and emerged successful 
in February e lec t ion of 1957 with narrow margin. Now Phibum 
government was charged of wide spread corruption and irregularit ies 
in noting which resulted in demonstrations by students and 
now aroused po l i t i c a l oppostion which led to the declaration 
of national emergency on March 2, 1957 under General Sarit 
Thanarat, later Fi^ld Marshal, was named commander of a l l 
Thailand's mi l i tary forces including the national po l ice . A 
few months l a t e r , on 20 October 196S, yet another bloodless 
coup d 'etat took place under Marshal oa r i t . Marshal oari t 
19 
himself took over as Prime Minister on 9 February 1959. Marshal 
darit with the consultation of the King introduced reforms and 
the c i v i l service was mobilized as never before to execute a wide 20 
range of impressive development programs," An e f f e c t i v e and 
stable government came into being and developments took place 
in various/and the country became sound. The government adopted 
s tr ick measures against the communist and the country became 
more modernized and in Sar i t ' s of the modernization of Thailand 
was one oi economic and technical modernization — not po l i t i ca l 
19. Hal l , op . c i t . , p. 858 
20. Vandevbosch and Butwell, op.cit. . , p. 292. 
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21 
modernization. Sarlt died in 1963 at the time when Thailand 
was economically sound and he was succeeded ^ his long time 
f a i t h f u l deputy, Field Marshal Thanam Kittikachon. In Thanam 
government, the influence o f a handful c i v i l i a n increased and 
moreover, appears to be great in any Thai administration in 
mahy years. The highly regarded and very able Pbie Sarasin, 
who served as the f i r s t Secretary General o f the South-east 
Asia Treaty organization and who i s Thanam 's minister o f national 
economic development, heads a fac t ion within the government 
22 
X which c lear ly seeks to reduce mi l i tary dominance. There are 
other c i v i l i ans who hold the por t f o l i o od education, economics, 
f inance, and fore ign a f f a i r s . In Thanam cabinet, Praphas i s 
a single man who vigorously defend the interst o f the mi l i tary 
within a Cabinet. These two elements are with-in the Cabinet 
and the communist threat within the country support mi l i tary 
regime. But Thanam wants the promulgation o f a new consti tut ion 
with a bicameral l eg is la ture . There i s also the question o f 
the Communist threat within the country and what the communist 
might do i f elections were held, Thailand is placed in constant 
danger from every corner whether communist threat came from 
Vietnam, or Laos or Chinese communist elements fittm Malaysia 
who acrossed the border several years ago, remain in hiding in 
the Thai jungle despite Thai-Malaysia e f f o r t s to drive them out 
and the greatest threat is communist China which might take 
21. Ibid.T p. 294 
22. Ibid.T p. 297. 
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advantage from the Chinese minority within the country which 
forms the largest single minority, numbered about three mi l l i on . 
« 
The second largest minority are.- Malays. They represent the 
legacy ol past Thai imperial ist ei ' lorts at the expence of t he 
then weak Kalay sultanats to Thailand's douth. There is also 
a sense of separatism but this has not so lar been p o l i t i c a l l y 
important. The Vietnamese refugee are also a problem to Thailand 
because they are over 'whelmi'ngly communist in their p o l i t i c a l 
or ientat ion. 
Thailand was the only South-East Asian country to 
escape conquest by the colonial Europeans in the heyday of 
western imperialism. I t was part ly the result of Anglo-French 
r i va l r y and part ly the shrewd conduct of Thailand's external 
relat ions under the King Chulalongkorn. fhibun government 
in 1941 concluded agreement with Japan and saved the country 
from Japanese domination. Thai freedom during the second 
lAforld war was 'limited-by the Japanese presence in the country, 
but i t was for greater freedom than any other 3outh-east Asia 
country know, Thailand sullered modest damage compared t o 
the great destruction wrought ooth in Burma ana, even more so, in 
tf.e Phil ippines. 
On 16 August 1945 , the Regent of Thailand declared 
that the Thai declaration of war on the United dtates and 
Britain in 1942 and other acts host i le to the United Nations 
23. Vandevbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. 311, 
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had been made against the wii:^. of the people. In January 1946, 
diplomatic re lat ions between the United States and Thailand 
resumed; Br i ta in also terminated the state of war. Thailand 
returned to France the portions of Laos and Cambodia occupied 
by her during war. Marshal Phibun, the war-time Premier of 
Thailand, resigned before the end of the war, but on 8 November' 
1347, a coupd'etat was staged and a f t e r a short in terva l Phibun 
returned to the Premiership." Both po l i c i es appear to have 
been the best ol the possible a l ternat ive open to Thailand at 
the time. In both cases Phibun served his countrymen wel l and 
acted .co;Urageously..*^ 
Thailand pursued strongly anti-Chinese po l i cy , and 
ha'd to repeal an anti-communist law to win the support of' the 
cioviet Union fo r entering into United N a t i o n s and immidiatly 
a f t e r becaming member' of the United Nation in 1946 became one 
of the worla body's strongest supporters. Thailand sent troops 
to repel communist aggression and has kept a small contingent 
there since that time. The r ise to power of the Chinese 
communists in Peking in 1949 frightened the Phibun regime. The 
Thai sought a reg ional m i l i t e ry defenee t r ea ty again-st the 
possible communist attack but were thwarted unt i l the Manila 
Pact was signed in 1954, bringing together the Phi l ippines, 
Pakistan, Austra l ia , New Zealand, the United S t a t e s , Br i ta in , 
and France, as we l l as the Thai in the South-east Asian Treaty 
Organization. The Thai wanted SKATO to be much stronger than 
i t turned out to be, with provisions f o r automatic response in 
24 
case ol aggression and large-scale economic a id . When the 
24. Ib id. , p. 312. 
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communist a c t i v i t i e s arose in Laos in the ear ly 1960s, Thailand 
desperately wanted ShATO to respond to the s i tua t ion . But i t 
was declined because i t might lead other consequences. When 
the communist P?,lhet Lao v io la ted the cease - f i r e across the 
Mekong River , American forces were landed in Thailand in 1962. 
'Thailand today is probably less interested in reg ional 
selective^ securi ty , which has proved so d i f f i c u l t to achieve, 
than i t i s in the c losest possible working re lat ionship with 
the United citates commensurate with i t s d ign i ty and independence 
u 
In the words of Vanden bosch and Butwell, "Another measurse of 
the Thai-American partnersmip i s the increasing number of 
United States Servicemen stationed in the country - more t&an 
20,000 in mid 1966 and the use of a i r f i e l d s in Thailand f o r 
raiQS on the ho Chi Minh Trail (from North to South Vietnam) 25 
and other targets in the Vietnamese war." There are mapy^Th^is 
who have openly expressed that while they are of Asian and of 
necessity must confront d i r e c t l y the problems of that continent, 
the United State is not an Asian"nation and could retreat across 
the P a c i f i c . 
The Thai f ind the i r main fr iends in Asia, accordingly 
i n such stated as Japan, the Phi l ippines, and Malaysia. Thai-
land strongly supported e l f o r t s to bring about regional economic 
co-operation through the Association f o r South-East Asia , in 
which i t shared membership with the F i l ip inos and Malay, in the 
25. Ib id . , p. 314. 
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early 1960s. But i t took a grave turn when the Malaysia plan 
came into being, the controversy over inclufiien o f Sabah, also 
claimed by the Philippines, in the new state of Malaysia 
when i t was formed in 1963. Thailand warmly greated e f f o r t s 
to revive ASA in 1966 and even proposed i t s enlargement. With 
Burma, 0?hailand has cordial relat ions but with Cambodia the 
re lat ions have been strained because of communist China's 
f r iendly re lat ions, I3ae Thai approach to Peking i s almost direc-
t l y the opposite. Now Thailand's future depends upon the policy 
o f the United States which is a great a l l y and at her door the 
Chinese are knocking, the future of Diailand i s not secure i f 
the United State thinks otherwise. And the increasing influence 
o f USA in this area would necessarily mean the in tens i f i ed 
Chinese act iv i ty i n this region. I t w i l l load to tension 
and Consequent danger of an armed con f l i c t . I t i s l i k e l y to 
become a battleground for those nations who are in search o f 
new enemies of war for the t r i a l o f their strength, Thailand 
would remain fo r a long time to come within the sphere o f 
influence of U.S.A. I t would serve as an - e f f e c t i v e bas:&. 
India 's basic policy in this region i s the restorat ion o f rea l 
freedom and free cooperation o f the nations of th is part o f 
the world. The economy o f this region i s complementary and i f 
they work cooperatively i t w i l l be to the mutual advantages, 
Bbreign and with strongs attached to i t would necessarily mean 
wire-pull ing of the big powers including China and India is 
l i k e l y to be a f fec ted ly these wirepullings. 
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C o m b o d i a j} 
fl 
Combodia is a kingdom o f a tout 70,000 square miles wedged 
in between Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, and the Gulf of Siam, 
I t i s situated between lat i tudes 10°- 15°N, and longitudess 
102° 30'-108°E, I t i s bound on the North and West by Thialand, 
the Gulf of Siam surrounds i t in the South West, Laos and South 
Vietnam are in the Worth and East of the country. The Central 
depression has Tonle-sap, the great Lake. The r i ve r Mekong flows 
through the country to Vietnam. The main mountain range i s 
situated between the Great Lake and the Gulf of Siam with peaks 
as high as 6,000 f e e t . a3ie tropical climate o f the country 
can be divided into two seasons. One i s from mid-October to 
mid-April, and is the dry weather. The rainy season is from 
mid-April to mid-October and is caused by the South-West monsoon. 
There i s l i t t l e var iat ion in temperature, 
Eie population of Cambodia i s more than 6,000,000 and i s 
rapidly growing. The Khmers are between 85 and 90 per cent o f 
the population, '•''Whose ancestors moved down from the north-
west into the Mekong Delta two thousand years before the 
Christian era. Their culture and r e l i g i on were strongly 
influenced by Hinduism over a long period, beginning in the f i r s t 
century A.D. The Khmers were under pressure from various peoples, 
but about the year 800 there emerged the Khmer Kingdom o f 
Kambuja (now Cambodia), with i t s capital at Angkor, which 
developed a great C i v i l i z a t i on as evidenced by i t s surviving 
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monumental structures, chief of which is the temple at Angkor 
Wat, the world's largest re l i g ious bui lding;" The chief 
products are r ice , f i sh , timber, cotton, sugar , rubber, nux 
vomica, gamboge, Cardamoms and lac . Unexploited forests cover 
three-fourth of the country's area. 
The people are more a kinf to the Siamese than to the 
people of Tongkin or Annam. I t is thought that the Khmer 
(Cambodia) race originated from the mixing o f the aboriginees 
with the Aryan and Mongolian invaders of the country, Budhism 
i s the re l i g i on of the people, Brahminism i s s t i l l in f luent ia l 
at the royal court. Centuries before the chr is t ian era, 
immigrants from the coast of India entered Cambodia and i t s 
culture was strc^ngly influenced by the spread of Hinduism and 
the Sanskrit language. In the f i f t h century A.D,, S'rutavarman 
founded a dynasty and the Khmers evolved as a powerful nation. 
During the next several centuries, Cambodia retained i t s 
so l idar i ty and power under d i f f e r en t dynasties. The decline 
started in the la te thirteenth century the Thais started 
a series of attacks. Angkor f e l l in 1431, Khmer culture 
declined; Hinayana Budhism was adopted from Thai. In the 
seventeenth century the Khmers began to experience pressure 
on the east from the kingdom o f Annam in present day Vietnam 
which by 1700 had won control over the Mekong Delta, At the 
close o f the eighteenth century the provinces o f Battambang 
and Siem-reap were annexed by Siam, and the Siamese p o l i t i c a l 
inf luence grev; at the Cambodian court, '•"A remnant of the 
Khmer people constitutes an important minority in South Vietnam 
today and serves as a reminder of the ear l i e r greatness o f the 
1. Vandenbosch and Butwell, "The Changing Face o f South-East 
Asia" Lexington (USA), p, 220, 
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WMie? Kingdom , while the presence of some 400,000 Vietnamese 
in Cambodia keeps a l i ve the fear of Vietnamese aggression. 
Caught between the r i va l forces of the Thai and Anamese (or 
Vietnamese) kingdoms, Cambodia in 1846 became a vassal of 
2 
both". In 1863, Pierre de-la Gradiere, Governor of Cochin 
China, came to Cambodia and turned i t into a French Protectorate 
A f te r some protests, Slam (Thailand) recogbused the French 
protectorate over Cambodia in exchange fo r Battambang, Angkor 
and the Laos t e r r i t o ry west of the Mekong River. The F'renchx 
Cambodia Treaty of 1884 great ly reduced the powers of the King 
and in tens i f i ed the French control of the country. Under 
French pressure, Thailand ceded Battambang, Siem-reap (Angkor) 
and Sisiphon in 1907. 
During the pre war days, the French pract ica l ly 
control led a l l importent aspects of administration as we l l as 
fore ign re lat ions, public works, custom, and the Finance. 
Professor Holland r ight ly observe, "the new pnase of Asian 
Nationalism is to discover a body of national idea ls , 
ins t i tut ions , att i tudes, myths, t rad i t ions , history, l i t e ra ture 
3 
and even language." During the irforld War I I , under Japanese 
pressure, Cambodia had to give Battambang, most of Siem-reap 
1. I b i d . . p. 221. 
2. Holland, viillem, L. "Asian Nationalism And the West." p. 6. 
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and parts of Kompong Thorn and strung Treng back to Thailand 
according to the Treaty signed on 9 May 1941. These t e r r i t o r i e s 
were returned to Cambodia in 1946 by the Thai-French Treaty 
4 
signed in Washington. 
There were very few e l i t e in Cgrabodia before the second 
VJorld war; v i r tua l l y no native middle class existed, and there 
was no national ist movement'of any consequence. When the 
Japanese depored the French from power in Indo-China in March 9, 
1945, the King of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk, declared the 
independence of his country. On 10 October, 1945,. French, 
Br i t ish and Indian troops occupied Phon Penh, the capi ta l of 
Cambodia. On 7 January 1946 a modus vivendi was signed between 
France and Cambodia under whish e f f e c t i v e authority was s t i l l 
retained by the French High Commissioner in Cambodia who 
happened to be the counsellor to the King, However, the King 
assured his people that he had not forgotten their aspirations 
f o r independence, France sent technicians and furnished 
capi ta l to help the country and used i t s influence to induce 
Thailand to restore the " lost provinces". By a treaty of 
November 8, 1949, France recognised the dejure' independence of 
Cambodia, but retained considerable control over fore ign relat ions 
and the army," 
1, Poplai , d,L. (edited) "Asia And Afr ica in the Modern World." 
Bembay, 1955, p. 74. 
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The King Norodom Sihanouk a f t e r the war had resolved 
to cnange the government from an absolute to a constitutional 
« 
monarchy as rapidly as possible On 31 May 1946, an e lec tora l 
law was promulgated for the e lect ion, by universal and direct 
vote , of a consultative Assembly which was to give i t s opinion 
on the constitution. The electionS_,took place in September 
and the constitution was promulgated on 6 May 1947. Professor 
Hall observes, " Cambodia had became a constitutional kingdom 
under a constitution promulgated on 6 May 1947 by King. Norodom 
Sihamouk* The central government consisted of a monarch with 
acouncil of Kingdom, a Prime Minister and Cabinet, and a 5 
National Assembly elected every four years by direct suf lerage . " 
In December 1947, elections were held for the f i r s t National 
Assembly. Democratic Party emerged as a Magority Party of 
National Assembly. Soon a dispute arose over a treaty with 
France in 1949 between the Executive and the Legistature. The 
King was in favour and the Democratic Party in National 
Assembly opposed the treaty of 1949, Because of deadlock, the 
King ordered a fresh elections and the elections were held in 
September 1951 but the Democratic won two-thirds of the seats 
and the King found himself in an unpleasant posit ion. There 
was a c r i s i s in Cambodia. On the one side the French insisted 
that the anti-French elements should be removed from the govern-
5. Hal l , D.G.E., "The history of South East As ia . " p. 835. 
N . I . 1966. , 
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ment and on the other s ide, National Assembly demanded complete 
Independence atonce and more oJ/er, the dissident groups v;ho 
were not in the government were crying that the people should 
defy French rule and take up arms for independence. The King 
found himself in a c r i t i c a l posit ion. He dismissed the 
Democratic ministry and asked the National Assembly to approve 
emergency powers f o r three years. But at the refusal of 
National Assembly, the Kind dissolved i t and declared Martial 
Law in January 1963. Now the King began to demand country's 
independence and went to Paris f o r discussion. He returned 
home dishearted and began to engage in a "dramatic propaganda 
move:'"' In June (1953) he went into voluntary ex i l e in Bangkok, 
declaring that he would not return to his palace in PHiQfc.n Penh 
unti l France had granted his country complete independence. 
He stated that he would ask Thailand to bring the case of 
6 
Cambodia's Independence before the United Nations, France, at 
l eas t , agreed for ta lk . Sihanouk returned a f te r a week in 
Bangkok and negotiatio.is began from his residence in Ballambang 
in northern Cambodia. On November 8, 1963, returned to his 
cap i ta l in triuaiph " and with complete v i c to ry . 
Now, Sihanouk urged constitutional reforms aimed at 
greater governmental s t ab i l i t y and the internal p o l i t i c a l 
s i tuat ion continued to cause the King concern. And in the 
6. Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. 222. 
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mean while Vietnamese c r i s i s arose and spread to the whole 
Indo-China. There were two Vietnamese governments. One was 
known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under President 
Ho chi Minh and the other the State of Vietnam under Bao Dai 
along with the kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos, Communist powers 
recognised HoCfei'Mliih's, government and Bao Dai's government was 
recognised by Vestern Powers, The c r i s i s spread throughout, 
lndo-Ch.ina in lc)53 and in 1954. Ho Chi Mtnh's forces entered 
into Cambodia to f i ght the Western forces in 1954. In July 21, 
1954, the Cease-f ire agreements signed at Geneva resulted in 
the withdrawal of a l l Viet Minh troops from the country. The 
Geneva declaration also expressed the hope that Cambodia, Loas 
and Vietnam would be f u l l y independent. 
The personal rule of the King was approved on 10 February o 
1955 by referendum in which 794,876 voted for him and 1,276 
7 
against him. King Sihanouk wanted po l i t i c a l reforms in the 
country. He, therefore, afedicated^i"^ favour of his fa ther , 
Prince Norodom Suramarit and organised his own party, Vanden-
bosh and Butwell wr i te , "An important factor which led him to 
make this drastic move was the opposition of the International 
control commission, which had been setup to supervise the Geneva 
Agreements, to his proposed reforms, which would have d i s -
8 
enfranclised many of his p o l i t i c a l opponents," 
7. Poplai , op . c i t , , p. 76, 
8, Vandenbosbh and Butwell, o p . c l t . , p, 223, 
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Prince Sihanauk formed Sangkum Reastr Nlyum (People 's 
Soc ia l i s t Community). In September 11, 1965, Prince Siharouk's 
Party w n 83 percent o f the votes and a l l o f the seats in the 
National Assembly. Latter on, Prince Sihanouk ins t i tu ted the 
National Congress, "a binnual forum to which the people were 
inv i ted to meet with him and his advisers to discuss current 
issues and a i r the ir grievances against l e g i s l a t o r s and 
government o f f i c i a l s . In 1957, the Congress was given a 
const i tut ional basisj the government and the National Assembly 
must execute the decisions o f Congress, and deadlocks between 
f 
the National Assembly and the executive must go to the Congress 
f o r resolution?*' Professor Hal l r i gh t l y observes, "King 
"Norodom's (Sihamuk) dramatic moves to f ree his country from 
French control brought him c r i t i c i sm as wel l as success. His 
self-imposed ex i l e , h is res ignat ion of the crown in 1955 i n 
favour of his father in order to f i gh t a general e lec t ion, 
and his subsequent changes o f mid about his own pos i t ion 
looked to some lik-e the exhibitionism o f p o l i t i c a l l y immature 
young man. But a King he could rot g ive the country the leader-
ship i t needed and although undoubted e r ra t i c , he had a c lear 
conception of his country's needs especia l ly o f the r e a l i t i e s 
o f i t s precarious posit ions in a World divided by the Cold War, 
In external a f f a i r s he adopted the neutral ist po l icy expounded 
by India 's Mr, Nehru, and played o f f one side against the other 
25. Ibid., p. 314. 
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i n order to obtain economic help f o r Cambodia with Communist 
China in 1966 he negotiated an agreement wherety China, invested 
capital in Cambodian corrmierclal undertakings. Next, he secured 
an agreement with Russia f o r the supply o f industr ial equip-
ment and technical instructors. From the United States, he 
received aM for i r r i ga t ion , education, health and road making 
projects, and towards the upkeeps o f his army, not to mention 
10 
an emergency supply o f r ice when the Cambodian harvest fai led.** 
In 1958, Prince Sihanaouk and his party won again in 
general elect ions. But at the same time there were other c r i s i s 
f inancia l scandal, an alleged plot to over throw the government, 
the death of the King and heightened tension between Cambodia 
and i t s neighbour, Thailand and South Vietnam, led to minister ia l 
c r i s i s . He emerged victorious in a l l c r i s i s . The problem o f 
the succession to the throne was solved by the creation of a 
new o f f i c e , the Chief o f State. Sihanouk was "Chosen*^ * as a 
head o f State by a popiiler refrendum on June 7, 1960. Kbw 
Sihanouk became a master of Cambodian po l i t i c s . In 1962, his 
party emerged victorious and he gave to the country the stable 
administration. The result of a l l this is a land o f remarkable 
s tab i l i t y located l i t e r a l l y next to the World's number one 
11 
trouble spot, war-ravaged Vietnam. Although, Siharouk had 
10. Hall , o p . c l t . . p. 836. 
11. Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . , p. 225. 
- 130 -
recognised and closely co-operating with Communist China and 
has recognised Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic o f Vietnam" 
but he has also vigorously opposed the communists and the ir 
movements in the country. In 1965 Sihanouk c r i t i c i s ed the 
communists of his country f o r the ir obstructionist behaviour and 
the ir anti government propaganda. The royal blood are the 
ruling e l i t e in Cambodia. There i s more formidable oppositidn 
from the Khmer Serai dissident movement based both in South 
Vietnam and Thailand to the exist ing regime, Bambodia's 
neighbours to the east and the West. His resistence to such 
fore ign intereference sharpens the image o f him as a dedicated 
patr iot s tr iv ing to develop his realm as a land increasingly 
capable of dealing with the problems of the second hal f of the 
12 
twentieth century. Prince Sihanouk, now, occupies a pivatal 
posit ion in Cambodian po l i t i c s . But he has done l i t t l e to help 
to develop h is country polit ical ly^. He has not prepared f o r 
this day constitut ional ly, ins t i tu t iona l l y , or otherwise^ There-
fo re , the future of the country i s uncertain i f he i s no more 
there. 
Cambodia under Prince Sihanouk fol lows a policy o f 
thorough going neutralism. According to Professor Hall , 
Norodom's neutralism re f l ec ted the intense desire of his people 
f o r independence, and their remembrance o f the long Thai-
13 
Vietnamese cohtest f o r control over his country.^* Prince 
Sihanouk once declared, "Our neutral ity has been imposed on us 
12. Ib id . , p. 226. 
13. Hall , op . c i t . J p. 836, 
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by necessity. A glance at a map of our part of the world w i l l 
show that we are wedged in between two medium-si2ed nations 
of the lAfestern bloc and only thinly screened by Loas from the 
scrutiny of two countries of the Eastern bloc, North Vietnam 
and the vast People's Republic of China. What choice have 
14 
we but to -try. to maintain an equal balance between the boles i " 
I t claims to be- neutral even against neutrals. An important 
factor in his sh i f t may have been the influence of India 's 
Prime Minster, Jawaharlal Nehru, who v i s i t ed Phnon Penh in 
November 1954. From about this time the iODV.e toward .neutralism 15 
became noticeable. Prince Sihanouk signed a friendship pact 
in February 1:^ 56 with communist China which embodied '.non-
aggression, non interference in the internal a f f a i r s of other 
countries, peace-ful co-existence, and equality and mutual 
b a n i f i t . Cambodia concluded agreements on economic and cultural 
re la t ion with communist China. In June 21, 1956 an agreement 
was Signed in Peking;.,China was to invest W 22,400,000 in the 
c o n s t r j c f c n of t e x t i l e , cement, paper, and plywood factor ies 
in Cambodia. Kiejft Sihanouk made an "uno f f i c i a l " v i s i t to the 
dov .et Jnion, where likewise an agreement :or- economic and 
industr ia l aid to Cambodia was concluded. The Soviets agreed 
to supply industrial equipment and technicians- instructors 
to Cambodia, and to build, equip and s ta f f a hospital in the 
14. Prince Sihanouk, "Foreign Afiairs', ' July 1958. 
15. Vandanbosch and Butwell, 0E£it^, p. 228. 
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Cambodia capi ta l of Phnon Penh. Sihanouk manifested his 
appreciat ion of the Soviet promises by declaring that the hope 
of his people, '^t'est^ in the Soviet Union f o r the r ea l i z a t i on 
16 
of our desires f o r peace and prosper i ty . " Though Cambodia 
was gett ing American aids and assistance but Pr ince 's at t i tude 
towards the United States was not sympethetic. He ca l l ed 
American assistance consisted mainly of luxury items. His 
att i tudes and l i n e of thinking were more sympethetic towards 
communist countries than the West. In 1969, he v i s i t ed Cairo 
and declared his country's f o r e i gn po l icy as neutra l i ty in 
internat ional sphere. Because of i t s neutrality,Cambodia was 
gett ing aids and assistance from both the blocs f o r her 
economy and m i l i t a r y . 
o 
Cambodian re lat ions with Thailand and South Vietnam 
were not cord ia l because there were border clasnes and guer r i l l a 
a c t i v i t i e s against Cambodia and Cambodia charged the west f o r 
a l l these a c t i v i t i e s . Sihanouk hailed communist China as the 
"only e f f e c t i v e support and rea l brother ' of Cambodia. At the 
same time, "South Vietnam government has asserted that the 
Vietcong the Communist g u i r r i l l a f o r c es , use Combodian t e r r i t o r y 
as a haven from which to make raids on Vietnamese outposts." 
Moreover, "the f ron t i e r between the two countries i s poorly 
def ined and much of i t runs tarough jungle, i t is not surprising 
Ib id . , p. 230. 
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that there .are repeated border inc idents , " In the vjords of 
Vandenbosch and Butv;e-il, " I t was quite c lear by 1966, however, 
that there were major Vietcong supply, regroupment and hospital 
f a c i l i t i e s within Cambodi^$jfrontiers despite Sihanouk's past 
denial^. This was but one of several indicators that rea l 
17 
Cambodian neutralism may have become a thing of the past . " 
They further s ta te , "Sihanouk has backed Cuba in i t s continuing 
controversy with the United States and supported China in i t s 
border dispute with India. Cambodia was also the only non-
communist government to congratulate China on the explosion of 
an atomic bombs. A f te r his return from, a v i s i t to communist 
China in October 1964, Prince Sihanouk declared that China 18 
was Cambodia's "number one f r i end . " 
In 1963, Prince Sihajiouk announced the immediate 
nat iona l i zat ion ol the import, and export businesses and of 
Cambodian banks. He further declared that Cambodia wished no 
further American and French mi l i ta ry economic aid a f t e r January 
1, 1964, and that American and JFrejach mi l i ta ry missions would 
also have to leave . The re lat ions of Cambodia with United States 
continued to de ter iora te . Several attempts were made to 
improve the re lat ions but Cambodian pro-communist att i tude ended 
the talks in deadlocks, "Neutral" Cambodia, has become a show-
case f o r co-existance with comminist China from the 
Chinese point ol view. Tiie United States, hov;ever, is unhappy 
17. I b i d . , p. 233. 
25. Ib id . , p. 314. 
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with the situation. China's Influence in Cambodia lias grown 
steadi ly as Prince Sihanouk has moved from reliance on the 
United States and the iAfest toward the courtship of the 
communist East; the Psychological pressure on Thailand and 
iaouth Vietnam has increased; and the Western posit ion in 
South-east Asia has deteriorated badly, f o r once the Western 
pressure has disappeared from a country, only extraordinary 
developments can restore i t . Perhaps the movement of Prince 
Sihanouk toward closer relations with Peking can be explained 
by the conviction on his part that China is going to dominate 
the region and that Cambodia must accmodate i t s e l f to the 
coming situation. 
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L a o s 0 
fi 
Laos i s a small, landlocked, under developed country, 
sparsely populated by a co l l ec t ion of tr ibes without a national 
h is tory . The kingdom o f Laos is situated between latitud^sn" 
13°40»W, and longitudes 100°-107°40'E. I t has an approximate 
area of 91,000 square miles o f mountainous country with" a popula-
t ion of two mil l ion, only about 8 per cent area of the country 
i s suitable for agriculture. About hel f o f the population o f 
Laos i s related to the Thais and to the Shans o f Burma. The 
remaining population consists of d i f f e r en t tr ibes l i k e l<bi,tb-ipg, 
Mans, Meos and Lolos, who had probably migrated to Laos from 
South China in the past centuries. Vandehbosch and Butwell 
observe, ""As in the case o f the v;hole of vAiat was Indo-China, i t s 
geographic posit ion has made i t important in World po l i t i c s . The 
ancient Tiwalr ies of the region, suppressed in the days o f 
Western Colonial rule, have broken out a fresh, and in addit ion 
Laos has been subject to the pressure o f the world wide con f l i c t 
between the communists and the anti-communists. In short, Laos 
i s in the cockpit of intense competition f o r loca l supremacy 
and international ascendancy}" 
The country can be divided into High Laos and Low Laos 
The former consists o f deep r i ver val leys and mountains with 
peaks as high as 6,600 f e e t . Low Laos i s a steppe-l ike country. 
1. Vandenbosch and Butwell, "The Changing Face o f South-East 
Asia", Lexington (USA), 1966, 
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which i s mainly used lor r.eaylng Cat t l e . There is a wide 
var i e ty of climate in the country. In Vientiane, the cap i ta l 
o 
of the country, the temperature varies-from 50 to 100°. The 
South-West Mansoon, lasting from May to October, brings from 
50 to 80 inches of rain to most parts of the country. I t is 
stretched over 600 miles from North to South in the Indo-Chinese 
peninsula. I t is the least developed part of the Indo-Chinese 
peninsula. The forest and mineral wealth is large ly un-
explo i ted. Teak is the main forest product. Beiore the war, 
the t i n mines in Laos -used to produce 1,200-2,000 tons of one 
per annum. There were no railways in Laos, but the Mek6ng 
r i ver provides an important means of communications. I t f lows 
through seven of the eleven provinces. 
The kingdom of Nan-Tchao was lounded by the Laotians ? 
about A.D. 713. After three centuries as a unif ied kingdom, 
Laos sp l i t in the seventeenth century into the kingdoms of 
Luang Prabang, Vientiane and champassak. By the end of the 
eighteenth century, a large part of Laos was ruled by Siairi-
(now Thailand), while Annam had established sovereignty over 
the South-Eastern part of the country. A f ter 1830, part of 
Luang Prabang also paid tr ibute to Annam. In 1893, three 
B'rench mi l i tary expeditions occupied important towns in Laos. 
Siam (now Thailand) was iorced to cede to France a large part 
of the Laotian t e r r i t o ry under her possession under a treaty 
signed on 3 October 1893. The Luang Prabang area /^est of Mekong 
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remained v/ith Siam, but that also was taken- in 1904. In 1907 
Siam recognised the rights of France in Laos, During the 
pre-war years, southern Laos was administered by the French 
d i r e c t l y , while the northern part of the country was ruled as 
a French protectorate by the King of Luang Prabang, This 
arrangement unchanged during the Japanese period. 
Japan took over the control of the whole of Laos on 
9 March, 1945, the French protectorate was ended and the 
independence of Laos was proclaimed. A Laotian Government 
under Japanese protection came into being on 15 Apr i l 1946. 
Af ter the f a l l of Japan, on 1 September, Prince Petsarath, 
the Premier, denounce'd the French protectorate in a proclama-
t ion, On 15 September, he declared the whole oi the country 
as the kindom of Laos ruled by the King of Luang Prabang, In 
Vientiane, Issarak, or the Free Laotian, created a People's 
Committee which declared a provijasional constitution on 
13 October and a new provisional government under Phya Khammao 
was iormed , and the King was made to abdicate. I t was only 
ear ly in 1946 that the French reoccupied Laos, and the Free 
Laotians had to move their government to Bangkok. Prince 
Petsarath now headed the Free Laotians and he was assisted 
by his brothers Souvann Phouma and So'Upharion Vong. 
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There was no clear sign of Laotian nationalism before 
World War. The Japancese occupation undoubtedly in spired 
2 
some anti-French sentiment and a ffiildj. nationalism. A modus-
vivendi was signed on 27 August ly47 between France and the 
King of Laos. I t confirmed the unity and independence of Laos 
and democratic Inst i tut ions for Laos was promised. This 
agreement strengthened the King's posit ion and the name of the 
kingdom was changed to Laos, Laotian nationalism at the end 
of lAforld i a r ' I I was f eeb le , and i t is s t i l l weak two decades 
l a t e r , '//hateven national ist sentiment existed was used by 
r i v a l ar istocrat ic Lao famil ies fo r control of the country. 
In view of the soc ia l conditions which preva i l , this is not 
surprising. A genuine, broad-based Laotien nationalism w i l l 
take time to develop. During their occupation,the Japanese 
gave both Laos and Cambodia v i r tua l self-government, and the 
Laotian e l i t e were determined not to luse gains, i^ ome of the 
national ist elements took to the buslk under communist leadership 
in hopes pi duplicating the Viet Minh feats in neighbouring 
Vietnam. Other nationalists agitated for freedom from colonial 3 
rule under non-communist leaders. By the Treaty of 19 July 1949 
between Laos and France, Laos became an Associated dtate within 
the French Union. By March 1954, 37 states had recognised Laos. 
2. Ib id . , p. 201. 
3* Ib id . , p. 202. 
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VJhen the 19 July Agreement was signed, the Free Laotian 
Government in Bangkok dissolved; soon a f t e r this, Souvanna 
Phouma became the Prime Minister of Laos, but his brother 
Souphanon Vong did not submit and organised a resistance 
irovement on Viet Minh l ines . Prince Petsarath withdrew from 
po l i t i c s . Prince Soupharon Vong established close contacts 
with the Viet Minh and announced the formation of a Laotian 
People's united Front in I960. On 22 October 1963, King 
Sisavang Vong signed a treaty of friendship and association 
with France in which Laos was recognised as f u l l y independent 
and sovereign"' state. Laos reaff irmed her membership of the 
French Union. France undertook to support the sovereignty and 
independence o f Laos. 
According to Vandenbosch and Butwell, "The obstacle to 
the rea l i zat ion o f Laotian national aspirations was not France 
but the Viet Minh. Ihey made unproked thrusts into Laotian 
ter r i tory in 1951 and in 1963-1964 and a l l i e d themselves with 
the i n i t i a l l y weak Pathet Lao rebel ls (Free Laotian Forces). 
Prince Souphanou Vong a pro-communist, had t r i ed to psrsm^de 
the non-communist Lao Issara dissidents to cooperate with 
Viet Minh but f a i l ed , was expelled, and turned to building 
up the Pathet Lao. The Lao Issara dissolved, but the Pathet Lao 
f irmly established themselves as a resistance movement against 
both the French and the royal Lao government. Reinforced by 
North Vietnam troops, they made themselves secure in the north 
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of the country along the border with what is now North Vietnam, 
and by the end of 1953 they had fought their way to within a 
short distance of Luang Prabang, the cap i ta l . They then with-
4 
drew to the northern provinces ol fciam Neua ancj Phong ia-aly." 
Therefore, Geneva agreement ol July 1954 provided for a cease-
f i r e in Laos. The Viet Minh and the French forces were required 
to leave the country and the f ight ing units of Patliet Lao were 
required to concentrate inithe provinces of Phong Saly and 
dam-lifeua. In two declarations, the Government of Loas promised 
f r e e , general elect ions by secret bal lot and announced their 
intention not to jo in 'mi l i tary al l iance not is conformity 
with the U.N. Charter or to give bases to fore ign mil i tary forces 
unless the country's security were threatened. 
Professor Hall observes, "After the Geneva Agreement 
trouble at once arose over the posit ion of the pro-communist 
Pathet Lao forces, which had cooperated c lose ly with the 
Viet Minh in the anti-French struggle. They seized the 
provinces of Pnong Saly and the Sam -Neua the north Vietnam 
f ron t i e r , and inspite ol the attempts of the control commission 
to negotiate a settlement they refused to accept the authority 
of the Laotian government. They wanted the alignment of 
the i r contry with i t s neighbours communist China and North 
Vietnam. Their p o l i t i c a l wing known as Neo Lao Haksat ( 
(Patr io t ic Party of Laos), was led by Prince Souphanon Vong, 
4 . Vandevbosch and Butwell, oP . c i t . , p. 223. 
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who had received communist in-doctrination in China. There 
was much f ight ing in 1956 a new Prime Minister, Prince 
Souvamna Phouma, negotiated a settlement with his ha l f -
brother by which Phong &aly and Sam Nevia were to came under 
the jur isd ict ion of zhe central government and the Pathet 
5 
Lao forces be integrated in the royal army." Professor Hall 
further maintains, "The agreement was, however, extremely 
complex, and i t s implementation painful ly slow because of 
the hos t i l i t y and suspicions of bothsides. There was also 
the fact that Laos had w i l l y n i l l y become the batt le ground 
of forces beyond her control . On one side were the communist 
dtat e China and North Vietnam, on the other anti-communist 
Thailand with the Central organization of SEATO in Bangkok. 
Moreover, not with standing the neutral status la id down for 
Laos at Geneva, American pol icy was seeking to build herup as 
an anti-communist bastion. American aid per head of the 
population was higher'than to any other country in the World, 6 
and f ou r f i f t h of i t went to the army and the Po l i c e . " 
Prince Souvanna Phouma assumed the premiership a f t e r 
a long cr ises . Alter an agreement with the Pathet Lao in 
1966, Souvanna phouma declared that Laos would- fol low a 
pol icy of neutra l i ty ' and in his own words, as, " more neutral 
5. Hal l , D.G.E., The History of oouth-East Asia, p. 836. 
Ib id . , p. .837. 
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than neutralism.'^ The Palhet Lao and Souphanon Vong joined 
cabinet and the army and moreover, the provinces of Phong Saly 
and Sam Neua were o f f i c i a l l y transferred in Debember 1967. The 
National Assembly was enlarged and supplementaiy e lect ion fo r 
the additional National Assembly seats were held in 1968. The 
Pathet-Lao front , the Neo Lao Naksat was permitted '•''undertake 
their po l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s in the l ega l forms as the other 
po l i t i c a l parties. A f te r elect ions, coa l i t i on government was 
set up with Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister and Prince 
Souphanou Vong as minister of economic planning. 
Now Pathet Lao wanted relat ions on diplomatic l e ve l with 
China, North Vietnam and the Soviet Oaion, and the receipt 
of aid from these countries too along tfnited States. But 
America threatened to withdraw i t s economic assistance. 
Therefore American aid was suspended on 30th June 1968 and 
then economic assistance was resumed in October. Professor 
Hall observes, " In May 1957 an other cr is is below up when 
the Pathet Lao forces were reported to be gett ing outside 
aid. But in the fol lowing November things looked better 
when the National Assembly approved a new cabinet under 
Souvanna Phouma which included Souphanou Vong and one other 
Neo Lao Haksat representative. In May 1958 elect ions for 
new seats in an enlarged National Assembly resulted in greatly 
increased Neo Lao Haksat representative. This alarmed the 
r ight wing parties so much that a new group ca l l ing i t s e l f 
the committee f o r the Defence o f National Interests came 
forward demanding a cabinet able to check the increasing 
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increasing influence of the l e f t wing. In July Souvanna 
Phouma resigned and the situation once mor.e deteriorated, 
a 
To cut short a very detai led story^much worse crises arose 
in 1959 involving an appeal to the United Nations by the 
Laotian c^binfet . which alleged acts of aggression by North 
Vietnam. A sub-committee sent to the spot by the United 
Nations could f ind no evidence of v io lat ions of the f ront i e r 
by North Vietnamese troops, and ciecretary General Dag 
Hammershjold, who went to a personal v i s i t to Laos in 
November, urged the adoption of a more neutral fore ign pol icy 
7 
and a reduction in mi l i tary aid from the lAfest", Phoni 
iiananiK-one became a f t e r iiouvanna Phouma, who was pro-vJestern 
and pursued a bold anti-communist pol icy. Therefore, 
Pathet Law reacted to this pol icy by return to i t s former 
methods, including open f i ght ing . I t was al leged that out-
side communist aid was being given to Pathet Lao and asked 
the United Nations to sand a team of observers. In November 
1959, Deg Hammerskjold payed a personal v i s i t and advised 
the Laotian government to pursue a pol icy of neutralism. 
Because of dissension in the cabinet PhoM" SananiKone resigned, 
and the King placed the country under the temporary control 
of the army. 
7. Ib id , p. 837. 
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In the meanwhile, a quite surprising event took place 
on the night of August 9, I960. G§ptain Kang'le staged a coup 
and soon took over the government and declared a neutral ist 
pol icy. Souvanna Phouma again became a Premier. Now there" 
developed an internal c r i s i s . Professor Hall r i ght ly observes, 
""But the country was now plunged into c i v i l war, in the 
course of which the right wing General Phoumi No so van, close 
connection of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the mil i tary 
dictator of Thailand, with American moral support, captured 
Vientiane, drove out Souvanna Phouma and placed Prince Boun 
Oum, the extreme right-wing leader, in power. Neither side, 
however, could win an out r ight v ictory. The situation looked 
to be dangerous to World peace. Action was, however, taken 
j o in t l y by Bri ta in and Russia as co-chairmen of the or ig ina l 
Geneva Conference, and eventually a f t e r further c r i s i s , a se t t l e -
ment was arrived at in 1962 much along with l ines of the 
8„ 
o r i g ina l plan."' 
When the c r i s i s was going on, China warned the Brit ish 
and Russian governments that the situation in Laos had" 
developed to extremely dangerous proportions "and that China 
would" have to consider taking measures to safeguards i t s 
9 
own s e c u r i t y . A f t e r Geneva agreement which was signed 
8. Hall , o p . c i t . , 837. 
9. Vandenbosch and Butwell, op . c i t . ^ p, 211, 
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on July 23, 1962, Souvanna Phouma formed a coa l i t i on cabinet 
"'composed of e leven neutrals, four r i gh t i s t s , and four Pathet 
Lao, with neutral ist Souvanna Phouma as Premier and minister 
o f defence, the l e f t i s t Souphanou Vong as deputy Premier and 
Minister o f National economy and planning, and Phoumi Nbsavan 
as Minister o f f inance and also a deputy Premier. Prince 
Boun Oum was re-appointed f o r l i f e as Inspector General o f the 
10 
Kingdom.'-'' The royal government o f Laos made a formal 
Declaration o f Neutrality which was accepted by a l l . This 
agreement did not l as t long because a f t e r some time, there 
developed a crises withing the various fac t ions . Premier 
Souvanna Phouma t r i ed to s e t t l e d i f f e rences with the Pathet Lao 
but f a i l e d . In Apr i l 1964, he annoTimced i n despair that he 
would resign. Now some sections o f the army o f right-wing 
and security po l i ce J)ut the Premier under arrest . This c r i s i s 
took a new turn, Pathet Lao forces put under the i r own control 
about t w - t h i r d s of the t e r r i t o r y by the beginning o f 1965, 
There was also. United States 's aid f o r Souvanna Phouma, 
"JNforth Vietnam clear ly was aiding the rebe l l s (the pathet Lao). 
Lao government troops, i n f a c t , captured some North Vietnamese 
regular troops. Premier Souvanna Phouma in September 1964 
declared that 12,000 North Vietnamese regulars were operating 
inside Laos. The United State in l a t e 1964 began air-bombing 
o f key points in Laos, in part icular along the Ho Chi Minh 
T r i a l (from North to South Vietnam), which runs through 
10, Ibid., p, 214, 
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11 
Pathet Lao control led t e r r i t o r y . " In the suimnar o f 1966, 
Pathet Lao had not mounted a major o f f ens i v e during las t 
month of the dry season. Laotian government succeeded i n 
hal t ing Pathet Lao movement and the government also succeeded 
in overcoming internal c on f l i c t s and problems which were 
large ly o f ecommic nature. Now Laos was gett ing economic 
and mi l i tary aids from various countries on large scale. 
There can be no peace or real economic s t ab i l i t y in Laos 
unt i l there i s a change in the regional and global internat ional 
s i tuation. The d i f f i c u l t i e s in Laos are in extr icably re lated 
to the h o s t i l i t i e s in Vietnam and the expansionist pressure 
o f China. The Laotian f r on t i e r has no r e a l i t y , certa inly 
none from a mi l i tary point o f view. With the control o f 
eastern Laos by the Pathel Lao, the Vietcong in South Vietnam 
were assured o f a f r e e supply l i n e unti l Ajnerican planes began 
bombing the Ho Chi Minh T r i a l . But the t e r ra in through which 
th is route runs i s such that air-bombing i s not always e f f e c t i v e . 
Clearly there can be no settlement in Laos without a 
Settlement in Vietnam. And, i f the Vietnamese settlement 
i s the wrong kind of settlement, the problem a f f l i c t i n g Laos 
may increase rather than diminish. Prime Minister Sauvanna 
Phouma also t r i ed at home to obtain a cease - f i r e and peace 
ta lks with the cominunist leader Prince Souphanou Vong but a l l 
h i s e f f o r t s too f a i l e d . He i s true nat ional is t and wanted to 
remain neutral i n h is pol icy but Vandenbosch and Butwell 
11. Ibid., p. 216. 
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observe, "The ob ject ive circumstances were fa r from conducive 
to neutral ity, but Souvama Phouma was trying just the same. 
The legit imate leadership o f Laos seemed to be seeking to 
remain-genuinely neutal, But the country appeared to be 
12 
the almost inevitable captive of c o n f l i c t . " 
12. Ib id . , p. 219. 
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POLITICAL ISSUE AND MILITARY SOLUTION 
The Importance Vietnam has gained i n recent times 
en t i t l e s i t to separate treatment. The Vietnam issue has 
assumed unprecedented proportions and has become daxig^ro 
explos ive . I t had from the very beginning the potent ia l o f 
becoming very i n f luen t i a l in South-East Asian p o l i t i c s . I t 
was l i t t l e known to most o f the peoples o f the world only a 
few years back but a f t e r the world war I I the p o l i t i c a l leaders 
o f the world have been very conscious o f the s trateg ic pos i t ion 
o f th is Country i n the region. Today the bloody struggle fo r 
ascendancy in Vietnam ranks as the most threatening c r i s i s 
since the Second World War, stimulating fears o f a Third World 
War and a d irect American confrontation with communist China^ 
In Vietnam, th e^ United States has done nost thankless commit-
ment in the years since World War I I and the assumption o f 
leadership against the forces of tyranny and aggression mani-
f es ted in internat ional communism. ' The war i n Vietnam was 
costing to United States heavi ly in f inanc ia l out lay, casual-
t i e s and, not least o f a l l , prest ige i n the eyes o f the other 
2 
nations o f the world. Now America f inds i t s e l f i n a very 
1. Vandenbosch and Butwell : The Changing Face o f Southeast 
Asia, Lexington (U.S.A. ) 1966. p. 160. 
2, Ibid., p. 161. 
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awkward posit ion, mary nations "-would lose f a i th in America's 
ab i l i t y to provide leadership to the mnr-communist nations i f 
the United States were suddenly to withdraw or to suf fer defeat 
on the ba t t l e f i e l d . According to Vandenbosch and Butwell, 
""The situation was an unprecedented one for the American 
democracy. The F i r s t and Second World Wars had been in the 
American mind holy causes conducted by a l l i e s against tyranny. 
In Korea the United States had been the o f f i c i a l l y designated 
leader of a l ega l l y authorized United Nations —— international 
f i ght ing force . But Vietnam was d i f f e r en t . Chi Minh was 
not Adolph H i t l e r . And the war was a c i v i l war, f o r a l l i t s 
international s igni f icance and fore ign support of the two 
sides. Nor could communist North Vietnam or the guarr i l la 
Vietcong in South Vietnam be said to threaten the United States 
3 
in arcr immediate sense.** 
Vietnam i s in the shape o f an "S"', very • narrow at 
the centre and with a bulge at each end. Spread along the 
eastern coast o f the Indo-Chinese Peninsula,Vietnam is situated 
between lat i tudes 8°-23°N., and longitudes 100°-109°E, I t has 
an approximate area of around 127,000 square miles and the 
estimated population i s over 24 mi l l ion, making the country 
the most populous o f a l l Southeast Asia, apart from Indonesia. 
3, Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t , , p. 162, 
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The Country extends forover 1000 miles from Southern China to 
the Gulf of Siam.' I t dominates the West coast o f the South 
China Sea. Vietnam has good harbour f a c i l i t i e s developed by 
the French and possesses the potential of an excellent naval 
base at Cam Ranh Bay. Eastward by water i s the Republic o f the 
Philippines, Southeast ward Br i t ish Borneo, and Southward 
Indonesia. S igni f icant in the future po l i t i c s o f South East 
Asia may be the re lat ions between Vietnam and the Philippines 
ly ing apposite eachother in the South China Sea. In terms of 
land neighbours, Vietnam is bounded on the north y by the 
People 's Republic of China with i t s strategic island o f Hainan 
east of the Gulf o f Tonkin, The proximity of Vietnam to China, 
regardless of the government in power in that vast country, is ^ 
f ac t o f major s igni f icance in the future o f the Vietnamese. 
Westward the neighbours of Vietnam are Laos to the north and 
Cambodia to the South. Gvien the basic weakness o f Laos and 
Cambodia, the locat ion of Thailand and Burma further to the 
west and of Malaysia further to the South West i s s i gn i f i cant 
i n the po l i t i c s of peninsular South East Asia. Vietnam's loca-
t ion, i t is Clear, both with reference to the South China sea 
4 
and mainland South East Asia gives her deuded advantages," The 
delta o f the Red River consitutes the heart of the rorthern 
bulge, while the Mekong River delta at the lower end gives the 
4, F i f i e l d , Russell, H. : The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 
1946-68, p. 295. 
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South a very rich agricultural area, therefore, i t has two 
important r i ce i ) ow ls , Hanoi and Saigon are the important 
c i t i e s of these two prosperous regions. Except for some f e r t i l e 
areas along the coast of Annam and the two r i c e bowls, the rest 
o f the country i s mountainous* 
Vietnam borders on China and intepmittantly has been 
under heavy pressure o f the Chinese. l±>re than thousands years 
(186 B.C. - 939 A.D. ) Annam, as the country was then known, was 
under Chinese rule. The Vietnamese accepted Chinese culture 
r e l i g i on and l i t e ra ture and moreover imperial p o l i t i c a l struc-
ture and mandarin bureaucaapy. There were struggles for succ-
ession of Vietnamese emperor a f ter the Chinese rule* The 
d iv is ion of Annam in 1673 into the two states o f Tonking and 
Cochin China led to long series o f dynastic quarrels which 
encouraged fo re ign intervention. Therefore, the story of the 
conquest of Vietnam by the French fo l lows the usual pattern o f 
European adventures in the Asian countries. In the l a t e eighteen-
th century, the f ug i t i v e King o f Cochin China sought the help 
o f a French bishop for the restorat ion of his kingdom. The 
bishop accompanied the king 's son to Paris where a treaty was 
signed in 1787. Eventually, the king was restored and he was 
also assisted in conquering North Tonking. The Combined terre-
tor ies constituted the kingdom o f Annam. The son of the king 
suspected French missianaries o f conspiracy and they were 
ordered to leave; on their re fusal , mar^ r French and Spanish 
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priests are reported to have been k i l l e d during 1833 and 1843. 
This was followed by French gun boat demonstrations in 1843, 
1844 and 1866. 
New development took place in 1868, France and Spain 
joined forces against Annam, therefore, Saigon was captured. 
The h o s t i l i t i e s were suspended in I860 on account of the war 
against China but were resumed in 1861, In 1862, a treaty was 
signed which granted re l ig ious freedom to French missionaries 
and an indemnity o f 4,000,000. Three ports were opened to 
the French and Spanish merchants and three Cochin-Chinese 
provinces were ceded to France. In 1867, three more Annamese 
provinces were annexed. In 1874, France entered into a treaty 
with Annam whereby she acknowledged the independence o f Annam 
and gave promise f o r the protection o f the l a t t e r . The Red 
River and three more ports were opened to French commerce; 
e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l i t y was granted to a l l Europeans, This treaty 
also recognised the French annexation of three Annamese provinces 
in 1867. In 1882, France demanded a new treaty. On re fusal , 
Hanoi and some delta towns were captured-Hue', The Capital was 
also taken. By the treat ies of 1883, and 1884, the French pro-
tectorate was declared over itnnam (Central Vietnam) and Tbnkin 
(northern Vietnam). China s t i l l exercised some influence in 
Annam. The Chinese agreed to approve the 1883 and 1884 t reat ies 
i f nominal Chinese sovereignty was recognised. In 1886, a treaty 
was signed in Tientsin which recognised the French Annamese 
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t r ea t i es . The Indo-Chinese Union came into being in 1887. I t 
comprised of an administrative system which consisted o f the 
colony of Cochin-Ghina, the protectorates of Annam Tangking, 
Cambodia and Laos, and the special treaty o f Kuang.-Chouwan,-
Laos became a part of the union in 1893 and Kuang Chou-Wan was 
added in 1898 when the Chinese leased i t to the French. There-
fore , French policy in Indo-China was characterized by extreme 
assimilation, economically, cul tural ly and p o l i t i c a l l y . MDre-
over, ''France educated anel i te who became thoroughly French-
f i e d in culture but who became d i ssa t i s f i ed because few adminis-
t ra t i v e posit ion were open to them and opportunities fo r advan-
cement in business and commerce were made d i f f i c u l t by the 
sharp competition o f numerous Chinese. France reluctantly and 
6 
slowly developed representative i n s t i t u t i o n s , I n the words o f 
Professor Hall , "'In the protectorates the native system con-
tinued to function and western education made very slow progress, 
A few Franco-vernacular schools were established at provincial 
capitals f o r training native subordinates; the ir standards 
were very slow. As in the case o f the other co lonia l t e r r i t o r i e s 
in South East Asia, Vietnamese nationalism seems to have been 
6 
to special product of the Franco-vernacular schools.*^' Jbreover, 
there was l i t t l e scope f o r the employment of Vietnamese i n t e l l e -
gentsia, v;ho in their f rustrat ion became b i t t e r l y anti-French 
5, Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t , , p. 163, 
6. Hal l , D.G.E., "The History o f South East Asia.*S W.Y.1966 
p. 716. 
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and revolutionary. Professor Trager i s of the opinion, that 
**in Vietnam nationalism as we speak o f i t today certainly 
or ig inated in the waning years o f the nineteenth century. Some 
o f the movements were organized by the deposed or s l ighted 
Vietnamese emperors, some by the mandarins who were loya l to 
them, some by other patr iot ic Vietnamese who were w i l l ing to 
f i gh t against French colonialism and i t s destruction or denig-
ra t ion o f t rad i t ion Vietnamese society . How much popula2j| 
support these movements acquired i s debatable, but they certainly 
had the support o f the educated e l i t e , which inspired, orga-
7 
nized, and animated them.®" The French established themselves i n 
both Cochin China and .Ibngking by conquest. In each case i t 
was a long protected struggle, and when at least forced to give 
i n the Vietnamese never lost the hope that one day the hated 
foreigner vrould have to withdraw. Banditry was never stamped-
out, there were constant plots which the French putdown with 
heartless severi ty. The French colonists blamed the l i b e ra l . 
pol icy of Bean and Sarrant and demaned protection. Japan's 
v ictory over Russia in 1906 created a wave o f tinrest u, v/hich 
came to a head in the Gilbert Chieu conspiracy in the fo l lowing 
y e a r . The Young Annamites protested against the Franco-Russian 
a l l iance . The in te l l i gents ia , influenced by the writ ings o f 
Chinese reformers such as Kang Yu Wei, who advocated the study 
7. Trager, Frank N. t ""Why Vietnam*^, N.Y. 1966, p.S6, 
- 155 -
o f Western culture, turned to the study o f the French Phi lo-
sophical wr i ters , mtably M)ntesquieu and Rousseau, and 
f locked to the UixLversity o f Hanoi when i t was founded i n 
1907. But French measures o f repression, including the sound-
ing up o f suspects and the i r Imprisonment on Pulo condore, 
and the closing of the University, bromght what may be consi-
dered the f i r s t phase o f the twentieth-centuiy nat iona l i s t 
Q 
movement to an end. Professor Trager r i gh t l y points out,"The 
f ac to rs that gave r i s e to Vietnamese nationalism and then, 
l a t e r to communism, are easy to see and to diagnose.Primari ly 
the Vietnamese did not want to be dominated by the French 
ary more than they had, i n previous centuries, accepted domi-
nation by the Chinese. Nationalism in a co lon ia l country 
alv/ays begins as a r evo l t against the a l i en power, whether the 
domination i s p o l i t i c a l , r a c i a l , cultural , economic,or r e l i -
g ious. " He further maintains, in other Southeast Asian, 
colonies, especial ly Burma and the Dutch East Indies, the 
indigenous patriotism, which was almost always under estimated 
by the colonial power, was strengthened by the Japanese v ic tory 
over Russia, by the Chinese Repmblic-an v ic tory o f Sun Yat 
Sen by the Russian Revolution,and above a l l , by western der i -
ved ideas of democratic and Marxist-revolutionary education i n g 
th is case transmitted through the French themselves." There 
8. Hal l , o p . c i t . , p. 718. 
9, Trager, op.cit . , p. 38. 
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» 
appeared two personal i t ies In Piian Bol Chau, the founder o f 
secret soc i e t i es and Phan Chau Trlnh, the moderate In Vletname 
In the beginning of twentieth century. According to Professor 
Trager *''The f i r s t period o f Vietnamese nationalism, which 
f o r f o r t y years had been t ry ing to f ind some way o f reassort ing 
the ind iv idual i ty o f Vietnamese l i f e , may be said to have 
10 
come to an end in the mid-1920's,' ' A f ter 1925, there emerged 
two separate approaches from separate groups. ' Revo lut lomry 
groups with strong republican views, and others, under Marxist 
inf luence, began to emerge in Vietnam*® which are to be fcnown 
now (the communist)' Democratic Republic o f Vietnam and (the 11 
nat ional is t , adti-communist) Republic o f Vietnam. ' In the 
words of Professor Trager, " '^In 1927, the nat ional is t were 
organised under the name of Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnam 
National ist Party ) . I t has been ca l l ed the most s i gn i f i can t 
o f a l l noa-communist revolutionary nat ional is t organizat ions j 
i t was modeled on the Kuomintang and frequently rece ived 
support from i t . The communists, under one name or another 
such/S as the Vietnam Cach Menh Dang Minh Hal (V ie t Nam 
Revolutionary League), and the Indo Chinese communist Party 
(founded i n 1930), were led almost from the beginning by the 
12 
o f f i c i a l Comintern agent Nguyen Ai QUDC (HO Chi Minh)." Then 
10. Trager, o p . c i t . , p. 61, 
11. Ib id , , p. 
12. Ibid., p. 63, 
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nationalist and conuuunist a c t i v i t i e s shi f ted from Tangking and 
Hanoi to Cochin China and Saigon_^ |ken the second world war 
broke out in September 1939, the communists in Vietnam resumed 
their mil i tant a f ter 1933 when the Yen Bay national ist uprising 
and the communist e f f o r t s took place which were impressed by 
the French Fordes. Now the communists once more were in xailapo; 
actions. During the war years^ |fe^t^nalist and communist 
leaders found refuge in China. E^tf j:hese years the emer-
gence o f other parties in Vietnam and some were merged into 
others. In my 1941, the communist organised another«United 
Front' with the elements of the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dang Min Hoi 
(Revolutionary League for the Independence o f Viet Nam), 
popularly known as the Viet MiMi, Later o n, IJo chi 
Minh and 
his Viet Minh joined the Dang Minh Hoi and became one of i t s 
o f f i c e r s C 
Professor Trager r i ght ly observes, "At ^^hinese ins is -
tence, the Indo-Chinese ^mmunist Party had been kept out o f 
the League (United Front), though the communist were able to 
exert the ir influence through their "Front", the Viet Minh, 
which was a partner in the League. "The communist Party 's 
organisation was meanwhile kept intact under the leadership 
o f two of Ho's most trusted-lieutenants : Vo Ngioren Giap 
who had learned guerr i l la f ac t i c s under Mao Tse-tung's f o l l o -
wers in Yennan and directed communist a c t i v i t i e s in North 
Vietnam; and Pham Van Dong, who was responsible fo r a c t i v i t i e s 
in the South.^' 
13. Trager, o p . c i t . , p, 67. 
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The Viet Mirih received aid from the A l l i e s during the 
war against the Japanese. " I n March, 1944, a government in 
ex i l e was set up in LUichow under .the aegis o f the Chinese, 
in which Ho Chi Minh held a minister ia l post. These arrange-
ments enabled Ho Chi Minh gradually to acquire a leading ro l e 
among Viet Nam national ists. V ie t Minh forces then, ca l l ed 
'^People's Army'^  f o r "national l iberation" ' - were f i gh t ing i n 
the Cau Bang Laug Son area, adjacent to China; th is was 
re ferred to^sas the '" l iberated zone** of Viet Nam. A l l i ed help 
given to the Viet Minh forces in that area helped Ho win 
some degree of recognit ion of i t s legit imacy. The Viet Mlnh's 
cr i t i c ism of the Bao Dal (the emperor o f Cochin China) regime 
as a Japanese puppet government famed support, in early 1945, 
among those Vietnamese who had .unaer.s't'andatOj;- l o s t respect 
f o r the emperor during the years in v;hlch he had been a French 
puppet. Hence to drive by Hb and the Viet Minh communists 
f o r a take over of Viet Nam was f a c i l i t a t e d by the aspirations 
o f maiy Vietnamese. They wished to end the i r dependence on 
14 
outside masters, whether French, Japanese, or any other, ' ' 
Professor Trager bse ry^^- , j . g , "'The Chinese under 
Chiang Kai-shek, with the help of the communist control led 
V ie t Mrih and of the nat ional ist control led League o f Revolu-
t ionar ies parties, were m i l i t a r i l y in control o f V ie t Nam down 
to the 16th para l l e l at the end o f the war. I t was agreed 
14, Ibid., p, 68. 
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at the Potsdom conference that the 'Br i t i sh v/ere to assist the 
Free French Forces south o f th i s l i n e . The Chinese, i n t h e i r 
area, and the Anglo-French forces , in the i rs , were to help 
i n diarming the Japanese and i n restor ing law and ottier. 
These mi l i tary arrangements were rapidly converted into po l i -
t i c a l ones. On August 19, 1946, the Viet Minh, with some 
assistance from the Japanese, took over Hanoi, they f a i l e d 
i n a similar e f f o r t in Saigon. On August 29, Ho Chi Minh 
formed the prov inc ia l government o f the Democratic Republic 
o f Vietnam with himself as President, Emperor Bai Dai who had 
handed over his grand Seal to the forces o f Iran Van Gian f i v e 
days ea r l i e r , accepted tWpOst of Supreme p o l i t i c a l Advisor 
to the V ie t Minh regime and bfistowed on i t the trappings o f 
leg i t imacy. On September 2, the Democratic Republic o f V i e t 
16 
Nam was o f f i c i a l l y proclaimed i n Hanoi,'* I t was wide spread 
f e e l i ng a f t e r the war that Vietnamese nat ional is ts i n the North 
as i n the South were decidedly against the French, Hiough the 
Japanese occupation col lapsed i n August 1946 but they aspired 
to genuine national freedom. But the French troops appeared 
with the backing o f the Br i t i sh and Saigon was retaken. In 
the Iferth, the matter was delayed by the Chinese who wanted 
some concessions from the French but the Vie t Minh took advan-
tages from the delay and formed e f f e c t i v e government o f North 
V ie t Nam. 
25. Ibid., p. 314. 
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In March 1946, the Japanese proclaimed the Independence 
of the Indo-Chinese states of Laos, Cambodia and Annam and 
Emperor Bao Dai was reinstated in Annam. Cochin China was 
joined to So.nking- and Innam in August and the new state was 
christened Vietnam. After the surrender of Japan, the po l i -
t i c a l vacuum in the country was f i l l e d by the l oca l committees 
o f the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dang Minh Hoi which was founded by 
Hochi Minh in 1841 and had been sporadically f i ght ing the 
Japanese. The country was partit ioned at the 16th para l l e l , 
the Chinese occupying the northern part, while the Br i t ish 
occupied the South Vietnam. The v i e t Minh had i n f i l t r a t e d 
deep into the South before the Br i t ish reached Saigon in 
September 1945. 
Bao Dai abdicated on 26 August, and on 2 September, 
the independence of the country was declared in the name o f 
the Democratic Republic o f Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh, On 
6 January 1946, the newly constituent National Assembly met. 
On 6 March 1946, a preliminary Franco-Vietnamese convention 
was signed in Paris according to which the Vietnamese Republic 
led by HoChi Minh was recognised as a f r ee state, having i t s 
Government, i t s Parliament, i t s army and i t s f inances. The 
Vietnam Republic on i t s part agreed to welcome in a f r iendly 
manner,' French forces being sent to replace Chinese troops. 
But, there a f t e r , the French began to pro eras t i j i^te . There-
were prolong negotiations fo r the transfer o f power, but no 
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act ion was taken by the French Governnsent. According to 
Vandenbosch and Butwell, %fhen the French returned to Vietnam 
in September 1946 they found most o f the country i n Viet Minh 
hands. The French were able to drive the revolutionaries 
from the c i t i e s and to establish their rule once again in 
the Urban areas but the country side, for a l l pract ica l pur-
poses, remained Viet Mirih governed t e r r i t o ry . By an agreement 
o f March 6, 1946, the freiKJh recognised the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam as ^free state with i t s own government, 
parliament and army, and finances, forming part o f the Indo-
Chinese Federation and the French Union." The tvro sides dis-
agreed over whether Cochin China should be included as part 
o f Vietnam, which otherwise consisted of ToiMug and Aamam, 
both protectorates under the prewar arrangements. The French, 
however, pledged themselves to hold referendum on the ques-
16 
tion,** In the words of El len J Hammer, "^the March 6 accord 
was a vague statement o f principles which postponed the 
necessarily for both sides to talk frankly with each other 17 
about their true in- tent ions. " In the words o f professor 
Hal l , "^ The Chinese l e f t Hochi Mihh in control o f the adminis-
t ra t i on and refused admission to French troops. This s i tuat ion 
Continued unti l 20 February 1946, when a Franco-chinese agree-
ment was signed under which, in return for concession on 
16, Vandenbosch and Butv/ell, o p . c i t . , p, 166, 
17, Hammar, Elian J#, ""Vietnam Yesterday and Today"®, 
N.Y. 1966, p, 137. 
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Yunnan Haroi Railway and recogni t ion o f the specia l pos i t ion 
o f the i r nationals i n Indo-china, the Chinese agreed to 
withdraw their troops,** He further maintains, "Early i n March 
an agreement was concluded with the Vietnam government at 
Hami , France recognised the (Democratic) Republic o f V i e t -
nam as a f r e e state forming part o f the Indo-chinese Federa-
t ion, which i t was proposed to create, and o f the French 
Union s a referendum was to be held to Cochin China to decide 
whether i t should j o in the Republic. I t was also arranged 
that a further conference should be held to decide such matters 
as the diplomatic re la t ions o f the republic, the future status 
o f Indo-china, and French cultural and economic interests i n 
Vietnam. This was held i n Apr i l at Dalat in Cochin China, 
and i t was at once evident that the French, in terpetat ion o f 
Vietnam^in-dependenee was markedly d i f f e r en t from that o f the 
18 
nat ional is t government.*" Therefore, the conferences were 
held to work out the de ta i l o f the March agreement between 
the VietiMinh and the French at Dalat in Apr i l and at iaofl 
J^Qn^ainebleeii i n Julyj another conference held at Dalat with 
•"representatives o f Laos, Cambodia, and the Vietnamese nationa-
l i s t , but not the Viet Minh. I t soon became)^  c lear to the 
V i e t Minh that the French had ro r ea l intent ion o f carrying 
out the agreed upon referendum, which had i t then taken place, 
would undoubtedly have jo ined the two parts o f Vietnam. For 
18. Hall, op.cit . ,pp. 799-900, 
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at that time, the nat ional is ts in Vietnam vjere openly c r i t i c a l 
o f the communists f o r having agreed with France on aiything 
short o f complete national recognition,*^ But Professor Hall 
observes, **0n 1 June Admiral d 'Argenl ieu announced the creat ion 
o f an antdnomous republic o f Cochin China as a prov inc ia l 
measure. This evoked a storm o f portest as const i tut ing on in-
fringement o f the agreement 
whereby Cochin China was to be 
f ree to decide i t s futiare statusiy referendum. Thereafter , 
things went from bad to worse. In July a conference opened 
between Franc© and Vietnam at ®)iatainebl'8aii, and which i t was 
in progress d ' l r g en l i eu held a second Dalat conference with 
representat ives of Cambodia, Cochin China,Eaos and Southern 
Annam, Vietnam was rot inv i t ed to be represented. The Vietnam 
del igates walked out o f Fontainebleau conXerence ioiproteslt 
without any decis ion being taken, save fo r an agreement singed 
on 14 September, providing fo r a cessatian o f h o s t i l i t i e s and 20 
the settlement o f a number o f cul tural and economic questions," 
There were v io lent agi tat ions and the Vietnamese leaders were 
i n a mood to budge an inch on the Cochin China question, " I n 
November Dr, Van Thinh committed suicide as a protest 
against the 'unpatr io t i c ' r o l e he had found himself forced po 
play as the French pupf)et ruler o f Cochin China, Armed 
19, Trager, o p . c i t , , p. 69. 
20, Hall, op .c i t , , p. 800. 
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uprisings brought French repr i sa l s , and on 23 November they 
bombed Haiphong, causing f r i g h t f u l casua l i t i es . On 19 
December the Vietnamese staged a surprise attack on French 
21 
garrisons i n ToTigMiig and tom|n,and f u l l - s c a l e war began," 
I t has been the tragedy o f Vietnam that i t s nat ion l i s t novement 
came under communist d i rec t ion , Hochi Mnh declared on 24 
March 1947 o f Vietnamese po l i cy . I f France woxild do to V i e t -
nam, he said, what the United States had done to the Phi l ippine 
and Br i ta in to India the Vietnamese people would bring to 
France friendlycop^J^r'atidJn, I f not, they would continue to 
22 
r e s i s t . But the h o s t i l i t i e s continued between France and the 
Vietnam. 
Bao Dai, who had f o r some time acted as supreme Adviser 
to the Hochi Mihh administration and had gone to china on a 
ce r ta in mission in March 1946, did not return. In February 
1947, the French High Commissioner Emile Bol laert sent Paul 
Mus to negotiate with Hochi Mi.rih and at the same time he 
approached Emperor Bao Dai a t Hongkong f o r his support. The 
to 
V ie t Minh also wanted/^negotiate through Bao Dai on i t s iiiofiia 
behalf w i ^ the French but the negotiations did not give 
f rus t . At las t the French succeeded in gett ing o f Bao Dai, 
"•they hoped to form a government around him that would draw 
21, Ib id . , p. 800, 
22, Ibid., p. 803, 
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23 
nat ional ist support from Hochi Minh..*^  On 16 September 1947, 
Bao Dai addressed a message to the people o f Vietnam that he 
was w i l l ing to get intouch with the French author i t ies . This 
was fol lowed by talks between him and the French High 
Commissioner, A f ter lox^-dTawi|iegotiations, an agreement was 
signed by Bao Das in Paris on 8 March 1949 by which the French 
ins ta l l ed Bao Dal as the head o f an a l ternat ive government 
o f Vietnam. This agreement did nat grant f u l l freedom to 
Vietnam. In the sphere o f f o r e i gn pol icy and defense, Vietnam 
had to submit to the contro l o f the French Union, The f i gh t 
between France and the Ho Chi Minh regime continued. On July 
1, 1949 Bao Dai formally decreed the establishment o f the 
state o f Vietnam. Professor Hall r i gh t l y points out, " I t was, 
o f course yet another taoguS;, version of ' independence,» Ho Chi 
Mihh's posi t ion was i n 20 way weakened, i n spi te o f the f ac t 
that he had wel l over 100,000 o f France's best troops f i gh t ing 
against him, -He s t i l l held most o f Tongking, elsewhere French 
troops occupied c i t i e s and maintained some l i nes o f communi-
cations. The economic l i f e o f the country was dis located and 
24 
the s tra in on France herse l f was more than she could bear," 
In the words o f Professor Tragey,''i3ie V ie t Minh had received 
diplomatic and material support from the communist world 
a t l eas t from the time o f the establishment o f the D,R,V. N," 
23. Trager, o p . c i t , , p. 74, 
24, Hall, op.cit . , p. 804, 
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He further states, " ' It was the advent of communist ru le i n 
China, bringing communist assistance to the very iaorders o f 
Tonkin, that was probably the decis ive factor in determlng 
the f i n a l outcome o f the struggle . Now there was d i rec t access 
to the communist world. V/ar material moved d i rec t l y across 
the border : r e co i l l e s s cannons, heavy mortars, anti a i r c r a f t 
guns, machine guns, tommy guns, bazookas, r i f l e s , trucks, 
tanks. At the f i n a l bat t le at Dien Bien Phu, the Chinese — 
communists contributed mi l i ta ry leadership and cadres to the 
26 
Vie t Mihh.** 
One o f the f i r s t acts o f the People 's Republic o f China 
(the Communist China) i n the sphere of f o r e i gn a f f a i r s was to 
recognise the Viet Minh government o f Hb Chi Minh as the 
sovereign power in Vietnam and was fo l lowed t^ y the Soviet Union 
on 31 January, The United States Government, in turn, recog-
nised the Bao Dai administration on 7 February I960 and 37 
a l l i e s o f the United States fo l lowed suit . The war in Indo-
china was no longer a f i g h t between Ho Chi Mnh on o f the one 
hand and Bao Dai and the French on the other, henceforth, i t 
acquired great internat ional s igni f icance, the United States 
considering i t more and more to be one o f the f ronts against 
internat io nal Communism. A mi l i ta ry aid agreement between the 
United States,France, and the three Associated States was 
26, Trager, op.cit , , p. 77. 
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signed in Saigon 24 December 195o. According to Professor 
Hal l , '•"Ndw France was to rec ieve more and more American aid 
to continue the struggle, and Indo-Ghina became a v i t a l out-
26 
post in the strategy o f Pentagon.'-" But the struggle was 
s t i l l going, the French were being suf fered badly at the hands 
o f V i e t Minh fo rces ,V ie t Minh at the same time were building 
up regular army capable of extended operations. Gradually the 
quantum of aid-equipment from both China and the U.S.A. moun-
ted and the sever i ty of the f i gh t ing increased t i l l the 
dramatic v ictory of the V ie t Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu. In 
the words of Professor Hall , "During 1952 the V i e t Minh forces 
under General Vo Nguyen^Giap's d i rec t ion were preparing f o r 
a winter o f f ens i v e . I t began in October with a sudden thrust 
to Lai Ghau on the Black River . Then in November they occupied 
Dien Bien Phu and went on to cross the border o f Laos. In 
March 1953, they launched an attack on Luang Prabang, i t f a i l e d 
but i t v;as obvious that they intended to repeat the attempt 
l a t e r . Other forces threatened Annam, while progress was 
made with the encirclement of the delta region o f Tongking. 
Through the ir command o f the a i r French forces were able to 
check there moves, but the disputed t e r r i t o r i e s usually 
remained under e f f e c t i v e V ie t Minh control , for the French 
27 
Union forces were confined to camps and f o r t i f i e d position.*^ 
26. Hall , op. c i t . , p. 804, 
27, Hall, Ibid., p. 829, 
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In France there was pressure f o r an armistice. I t was th is 
f ac t and the decis ion on 26 January 1964 o f the f o r e i gn minis-
te rs o f the United States, Russia, Br i ta in and France to i n v i t e 
communist China to a conference on the Far East in the f o l i o win 
28 
Apr i l led Gi^pv-to stake everything upon a spectacular v i c to ry , 
prime Minister o f India Mr. Nehru ca l l ed f o r a cease-
f i r e i n Indo-china, on 22 Februaiy 1964. Ear l ier on 28 Novem-
ber 1963 a Stockholm paper, Expresses, published an interview 
with Dr. Hochi Minh who was reported to have expressed his 
wi l l ingness to discuss peace with France. On 18 February i n 
1964, the Ber l in conference part ic ipants announced that the 
United States, France, the Soviet Union, China and some other 
interested countries would discuss the problems o f restor ing 
peace in Korea and Indo-china at Geneva. In the meanwhile, 
V ie t Minh forces were marching forwards, **the danger now became 
intense with massive American forces a-rrSViaagoff the coast o f 
Indo-Ghina, and Mr.Dulles hunting at the possible use of 
atomic bombs. Happily Bri ta in^ f i rm stand against a l l i e d 
intervent ion and in favour o f a negotiated settlement carr ied 
the day. The Geneva Conference, which had assembled on 23 
Apr i l , was able to conclude armistice agreement on 21 July 
Covering Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and arranging f o r a cease-
f i r e and the appointment of a International Armistice contro l 
28. Ibid., p, 830, 
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Commission composed of representat ives o f India, Canada and 
Poland. Vietnam was to be part i t ioned along the Ben Hai 
River at the 17th para l l e l o f l a t i tude c lose to the Dang Hai 
wal l , bui l t in 1631 to defend the Nguyen domains from the 
^"lords of the Nbrth^. The north was to be under the 'Demo-
cra t i c Republic o f Vietnam', i . e . the Viet Mlnh; the South 
was to be under the Saigon government of which the ex-emperor 
(Bao Dai ) was the head. I t was only a provis ional arrangement 
f o r general e lect ions to unify Vietnam were to be held in 
both sectors i n July 1966 under international contro l . V ie t 
Minh forces were to withdraw from South and centra l Vietnam, 
Qanbodia and Laos according to an agreed t ime ta i i e j s imi lar ly 
French Union forces were to withdraw from mr th Vietnam, 
Canbodia and Laos, but France might maintain a l imi ted number 
o f instructors i n Laos to t r a i n the national army and r e ta in 
29 
the use of two mi l i tary bases there."" Vlhen the Geneva Con-
ference on Indo-Ghina was going, on 2 May, the Colombo 
Conference o f f i v e South Asian Prime Ministers made a plea 
f o r immediate c ease - f i r e in Indo-China. The Premiers recomm-
ended d i rect negotiations between France, the three Associated 
states of Indo-China, the V ie t Mirih and other par t i es inv i t ed 
by agreement. Bie Geneva agreements which were signed on 
21 July 1964 declared that m f o r e i gn troops would be ixitmamsj 
introduced in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would not ask fo r 
25. Ibid., p. 314. 
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f o re i gn aid except as defined, in tlie agresments. No fore ign 
mi l i tary bases were to be established in Vietnam, and Laos 
and Camtodia wu ld not j o i n any fore ign al l iances. According 
to Vandenbosch and Butwell, "As a United States senator put 
i t , the French wanted to get out o f Indo-china, the Brit ish 
wanted to stay out, and the United States, i t seemed, wanted 
30 
to get in."' 
South Vietnam fi 
fi 
In South Vietnam there was a prolonged tussle between 
Premier Ngo Dinh Diem and the Army chief of S ta f f , General 
Nguyen Van Hinh. The l a t t e r was dismissed by Emperor Bao Dai 
l a t e in November 1964. According to Professor Hal l , '^The 
Geneva settlement was made over the heads of the Saigon 
authorit ies, who were strangly agaihst part i t ion. They were, 
therefore, able to evade the clause providing fo r general 
e lec t ion in July 1956. They entai led changing the t i t l e o f 
the French commissioner general to 'ambassador', denouncing 
the monetary and f inancia l agreement with France and bring 
the Vietnamese piastre into the dol lar bloc, arrangements 
f o r the withdrawal o f the French Expeditionary corps and for 
channelling American aid d i rec t ly to Saigon instead o f through 
Paris, and f i na l l y the r e j e c t i on of Bao Dai 's authority and 
30. Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t , , p. 172. 
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the proclamation on 26 October 1966 o f the Republic o f V i e t -
nam a f t e r referendum In which "'the f i n a l results surpassed 
even the most sanguine expectations, as the votes in some 
31 
cases exceeded the names on the e l ec tora l ro l l .S ' iN '^ Dinh 
Diem was appointed as Premier in June 1954 with l i t t l e autho-
r i t y , He was a nat ional ist leader and had some administrat ive 
experience. Moreover, he had the backing o f America. He 
took advantage ofj^ the absence o f Bao Dai who usually conduc-
ted h is o f f i c e nrast o f the time from his residence on the 
R iv i e ra . He took a l l power i n his hands a f t e r conducting 
p l eb i sc i t e which came in favour o f Diem. On October 26 the 
Republic o f Vietnam was proclaimed with Diem as i t s f i r s t 
President and the new const i tut ion invested the President with 
broad powers and spec i f i c a l l y outlawed communism. In the 
words of Vandenbosch and Butwell, "^Ihe v i r tua l pa r t i t i on o f 
Vietnam at roughly the seventeen pa ra l l e l gave South Vietnam 
an area o f about 66,000 square miles and a population o f 
about 13,000,000. I t i s separated from North Vietnam by 
boundary o f less than 60 miles but has a long border with 
Laos and Cambodia. South Vietnam i s predominantly agr icul tu-
r a l with sprinkling o f l i gh t industry. The southern hal f o f 
truncated Vietnam faced almost insuperable d i f f i c i i l t i e s 
fo l lowing par t i t i on . Some 900,000 refugees, nearly a l l 
20, Hall, op.c i t , , p. 800. 
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Catholics, came down from the mr th , requir ing an expensive 
Besettlement program. The strongest kind of feudalism, more-
over, prevai led i n the country. P o l i t i c a l and mi l i tary 
iuhhority was exercised by three groups - two unique and 
powerful r e l i g i ous sects, the syncret is t Gao Dai and the 
a l legedly reformed Budhist Boa Hao, and the Binh Xuyen, r i v e r 
pirateswho dominated the po l ice and gambling establishments 
o f Saigon, the cap i ta l c i ty , . A l l three groups had thelr-oBn 
armies. In addition, there were pockets o f the d isc ip l ined 
communist V ie t Minh's own army, a v i o l a t i o n o f the 1964 
Geneva Accords, 'The emperor, Bao Dai, conducted his o f f i c e 
most of the time from his residence on the R iv iera , whi le the 
Commander o f the army acted as i f he were responsible to no 
one but himself.Economietconditions were bad. The outlook 
32 
f o r South Vietnam was gloomy.''* Vandenbosch and Butwell 
33 
praised the achievements of Diem and there fore th€y are 
very sympathetic towards him because o f his dealings against 
the communists. But Professor Hal l puts it,** Bao Dai has 
been i n e f f e c t i v e as national leader, i n h is place President 
Ngodinh Diem was bui l t up as the saviour o f the nation. He 
had been chosen as prime ministertf o f the Saigon regime by 
Bao Dai because of his f i rm ins is tarce on independence. But 
he was a cathol ic and more French thenVl'^tnam-es^ In education 
32, Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p , c i t . , p, 176, 
33, Ibid,, p. 177, 
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and outlook. He had no support In the country, lacked 
admlnlstyatiye experience and showed l i t t l e capacity as a 
leader. I t was Aiaerican support that kept him in power, the 
American saw him as an honest man and one whose anti-communisi] 
could be absolutely r e l i e d on. Ihus he was able to defeat 
his r i va l s and establ ish a d ic te torship . His r i v a l s were 
formidable. The army under major General Nguy.en-^'Van'-Hinh 
was independent, and Hinh himself had the backing o f Bao Dai» 
An other general, Le Van Vien, was the head o f the Binh Xuyen, 
a gangsterish-organisation cont ro l l ing the Pol ice and the 
vice«»raak-ets of Saigon, Then there were two p o l i t i c o - r e l i -
gious sects, the syncret ist Cao Dai and the reformed Budhist 
Hoa Had, with the i r pr ivate armies, contro l l ing large areas 
of the country. To complete the picture, the V ie t Minh i n 
evacuating the i r forces to the north o f the 17th para l l e l 
l e f t behind large numbers o f p o l i t i c a l cadress secret ly 
working fo r the communist cause whi le from Ibngking hundred 
34 
of thousands o f refugaes poured southwards.** 
In November I960, there was an attempt to overthrow 
his government and the behind th is .mo3r© i t was a mi l i tary 
group. There were communist gue r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s on large 
scale and theUilerais government was becoming unpopular. I t 
was his authori tar ian character and d i c t a t o r i a l tendencies 
mounted d i s sa t i s f a c t i on among the masses and loore over 
20, Hall, o p . c i t , , p. 800. 
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vigordusly d is l iked was the family nature o f his regime. A l l 
his re la t i ves were on the high posts and the almost mi l i tant ly 
Catholic character of the regime was bound to create resent-
ment while the population of Budhist was about 70 per cent and 
the Catholic was only 10 percent. There was a strong p o l i t i c a l 
opposition and the government became more in secure, Ifow 
Diem resorted oppressive measures and on May 9, 1963 the 
government forces f i r ed on Budhist deiBonS±ratiar|.n Hue and 
k i l l ed nine persons. There was a strong protest the Vietnam 
ever experienced and instead o f seeking conci l ia t ion, the 
government raided Budhist temples, herded monks and rauns into 
trucks and took away in August. There occured a palace coup 
and Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Khu took over the administration 
and he had been the chief o f secret pol ice and chief adviser 
to Diem.. Madame Nhu charged the Budhists witti-being dupes 
of the communists. According to Vandenbosch and Butwell, 
**Forth'Q United States government the s i tuat ion was extremely 
d i f f i c u l t . I t was not in South Vietnam to govern but to help 
the Vietnamese government to suppress communist in f i l t r a t i o n , 
35 
subversion and gTierrll lav war f a r e , " Henry Cabot Lodge was 
sent as an ambassador in August 1963. President Kennedy in a 
te lev ised interview on September 2 sa i d , " I don*t thirik that 
the war can be won unless the people support the e f f o r t . And 
36, Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p , c i t , , p, 179, 
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i n my opinion, in the last two iODnths the government bas 
gotten out o f touch with the people with changes in 
policy and perhaps in personnel I think (popular support) can 
36 
(be regained),^* In^ the meatiwhile, a group of generals 
y * 
seized control o f the government on November 1. Eieni: and his 
brother Miu were k i l l ed and the mil i tary junta in a broadcast 
to the nation^ accused the Diem regime of abusing power, o f 
thinking only o f personal ambition, o f s l ight ing the father-
land and interest , o f trampling on the people 's lawful r ights , 37 
and o f in competence, 
Nort Vietnam fi 
fi 
North Vietnam has an approximate area of 61,293 square 
miles of t e r r i t o ry as compared with 66,948 for the South. 
However, the population o f the North i s probably two and a 
half mi l l ion greater - about I5,500j. to 13,000,000 (1966 
estimate). The North has a better base for industr ia l i zat ion 
phos 
than the South, possessing large deposits of coal, i ron and/ 
phates, and some deposits of copper, lead, manganese, z i ix and 
other metals. On the other hand, the rforth i s de f ic ient in 
the production o f r i ce , the staple food o f i t s people, whereas 
the South under peaceful conditions would have large amounts 
fo r export. 
36, Vandenbosch and Butwell, Qi»tdd, p. 179, 
27. Ibid., p. 378-79. 
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Ho Chi Minh regime became the o f f i c i a l government 
a f ter 1954 though i t had ruled much of the t e r r i t o ry since 
1946. I t began ^iriih a government o f western democracy but 
in fact Controlled by an oligarchy of communists. The 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam adopted a new Communist type 
Constitution in I960.'' A popularly elected National Assembly 
meets f o r very br ie f sessions. I t e lects the president and 
delegates the exercise of i t s authority between sessions to a 
Permanent Standing Committee. The control l ing power i s held 
by the po l i t i c a l Bureau and central conimlttee of the ruling 
workers Party (Lao Dang). The leaders of the party are also 
the top men in the government. The veteran communist leaders 
Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dang are president and premier 
respect ive ly . " I n contrast with the parade of governments 
in^' the South since the f a l l o f Diem, the po l i t i c a l leaders 
38 
in the North have been stable f i x tures , " 
Now the North 'took a determined drive to socializ8;t{ 
the economy. Russia and communist China are the main coun-
t r i e s which had helped Wi-—-J to industr ia l i ze the country." 
Communist bloc^ grants and loans to North Vietnam to ta l l ed 
over a mi l l ion dol lars from 1955 to 1961. As i s evident 
from the large number of fac tor ies which have been bui l t since 
1960, considerable progress i s being made in industr ia l izat ion. 
38, IMd,, p, 181, 
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The North Vietnam experienced t\jo peasant disturbances in 
1966 and in 1961 because o f land reform and the emphasis upon 
industr ia l i zat ion at the cost of rural development. 
The primary object of the government o f North Vietnam 
to reunify the Vietnam.'GoJnrawiist China and the North Vietnam 
are agree on revolutionary action to l ibera te the South 
Vietnam, And at the same time, North Vietnam fears Chinese 
domination and hence would l i k e to balance Russia against 
China. Mareover, North Vietnam needs bothR'ussian help to 
industr ia l ize and i t s mi l i tary aid. Hochi Minh regime followe< 
a neutral pol icy because o f the controversy between China and 
Russia and Ho has even tr ied to mediate the dispute. North 
Vietnam did not sign the test-ban treaty and in th is -way i t 
openly sided with China and moved more and more in the direc-
t ion of China. Mare over, North Vietnam believed that China 
was next door and could help in c r i t i c a l time as there was 
an acute food shortage in 1963 and communist China came f o r -
ward fo r i t s help. In their consuming desire f o r reuni f i cat io i 
the North Vietnamese communist leaders naturally supported 
China's aggressive doctrine of armed revolution for l ibera-
t ion of peoples from imperial ist control and re jected the 
Russian policy o f co-existence with the cap i ta l i s t world. 
China vigorously supported the revolut ion in South Vietnam; 
Russia wanted peace and was able to disturb re lat ions with 
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39 
the United States,' ' The North Vietnam and the communist 
China both desired to eliminate American power and influence 
in South East Asia. "'The explosion of an automic bomb by-
China undoubtedly also had i t s Influence. North Vietnam i s 
probably no longer f ree to negotiate or make peace against 
40 
the wishes of Peking, even i f i t wished to. V/riting about 
the re lat ions of China and Russia, Vandenbosch and Butwell 
declare," unless re lat ions between China and Russia improved 
greatly Russia could get no advantages from communist gains 
in Southeast Asia, for this region i s China's sphere, and 
whatever the communist harvest there might be, i t would be 
reaped by China. Yet Hanoi does not wish domination by Peking 
and s t i l l apparently hopes to play o f f the two communist 
giants one against the other - as evidenced by North Vietnam's 
high l e v e l representation in 1966 at the 23rd Soviet Commu- 41 
nist Party congress, which the Chinese donounced and boycottedV 
The South Vietnam a f te r the Diem^s regime was p o l i t i -
ca l l y in Stable. Therefore South Vietnam experienced various 
governments since the f i r s t mi l i tary coup but a l l were in 
stable and could be understood as caretaker administrations 
best,/; . Moreover, the mi l i tary s i tuat ion also deteriorated 
39, Ib id. , p. 182. 
40, Ibid. J p. 182, 
41, Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p . c i t , , p, 183, 
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and the communist Vietcong took advantages from the weakness 
and expanded into a formidable f ight ing force eqtdpped with 
modern Infantry weapons. In the Mekong Beltaj,, v/here South 
Vietnam's population i s concentrated, more than half of the 
people l i v e under a communist shadow government which engages 
in ac t i v i t i e s much l i k e a regular government, including the 
co l l ec t ion of taxes. ' American troops before 1961 were 
about 700 men and by mid-1966 the f ig i i re had r isen to more 
than 266,000. South Vietnam had 346,000 men in the regular 
army and 350,000 in pol ice and para-military forces. Bie 
Vietcong forces was estimated at 90,000 regulars'* ( f u l l t ime) 
43 
and as mary as 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 ' * irregular» ( gu r r i l l a s ) . " 
The American Forces have been playing a dynamic ro l e • 
in South Vietnam, They came as "'advisers*^ and served as such 
unti l 1966 so far as the basic posi t ion of United States was 
concerned.'" American mil i tary men were not to sheot unless 
shot at when North Vietnam attacked" United States naval 
vessels in the Gulf of Tbnkin on August 6, 1964 President 
Johnson ordered "^'positive reply'*'. American forces made a ir 
attacks on North Vietnamese naval insta l la t ions . On 
February 6, 1966, communistgtierrillas staged infantry and 
44 
mort.ar attacks on American insta l la t ions at Pleiku air base.'' 
42. Ib id. , p. 183. 
43. Ib id. , p. 184. 
44. Ibid,, p. 184, 
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And the war started and there were no stop reta l iat ions from 
each side. ""It i s obvious that the hos t i l i t i e s in South 
Vietnam had at^ . c i v i l vrar and an international war 
character, but in 1966 the la t ter c lear ly became dominant.'*. 
In the words of Vandenbosch and Butwell, ""The hos t i l i t i e s in 
Indo-Ghina took an increased international character v;hen 
American planes la te 1964 began bombing the communist supply 
l ine running from North Vietnam through central Laos to South 
Vietnam was this a v io lat ion of the 1962 Geneval agreements 
which guaranteed the neutrality and independence o f Laos and 
spec i f i ca l l y forbade the entrance of fore ign troops into the 
Country, The state Department jus t i f i ed reconnaissance and 
bombing missions in Laos on the ground o f continuing commu-
nist violations of the agreement. The United States as wel l 
as Communist China and North Vietnam are signatories of the 
46 
agreements, 
The Vietnam cr is i s drew the eyes of the world and 
•'there was profound concern throughout the world that the 
l imited war in Indo-china might-escalate into a general war. 
Ef forts were made to bring about negotiations for a peaceful 
settlement, Uthanfc, the Secretary General of the United 
Nations made an appeal for a settlement on conference table 
45. Ibid. , p. 186< 
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on February 12, 1966 and he also had attempted to arrange 
secret Informal discussions between Hanoi and Washington but 
without f r u i t . Pope Paul VI had t r i ed to make contract with 
po l i t i c a l leaders to plead for peaceful solution in Vietnam 
on February 20, 1966, " I n Apri l , 18 non,-aligned State made 
an appeal f o r negotiations without conditions to end the 
f i ght ing in Vietnam and in June the conference of (Br i t i sh ) 
commonwealth prime ministers proposed the sending of a peace 
mission, headed by the countries involved. There were other 
attempts to bring about peaCe talks : France's propsal for 
a new Geneva conference, Soviet endorcement of a Cambodian 
conference which could serve as Dackdoor approach to the 
Vietnam problem, and India 's plan for a cease - f i r e policed by 
46 
an Afro-Asian force." President Johnson came out with several 
proposals for peaceful settlement and demanded that the 
Communists cease their attacks in South Vietnam before any 
discussions coxald take place and America wanted an indepen-
dent South Vietnam f ree from outside interference and attack, 
" 'tied to no a l l iance, a mi l i tary base f o r ro country.«» And 
President Johnson also proposed f o r ecoromic development plan 47 
f o r South East Asia, At one time, ' the American were w i l l i ng 
to withdraw their forces from South Vietnam as soon as that 
46, Vandenbosch and Butwell, o p , c i t , , p. 186. 
47. Ibid,, p, 187. 
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t e r r i t o ry was in a posit ion to determine i t s own future 
without external interference. South Vietnam's future 
government and reuni f icat ion o f the two ¥ietnames, i f i t should 
take place, should be determined by f r e e e lect ion. Hschi 
Minh's government termed the American peace offensive'* a 
t r i ck , merely the repet i t i on o f o ld themes. The bombing o f 
North was resumed on January 31, 1966^after helding o f f for 
about one month. The war in Vietnam i s r is ing the cost of 
war. In 1965, the United States probably spent in excess o f 
s ix mi l l ion dol lars f o r Vietnam in the same year, an out lay 
o f 1 6 . 6 mi l l ion dai ly , and President Johnson's 1966-1967 
budget cal led f o r an increased expenditure o f ^ 10.6 b i l l i o n 
48 
annually. The United State built new major mi l i tary insta-
l l a t i o n in or near South Vietnam, three major j e t a i r f i e l d s 
a navy base at Camranb Bay, and another sizeable naval ins-
t a l l a t i on at Satlahip on the Gulf of Siam in Thailand and 
in early 1967 many American service men los t their l i ves and 
i t crossed a l l previous records. 
In February 1966, the Saigon government i t s e l f admitted 
that i t control led only 10 per cent o f the land area south of 
the seventeenth para l l e l } nearly half the people in the South 
l ined outside this area. The fac t was that the war was s t i l l 
going against the United State in Vietnam in 1966 and the 
27. Ibid., p. 378-79. 
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posit ion remains upto present day. In the meanwhile, premier 
Chou En Lai o f communist China came out **all o*ut support" 
whatever the extent the United States "maytf widen the war and 
whatever cost we may pay.' Some feared that a direct American 
Chinese clash was imminent and the communist China at the same 
time was aiding ifes Hanoi with aDdern arms and amunitions, 
Mareover, the internal condition of South Vietnam was 
not sat is factory in 1966. premier Caoky o f South Vietnam 
faced Budhist demonstrations. I t was anti-government because 
Ky*s government did not sa t i s f y the people 's needs and the 
promise was not f u l f i l l e d to give a constitut ion to the country 
which would sa t i s fy the people.Therefore, the government was 
lacking the support of the people. And United State several 
times proposed tor peaceful settlement but Ho ' s government 
not 
did/rely on the statements of the government authorit ies. Now 
the war in Vietnam is neither win nor l o s t . But Vandentosch 
and Butvell observe,""The f a i l u r e to date of the United States 
in Vietnam i f "failure** i t can r ea l l y be ca l led 
r e f l e c t s the fac t that there were l imi ts to what Americans 
could accomplish in that country, given the state of a f f a i r s 
within Vietnam, the length to which the United States, was 
wi l l ing to go in seeking to at ta in i t s end, and the ideo log i -
cal and moral climate of the world in which i t found i t s e l f 
(as wel l as i t s own moral values) , Vietnam i s not yet los t 
to the communists. The communists may win in South Vietnam, 
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or they may lose or they may win and subsequently turn out 
to be no more fr ightening than communist Poland or Yogo-r""; 
s lav ia . I t i s important, o f course, i f Vietnam becomes a 
Communist country, but i t i s primarily important to the United 
States and Vietnam's neighbours in Southeast Asia in terms o f 
whether or not the Vietnamese communist choose to pursue a 
peaceful or aggressive fore ign pol icy. I t may s t i l l be possi-
ble to prevent Vietnam from going communist. But, i f i t i s 
not, i t i s probable that the forces opposed to communism, i f 
they can coalesce, can prevent Vietnamese communism from s p i l l -
ing over into most o f the rest o f Southeast Asia. If^however, 
the Countries o f the region Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia 
Burma, the Phil ippines, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia 
are not wi l l ing to take a United and determined stand, then 
i t i s open to serious questioBi®^ whether the United States could 
49 
or should take on the task alone.** Though President Nixon o f 
United States had made two proposals fo r peaceful settlement 
which came f i r s t on May 14, 1969 and the second was in the las t 
week of the same month but i t seemed that i t did not sa t i s f y 
the Ho's government. The recent announcement o f President 
Nixon to withdraw U.S.forces too: gradually might have serious 
repurcussions. The Vietnamese has been engaging the attention 
49, Ib id. , p. 199. 
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o f China. Once re l ieved of this pressure, i t might spread 
i t s tentacles-; elsewhere. India i s watching the situation 
very c lose ly . On the one hand India 's i n t e r e s t l l e s in the 
withdrawal o f a l l f o re ign forces from the Vietnamese so i l , and 
on the other in keeping the Chinese manoeuvre away from the 
Indian so i l . But once China is f ree from the Vietnamese 
length there i s very l ike l ihood that i t might spread i t s arms 
towards India, and try to harm i t through direct invasion, 
subversiontr or i n f i l t r a t i o n . 
C H A P T E R I I I 
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Strategic, Ecommic and Commercial Interests 
C H A P T E R I I I 
THE U.S.A. AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
Strategic, Economic and Commercial Interests 
Since the end of the Second V\forld War, the World has 
witnessed many important po l i t i c a l changes. The spread of 
communism and the r is ing t ide of nationalism have been the 
two of the most potent influences upon the course of inter -
national developments. These two forces have a f f ec ted very-
much of the many areas of the World and therefore South-East 
Asia is not in an exception. Roughly, South-East Asia i s , the 
area of continental Asia and the o f f shore Phil ippine and 
Indonesian archipelagoes which l i e s south of China and east 
of India. The region is very important because of i t s resources 
* 
I t is f u l l of rav\/ materials and also provide a market for 
surplus goods. 
And because of strategic importance and f u l l y of raw 
materials, i t has been under the influence of colonial powers. 
"The French" and the Dutch "have withdrawn, the Br i t ish are 
withdrawing; the Chinese are trying to stage come-back", and 
the United States which was least interested in South-East Asia 
unt i l the World Vilar I I , except f o r the Phil ippines, but this 
interest was almost non existent . Since that time the degree 
of United States interest in the region has increased great ly , 
"as i t undoubtedly w i l l continue to increase in importance 
1 
in the future." But Venden bosch and Butwell observes, 
1. King, John Kerry, South-East Asia in Perspective, N.Y. 1959, 
P - x v i i . 
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"This region produc&snearly two-thirds of the World'd t i n and 
over f ou r - f i f t hs of i t s natural rubber. While i t s output of o i l 
i s not large in terms of t o ta l worldprodiiction, i t i s neverthless 
o f great strategic signif icance because so l i t t l e o i l is produced 
else where in ..South or East Asia. The loss of the other 
important products of the region — bauxite, tungsten, iron ore, 
tea) suga^, co f f ee , spices, abaca, copra, and coconut o i l — 
would only be inconvienient for the west, but to allow f r ee 
access to them to communist countries would greatly strengthen 
the la t ter «s economic and po l i t i c a l power. Burma, Thailand, 
and South Vietnam, f o r example is normal times produce great 2 
qual i t ies of r i ce , a staple food important to a l l Asian countries'.' 
The area of South-East Asia covers some l,6i60,000 square 
miles spread over a la^SQ portion of the globe with a population 
o f more than 226 mil l ion, "hal f continental and half peninsular, i ' 
i t l i e s ax astride the great trade routes of the Eastern World, 
whose strategic importance became str ikingly apparent in the 
3 
Second World War." North Vietnam under communist domination 
backed by communist China creates a s i tuat ion much more alarming 
then 1941 when Japan over run South-East Asia almost at w i l l and 
to threaten Australia and India . And moreover China i s more 
advantageous posi'^ion than i t was Japan during Second Word War 
2, Vandev bosch and Butwell, The Changing Face of South-east 
Asia, Lexington (USA) 1966, p. 361. 
27. Ibid., p. 378-79. 
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because the Chinese constitute a largest minorities in the region 
about 14,000,000 person providing a bridge head f o r i n f i l t r a t i o n 
and subversion and the World has watched with grave concern the 
explosiamby China of the nuclear bomb. The Chinese, Indians 
Europeans and Arab^ control a dispropertionately large part 
of economic l i f e of the region, they are not eas i ly assimilated 
and they are, for the most part, nationals of large and powerful 
neighbouring cqntries. According to Vanden bosch and Butwell, 
"there is l i t t l e cultural unity to be found in South-east Asia. 
Nearly every country has s ign i f i cant minorit ies, both rel ig ious 
and ethnic. In Malaysia, where the native Moslem has became a 
minority in his own country, the division are sharp. Much time 
must pass before a various communities of the Malaysia can be 
merged into a jnation. Developments in Indonesia indicate rather 
c lear ly that the Dutch over three centuries f a i l ed to mold the 
people of the Myriad islands into a real unity. I t is much the 
same regional ly . The population of one state is predominantly 
Christian; that of another, Moslem; that of several , Budhist; 
and Malaysia has no majority for any one f a i th . Because they 
were ruled for long period by d i f f e r en t powers, these countries 
have been drawn in d i f f e rent directions cul tura l ly . The absence 
of po l i t i c a l and cultural uni f icat ion aid the western powers in 
establishing their control o r i g ina l l y , and today the divers i ty 
remains in aggravated form. The colonial administrations have % 
been replaced by weak, independent states, the economy of much 
of the region has deteriotrated, the work of wel l trained 
experienced colonial o f f i c i a l s and able foregin entrepreneurs 
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has been taken over by untrained, Inexperienced natives. Social 
and c i v i l unrest, insurrections and armed s t r i f e , and p o l i t i c a l 
ineptitude have rendered the region ^xceeilingly vulnerable to 
d irect and indirect communist aggression. Even i f there were 
no threat of external aggression, the situation would be acute, 
f o r in several of these countries the forces o f d is integrat ion 
are strong. With Jbheir soc ie t ies open to communist in f i l t r a t i o n 
and subversion, the sitiaation i s very serious. Ihe region i s 
utter ly lacking in the economic and mil i tary power with which 
to defend i t s e l f , and, wh^t i s worse from the western point o f 
4 
view, i t frequently seems to lack the w i l l to defend i t s e l f . " 
The United States o f America Decame increasingly concerned 
about Communist ac t i v i t y i n &uth East Asia from 1948-onwards. 
And when communist China and Soviet Union recognized the 
communist Ho Chi Minh's regime in Vietng^m, in January 1960, the 
United States soon thereafter announced i t s recognit ion o f ron-
c.ommunlst Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Now the area became 
v i t a l to the security of the United States. Dr. King points 
out, '"Ibday South-east Asia loams so large in America's national 
interest thgt i t f i ghts f o r posit ion w i l l a l l other international 
interests, and secures mi l i tary and economic commitments o f 
5 
scope never previously antii&'ipated." For the safeguards o f i t s 
in teres t , the United States and the Philippines concluded a 
4. Ib id. , pp. 365-366. 
5, King, op.cit. ^  p. 2. 
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mutual defence treaty on August 30, 1951 and on September 1, 
1951 the United State, New Zealand, and Australia formed the 
A. N. Z. U.S. Pact. According to Dr. King, "'Present acute 
American concern for the area emerges from four principal^ 
events: (1 ) the second world war revealed the strategic 
r 
importance of South-east Asia to the l i i ited States both in 
mi l i tary and in economic termsj (2 ) the independence achieved 
by Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the States o f Indo-
china resulted in the formation o f new relationships between 
these states and the United States; (3) through the communist 
v ictory in China the r e l a t i v e l y weak states o f south-east Asia 
became exposed to the poss ib i l i t y of communist aggression and 
domination; (4 ) the key ro le assigned to Great Br i ta in and Japan 
in American security planning enhanced American interests in 
South-east Asia because of the economic fact that access to the 
trade and resources o f South-east Asia is v i t a l to both American 
a l l i e s thus, the United States not only has interests in South-6 
east Asia; i t has also interests in re lat ion to South-east Asia, " 
I t i s alleged that American interests in South-east Asia are 
ideo log ica l , humanitarian, po l i t i c a l , economic, cominercial, and 
strateg ic and moreover American interest depends on the whole 
region because i f i t i s f a l l under the communist deomination, i t 
i s a threat to American security. In the words o f Dr. King, 
•^ When the area i s considered as a whole, and when American 
interests are taken in combination as a mult ip l ic i ty o f interests 
in the perspective o f present world conditions which extend 
6. Ibid., p. 2, 
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from the cold war to an Intense global e f f o r t by the United 
State toprevent international communism from engulfing the 
entire Eurasian land mass, American interests in South-east 
7 
Asia became extermely s i gn i f i cant j perhaps even dec is i ve . " I t 
i s also said thgt emotionally, in te l l ec tua l l y , and h i s to r i ca l l y 
the United States is committed deeply to the basic values o f 
democracy - national independence, individual l i be r ty and 
dignity, representative government, the concept o f the St^te 
as the servant of the people, economic, p o l i t i c a l , and socia l 
opportunity and progrisss. Dr, King also observes, "Today the 
most powerful begrar's of these non-democratic, to ia l i ta .r ian 
values are the communists. Wherever the cont ' l ic i t ing values 
of democracy and communism meet, i t is inev i table that they 
clash; and, because they have already chosen Asia as a major 
meeting ground, the ominous sounds of war face are c lear ly 
discernible. Whether by words or deeds, the batt le f o r South-
east Asia and adjacent a^eas i s not only on but w i l l undoubted-
l y continue f o r some years to come. Already China has f a l l e n 
to the communists, leaving the Chinese people to brutal 
communist or-deal of organised brain washing and regimented 
hate. The blow against freedom in China has resounded to the 
detriment of the f r ee world every where, part icular ly the 
United States, But this does not lessen th^t the f a t e of the 
rest of Asia is yet to be decided , and i t i s urgent as never 
7. Ibid,J p. 3. 
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Q 
before that South-East Asia reta in a choice fo r freedom." 
According to Dr. King, " In geogo l i t i ca l terms, South-east 
Asia occupies a posit ion o f global strateg ic importance 
rouphly comparable to Panama and Suez. Thailand, the states 
o f Indo-China, and Malaya (row Malaysia) just South-and east 
from continental Asia more than one tliousand miles into the 
South China Sea. Offshore, the Philippine and Indonesian 
archipelagoes complete a great barrier between the Pac i f i c and 
Indian Oceans. Only through the narrow Straits of Malacca, vjhich 
are dominated by Singapore, may this barrier be penetrated 
conveniently. In South-east Asia, too, the great international 
air routes converge from the West coast of the United States 
from Australia and Europe. In the hands o f a hos t i l e power, 
the Peninsula and o f fshore islands o f South-east Asia and Afr ica 
would be isolated from the Pac i f i c ; India, New Zealand, and 
Australia would be threatened immediately. The entire area 
o f south - east Asia and the western pac i f i c , including 
Australia and New Zealand, i s an inter-connected strategic 
9 
unit of far-reaching importance." He further i l lus t ra tes , 
"Another geopol i t ica l interests in Asia i s bounded by 
the recently awakened knowledge of American security needs. 
This may i l lust rated by h is tor i c reference to events in the 
At lant ic coHsrlng the periods o f the two world wars. Although 
the American public was never fu l l y avmre of the fact at the 
8. Ib id. , p. 5, 
9. King, op. cit., p. 
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time, and American leaders were reluctant to admit i t , a basic 
reason for American part ic ipat ion in the F i rs t World War was 
to prevent continental Europe from f a l l i ng into the hands o f 
a single host i l e power. With German submarines sinking merchant 
vessels within a scant distance of Boston and New York harbors 
and the resultant loss of American l i f e and property, f o r the 
f i r s t time there were demonstrated two facts pertinent to 
United States secur i ty . : (1 ) the Atlantic Ocean no longer was 
a great protective barrier f o r the United St^tesj (2 ) the 
protection o f f e red by the Atlantic Ocean and the lega l concept 
o f freedom of the seas depended, in f ac t , on the ro l e of the 
Br i t i sh Navy. The second World War repe9ited this early lesson 
o f pnwer po l i t i c s which, the second time round, made a deeper 
impression. I t is now generally recognised that the Atlantic 
i s a source of protection only when policed and that the problem 
of policing the Atlantic would be i n f i n i t e l y greater i f aon t ihen t^ 
Europe were dominated-by a single host i l e power. Thus, America's 
f i r s t itne^ of defence i s the continent of Europe rather then the 
At lant ic . The principle, recognized in Br i t i sh fore ign policy 
f o r centuries at least has become a pr inciple of American 
po l i c y , " He further states, "The same pr inciple o f American 
security applies in the Pac i f i c . Duririg the Second W^rld War 
the question of Japanese domination of continental east Asia and 
the islands of the Western and South-Western Pac i f i c was a v i t a l 
Pac i f i c issue. Through such experiences as Pearl Harbor, the 
instances of the shell ing of west coast towns by Japanese 
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submarines, the defence of Alaska, Australia, New Zealand, 
and India, there is ample indicat ion of the threat to American 
security of an unpoliced Pac i f i c Ocean and domination o f 10 
continental Asia by a single power," Today, China i s a constant 
danger, i f Peking succeeds in establishing control over a large 
part of Asia, i t is just as consistent f o r the United States 
to have a continuing interest in f r ee , strong, and independent 
states in South and South east Asia as for.' the United States 
to maintain i t s interest in the f r ee , strong, and independent 
States of western Europe, Professor Buss r ight ly observes. 
Idealism was postponed in the interest of expediency as the 
United States made the unpleasant choice between the osx 11 
unattainable and un-acceptable." 
lEhere is also commercial interest in the region though 
i t i s not on large scale but i t s — importance can not be 
denied. The signi f icance of the trade, however, i s embodied in 
i t s strategic - implications. South East Asia supplies about -
90 percent of the World's natural rubber, 66 percent of the 
World's t in . " I n c a s e of two Important strategic materials, 
t i n and natural rubber, the United States depends wholy^' upon 
fo re ign imports f o r a l l i t s reguirements. Jute, Kapok, Copra, 
and tungsten are also important to the American economy. Though 
10. Ibid. T p. 8. 
11. Buss, Claude A, **The Far East", N.I. 1950, p. 716. 
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the United States has succeeded in developing o f synthetics and 
substitutes f o r those materials which had been obtained from 
South East Asia. But s t i l l t in and natural rubber stand as 
major strategic requirements. Moreover, South East asia f u l f i l s 
the requirements of the American's industry because a f te r the 
Second World Wai" i t s resources are not . - e n o u g h and now the 
United States i s a resource de fec i t country. Therfore, the 
region is most important fayom economic point of view to the 
United States. Dr. King gives another aspect of American 
interest in the region. He states, ""Thero i s communist China 
s i t t ing l i ke the cormorant Soviet Union over the captive 
economy system of eastern Europe, hoping to envelop South East 
Asia in i t s wings. Control o f South east Asia 's r i ce , rubber, 
and t in would go fa r toward solving china's food and fore ign 
exchange problems, i f ever the Chinese communist regime, which 
repeatedly has proclaimed i t s e l f a foe of the United States, 
could move in. I t >is only pract ical implementation o f securijby 
interests f o r the United States to deny the Chinese communist 12 
regime a maximum of South east Asia 's resources.** 
There are variety of preMious security commitments in 
Asia which the United States has concluded such as mutual 
defence treat ies with the Philippines, Korea, Formosa, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand and through the Manila Pact American 
12. King, op . c i t . ^ p. 10. 
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security commitments have been extended to include Pakistan, 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Therefore, the 
United States interest in South-east Asia, is in United States 
security and wel fare" and not as a bulwork against communism 
only. As Dr. King puts i t , "Apart from the meaning of the 
mult ip l ic i ty of United States interest — ideo log ica l , 
humanitarion, geopo l i t i ca l , economic, commerical, s trateg ic , 
security and accoumulative — a l l sings point in 'one direct ion. 
In the years ahead. South-east Asia and the surrounding areas 
are bound to play a ro le of increasing importance in World 
a f f a i r s , a matter which w i l l be re f l ec ted by the continued 
13 
growth of United States national interests in the area." Now 
the United States is increasingly interested in the region 
because of the presence of communist China in South East Asia 
which is a constant danger to world peace and the security of 
the United States. Professor Fred Greene observes, "China 
is the centerpiece, though a considerable -measure of i ts 
importance derives from the s ign i f i cant geographic setting in 
which i t functions. I t s mil i tant advocacy of ideaological 
hos t i l i t y toward the United States, i ts commitment to under mine 
all.opposing po l i t i c a l orders, and i t s ready rel iance on instru-
ments of violence and coercion give a cutting edge to the power 
potential that i t s leaders claim l i e s within Peking's reach. 
* 
China hopes to acquire the capacity to gain hegemony over Japan 
and India and to val idate i ts operational concepts f o r the 
27. Ibid., p. 378-79. 
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communization of other nearby lands. Peking's leaders further 
hope to prove their r ight to lead the rest o f the hon..Western 
World - the nations of A f r ica and Latin America i n particular -
and set i t on a course for revolutionary p o l i t i c a l warfare while 
14 
holding the United States, and a l l other opponents at bay." 
About Mexican interest , Professor Fred Greene observes, " To 
begin with, this country does have a major presence in Asia — 
and can probably re ta in a substantial posit ion there in the near 
future - because of past endeavors and because maw states fear 15 
the Chinese communists," 
The United States committed i t s e l f in the beginning o f 
August I960 when America came to the rescue o f France in the 
struggle of Indo-China because France WaS not i n posit ion a f t e r 
the Second World War to bear the burden of mi l i tary campaign 
against the Viet Minh. Olherfore, the United States sent an 
increasing stream of mi l i tary aid to the French and the Vietnamese, 
bearing by 1963 about a third of the cost o f the Wgr, In sp i te o f 
this great expenditure and e f f o r t the mi l i tary s i tuat ion had 
deteriorated. The Climax and c r i s i s c&me with the batt le o f Dien 
Bien Phu i n Apr i l and May 1954 with a v ictory for the Viet Minh. 
Utter ly discouraged and weary of the war, France was determined 
14, Greene, Fred, U.S. Pol^icy and the Security o f Asia, N, I . 1968, 
p. 2-
15. Ibid. T p. 3, 
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to withdraw. This sibuation was painful to the United States 
which suffered a setback in Indo-China. A conference o f American 
Br i t ish, French and Russia fore ign Ministers which met at Br i ta in 
in January and February 1954, suggested ca l l ing a conference on 
Korea and Indo-China to be held at Geneva in Apr i l . The United 
States government was unhappy about the conference,and i t s policy 
with respect to i t was uncertain. Secretary Dulles, obviously 
frustrated by the trend o f events, f lew to Europe and publicly 
appealed for a ""United action*^ policy to stop communist aggress-
ion in Indo-China. The result was a public rebuf f . Bri ta in, 
influenced by domestic public opinion, as we l l as by the views 
of comiaon V/ealth members, and a sincere desire on i t s own part 
to attempt a peaceful settlement with the communist countries, 
refused to part icipate in any such action "^in advance of the 
results o f Geneva.*^ The European fear was that Dulles wanted 
to scuttle the Geneva conference. But i t i s quite clear that he 
wished only to strengthen the anti-communist posi t ion in order 
to get a more favourable settlement. The responsce o f America's 
European a l l i e s was a major reason why the United States took 
s-ucti an in-activ.e part in the Geneva Conference. The a l l i e s 
seemed to be working at cross purposes. As a United States 
senator put i t , the French wanted to get out of Indo-China, the 
the Bri t ish wanted to stay out, and the United States, i t seemed, 
1 6 . Vandevbosch and Butwell, pp. c i t . , p. 1 7 1 . 
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wanted to get Therefore, ''the Geneva agreements meant in 
e f f e c t the practical withdrawal of France from Indo-Ghina, the 
evacuation of the communist Viet Minh forces from Cambodia and 
Laos as well as South Vietnam, the temporary d iv is ion of Vietnam 
at about the seventeenth para l le l , and a planned plebisc i te in 
two years to determine the future status of the whole o f Vietnam. 
An International control commission, composed o f Canada, Poland 
and India, with a la t ter as chairman, was established to supervise 
17 
the execution of the accords.'' Therfore, the United State suffered 
a diplomatic defeat in Indo-Giiina in 1964, An internationally 
legit imatized new communist state came into being — possessed 
of some of the most important mineral resources in a l l South-east 
Asia, a most strategic location, land an industrious population of 
more then 15,500,000 persons. The plebisci te scheduled for July 
1966 was not held, chie f ly because of the refusal of the South 
Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem, supported by the United 
States, to Cooperate in holding i t . Vietnam thus joined Germany 
and Korea as divided countries, vic;tims of the t i tan ic struggle 
between communism and the f r ee world for the strategic areas of 
18 
the globe." 
Mr. Dulles declared, in a press statement of July 23, 1964, 
that the "important thing from mw aa i s not to mourn the past but 
to seize the opportunity to prevent the loss in North Vietnam from 
17. I ^ . , p. 172. 
18. Ibid,J p. 371. 
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leading to the extension of communism throughout South-east Asia 
and the Pac i f i c South West/' He stated that there were two 
lessons which the f r e e nations should learn from experience: 
namely, "'that resistance to communism needs popular support and 
this in turn means that the people should f e e l that they are 
defending their own national inst i tut ions, " and "that arrangements 
fo r co l l e c t i ve defence need to be made in advance @f aggression, 
19 
not a f ter i t i s under way." 
On July 21, 1964, the Settlement reached and i t was 
interpreted by most of Americans as one of the greatest communist 
v ic tor ies of the decade. According to Professor Buss, "Under 
secretary of State Walter B Smith refused to j o in in the declara-
t i on of the Conferecc'e but he asserted tha t^ the United States 
would re f ra in from the threat or use of force to d is turb. ! the 
agreement reached. Farther more, he declared that the United 
States would view any renewal of aggression in v io la t ion o f the 
agreements v/ith grave concern and as seriously threatening 
20 
international peace and securi ty . " 
Now Secretary Dulles o f United States redoubled his 
e f f o r t s to consumate the South-east Asia co l l e c t i v e Defence 
treaty, a f ter the tragedy of Indo-China." " i t s purpose was to 
prevent further communist expansion in the region. He was 
unsuccessful to unite South-east Asia, Nationalist China, Japan, 
19. VandeW-^scla and Butwell, Quoted, p. 372. 
20. Buss, op .c i t . y p. 717. 
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and Korea in a s'oli-d antl-communist f ront . Ifor could he hope 
to gain for his ideas the support of those including Nehru, who 
believed that the Ameicican schemes would proinote tensions and 
who prefered the a l ternat ive Bri t ish proposal f o r an Asia Locarm 
which sraxisit would bind both sides communists and anti-21 
communistst a comrcon comfnitment to preserve the peace.*" Therefore, 
Secretary Dulles succeeded in the formation o f SEATO.' On 
September 8, 1964, eight nations - the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, rAustralia, New Zealand, the Phil ippines, and 
Thailand -singed the Manila Pact, The signatory powers repeated 
their o f t stated promises to s e t t l e international disputes by 
peaceful means to develop the ir capacity to r es i s t armed attaCk 
to prevent and counter subversive a c t i v i t i e s to strengthen their 
f ree inst i tut ions, and to cooperate with one another in the 
promotion o f economic progress and social wel l being. EaCh party 
recognised that aggi'ession by means o f armed attack in the treaty 
area (from western Pakistan to the Pac i f i c Ocean as fa r north as 
21 degrees 30 minutes north lat i tude, thus excluding HongKong, 
Formosa, and Japan) against ar^ r of the parties would endanger i t s 
own peace and safety and agreed that i t would in that event §ict to 
meet the common danger in accordance with i t s constitutional 
processes. The United states speci f ied that i t understood 
aggression to mean communist aggression. The t e r r i t o ry covered 
21. Ib id , , p. 718. 
22. Ib id . , p. 718. 
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by SEATO has not increased but shrunk. Malaya was reiaoved from 
SEATO 'S operation when i t became Independent in 1957 and did 
not j o in the organization. Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, also 
formarly Br i t ish ruled, under went a l i ke change when they became 
members of the Federation o f Malaysia in 1963 (Singapore becoming 
independent by i t s e l f in 1965 and talking — dangerously about 
the poss ib i l i t y of a Soviet naval base on i t s s o i l i f Br i ta in 
ever abondoned i t s defence respons ib i l i t i es towards Malaysia or 
i t s e l f to the United States) . Laos ceased to be a protocal state 
with the Geneva Agreements o f 1962, Cambodia, while technical ly 
s t i l l covered by the protocol, has quite spec i f i ca l l y spurned i t s 
promised protection. Conceivably Prince Iforadom Sihanouk might 
s t i l l c a l l upon SEATO for protection should communist China or 
North Vietnam invade his country, but i t is not l i k e l y th^t 
Cambodia would be taken over in this fashion. Professor Fred 
Greene r ight ly observed, "The United States haS had a long 
t r a t i t i o n o f involvement in Asian security a f f a i r s without clearly 
ident i f y ing or jus t i f y ing i t s interests in terms o t a coherent 
pol icy. Though at times the engagement has been very extensive 
in prest ige and e f f o r t , from the pre 1941 confrontation with 
Japan to thfe war in South Vietnam, the United States has t r i ed 
to r e s t r i c t i t s physical — coMnitments, The Ainerican stance 
has been shaped in a series o f responses to aggression or immediate 
threats. The United States s t i l l has to devise a defence pattern 
based on i t s own concepts and in i t i a t i v e s and in harmony with i t s 
23 
view of i t s own major interests. '* 
23, Fred Greene, OP. c l t . , p. 34. 
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Therefore, the United States tsi alarmed when some Asian 
power has displayed the potential to threaten and absorb the weak 
countries of Asia. In the words o f Professor Fred Greena, "This 
review of the diplonia'^ ^ic mil i tary record during this century 
indicates that American security interests have in most instances 
been closely t ied to the s tab i l i t y of relations anong the Asian 
countries. When some Asian power has displayed the potential to 
threaten and absorb weaker Asian countries, that threat have also 
posed at least a potential danger to American security interests 
in the Pac i f i c , Even when the United States has not been involved 1 
i t has had to deal in subsequent crises with the l ingering 
repercussions of diviisiveness and intra-Asia al l iances . Often, 
of Course, the danger to U. Si interest has been direct and 
iirnnediate."' He further states, "''''The i n i t i a l American concern in 
the region was aroused by the impotence o f China, and the United 
States became increasingly involued as the Japanese Empire began 
to over shadow Eastern Asia. The present commitments again focus 
on China which, through the changing fortunes of history, has today 
24 
became capable of menacing a l l i t s neighbours.'^ 
There began a shi f t of the United States policy in Southeast 
Asia. I t was more or less Soviet Union's attitude towards Southeast 
Asia when she came forward for economic aid programme to the 
countries of the region. In la te 1965, the Russian leaders 
Bulganin and Khrushchev v is i ted Burma v;hen they were returning 
home from India. "This was followed by an agreement to provide 
24. Ibid,, p. 36. 
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technical assistance and equipment in exchange fori Burma's surplus 
r i ce , which was not readily f inding a market. The D.S.S.R. also 
o f f e red , as a g i f t , to build and equip an industrial ins t i tu te . 
In September of the same year Djakarta announced on agreement 
between the Soviet and Indonesian governments whereby the former 
would extend the l a t t e r a credit o f 0^  100,000,000 at an interest 
25 
rate of 2-| percent and with repayment in 12 years , " So there 
began a reorientat ion of American policy. Now the United States 
sought to counter this Soviet diplomatic and economic o f f ens i ve . 
Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State paid a v i s i t to several Asian 
countries and v is i ted Indonesia and invited Sukarno to the v i s i t 
the United State on behalf of the Presiden Eisenhower. Therefore 
"President Eisenhower at a press conference on June 6, 1956 
declared t|iat mil i tary a4.1iances were not always on advantage 26 
and involved a risk fo r the country entering them." This was the 
open inv i ta t ion to the countries o f the region which were not 
committed to the Systems, there fore , i t seemed that the United 
States was prepared to g ive aid for economic developments. There 
were reactions from the a l l i e s and the United States had to 
sa t i s f y the a l l i e s with the explanatory statement. But i t was 
obvious that there were roots f o r the reorientat ion o f the pol icy. 
Now af ter some times. Secretary Dulles declared neutral ity to be 
immoral. When Vice President Nixon v is i ted the Philippines and 
other countries o f South and Southeast Asia in July 1956, he also 
26. Vandev bosch and Butwell, o p . c i t . . p. 376. 
26. Ibid.^ p. 377, 
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declared the immorality of neutralism and warned against trade 
agreements with the Soviet b loc . But soon the United States took 
the new path. The right of neutral i ty was recognised and aid was 
promised to countries even i f they did not align themselves with 
the West and now United States began to emphasize the need f o r 
economic and social progress in the under developed countries. 
According.to Vandcn-bosch and Butwell , "The American object ive 
was to contain the communist, part icular ly China, as f a r as 
Southeast Asia was concerned, and to assist the nations of the 
l a t t e r region to become strong and stable so as to be able to 
survive in a much more troubled world than their nat ional ist 
leaders had anticipated en route to independence. Idea l ly , this 
meant democratic governments pursuing - progressive economic and 
social pol ic ies and cooperation d i rec t l y or ind i rec t l y with the 
27 
United State and l ike minded nations." 
Moreover, South East Asia was passing through a transit ion 
stage. There was no stable system in the region. In Indonesia, 
President S0ukarno came with the idea of "guided democracy" and 
Burma experienced two mi l i tary coups, (soldiers then c i v i l i an in 
i960 and then soldiers in I962). Thailand, a firm America a l l y . 
27. Ibid., p. 378-79. 
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remained inontheiess army run, while mi l i tary came to dominate 
the government in bouth Vietnam atter Ngo Diem's ouster and 
murder in 1963. The tie-cornered struggle tor power in Laos 
and uamoodian Prince Sihanouk's messiah l ike seit-image l ike 
wise made democrary most improoaoie tor either ot these tormeriy 
trench-governed lands in the tore seeaoie xuture. Oniy the 
Phil ippines, Malaysia, and i>ingapore (^hich sp l i t away irom 
I 
jvidiaysia in i96b) seemed destined tor democratic government, 
and theretore, deteriorat ion ot economic conditions was a major 
consequence ot the C i v i l Wars in ooth bouth Vietnam and Laos, 
There were guerr i l la ac t i v i t y ot communists in Vietnam atter 
19^9 and were joined oy "invaders" trom north ot the i7th para l l e l 
YandelfV-bosch and uutweii i l lus t rated another point "countries 
close to Uiina eagerly sought to make some kind of peace with 
Peking - usually tor ditterent and mixed reasons, oamoodia, 
teartui ot Thailand and bouth (and potent ia l ly North) Vietnam, 
openxy desired the protection ot communist ohina against these 
two t radi t ional adjacent adversaries. The American amoassador 
in Rangoan rarely saw the ourmese premier, out the l a t t e r 
welcomed v is i t ing uhinese Statesmen and himseit t rave l l ed to 
Peking in pursuit ot good relat ions with ourma's giant neighoor.* 
Indonesia and Uiina came to cooperate to such an extent oy the 
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28 
middle 196''0!S that Sukarno openly spoke of a Djakarta-Peking dx i s . " 
Though the United States accepted neutralism as a reason-
able species of fore ign pol icy but i t gave also a l i t t l e r esu l t . 
The United States oponly encouracjed the Laotian government in the 
half decade 1955-1960 to abondon the neutra l is t course sot f o r i t 
at Geneva in 1954. The result was a fragmentation of the country 
i n i t i a l l y p i t t ing "neutra l i s t " and communist against a pro-
American fac t i on . Therefore, the United States exploi ted the 
si tuat ion in Laos, In 1963 when there was a Malaysia plan with 
the inclusion of northern Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s of Sarawak and 
Sabah and Singapore. Indonesia and Phil ippines claimed over 
northern Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s and even Indonesia adopted the 
p l i cy of confrontation towards Malaysia but Singapore broke 
away from the p o l i t i c a l parternship in mid-1965. Therefore, 
the United States supported Malaysia and had hoped f o r much 
but received l i t t l e - .w i th regard Indonesia, the United States 
could not win the fr iendship of the S^eukarno government, 
though the United States had played a major ro le in the 
negotiations that led to the t rans fer of western New Guinea 
28. Ibid., p. 380. 
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from Dutch to Indonesian hands in 1962-63 and also gave 
economic aid in large scale to remedy i t s troubles economic 
s i tuat ion. "By late 1965, the United .States had been forced 
to abondon i t s information services, withdraw Peace corpo 
to 
personnel, and countera-ct i t s aid programme/extremely modest 
proportions. Provate American groups - o i l f irms, foundations, 
29 
and such - also found the ir a c t i v i t i e s curtailed or concluded." 
Now Indonesia was leaning towards China and the communist coup 
was suppressed in 1965 and the fa te of S/fiukarxio was also 
decided once for a l l . Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia spurned 
American aid and also did not endorse the communists at home 
and adopted a neutral po l i cy . The Ne win government of Burma 
which could not be cal led procommunist , was seeking an 
accommodation vdth Peking that would permit Burma's survival 
as an independent nation. The Phil ippine was an a l l y in the 
region and Thailand posed no major problems tor the United 
States. However, i t was Vietnam that posed a serious biggest 
problem during thes^e years and absorbed American attention and 
problems of nearby States. 
'•Vith regard Vietnam, the United States does not think 
f o r a moment under communist domination which w i l l endanger the 
security of America. "On February 17, 1965, President Johnson— 
decaled, "As I have said so many, many times and other Presidents 
ahead of we have siad, our purpose and our object ive there is 
29. Vandev bosch and Butwell, op.cit., p. 383. 
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clear . That purpose and object ive is to jo in in the defence 
and protection of the freedom of a brave people who are under 
attack that is controlled and that i s directed from outside 
their countxissl' In a news conference on July 29, 1965, the 
President declared that, "this . . . . war is guided by 
North Vietnam and i t is spurred by communist China. I t s goal 
is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to 
30 
extend the Asiatic domination of communism." I t is to be noted 
that the Americans came to south Vietnam as "advisers" in the 
begining a f te r the Geneva Accords of 1954 and then established 
themselves mi l i ta r i t y though they decaled that they were 
protecting South Vietnam- from Viet Congs. Reviewing the 
United States pol icy towards Soilith Vietnam, Ivir. Honey observes, 
"The United States provided generous c i v i l and mi l i tary aid 
to South Vietnam from 1954 onwards, which made possible the 
restoration of order and rapid economic reicovefy. As the 
spectre of insurgency became a r e a l i t y , i s o American mi l i tary 
aid was increased to enable South Vietnam to meet the growing 
strength of the Viet Cong. In February 1962, the exist ing 
Mi l i tary Assistance Advisory Group was f e l t to be inadequate 
fo r this task and was replaced by a mi l i tary Assistance 
command (Vietnam) American soldiers accompanied Vietnamese 
mi l i tary units in the role of advisers, but aeroplanes and 
helicopters were flown— by American as wel l as Vietnamese 
30. Vandetn bosch and Butwell, Quoted, The Changing Face of 
South east Asia, p. 386. 
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personnel. United States involvement in the war was steadi ly 
growing, but serious doubts were awakened in Washington by the 
p o l i t i c a l ins tab i l i t y which lasted throughout 1964 and by the 
apparent inab i l i t y of any government to impose i t s e l f upon the 
country and people. At one point Secretary of Defence Mac 
Namar^ a made several public appearances with General Khanh the 
Prime Minister, f o r the purpose of consolidating the l a t t e r ' s 
posit ion and discouraging further changes, but a l l to no avaiL 
By the end of 1964 i t being asked how long South Vietnam could 
continue to defend i t s e l f against the Viet Cong unless i t put 
an end to anarchy, and the South Vietnamese people themselves 
now entertained serous misqvings about the future. In these 
circumstances Washington hesitated to commit large numbers of 
American mi l i tary personnel to Vietnam to watch the rapidly 
expending might of the Viet Cong, and American uncertainty 
endangered a fee l ing of hopelessness in South Vietnam. Embolden-
ed, the Viet Cong launched major' attacks against American a i r 
31 
bases in South Vietnam and successfully i n f l i c t ed heavy danger. 
He further states, "February 1965 was the turning point in 
Vietnam. The destructive Viet Cong raids on American a i r f i e l d s 
f i n a l l y convinced the United States administration that stronger 
action had necessary i f the situation were not to deteriorate 
s t i l l further. Retal iary bombing attacks against mi l i tary 
targets in North Vietnam were undertaken by the South Vietnamese 
and United States a i r forces, with the Americans playing the 
31. Honey, P.J. The Origins of the Vietnam V/ar. 
Edited by Sibnarayan Ray, Vietnam - Seen from East and West, 
p. 31. 
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dominant ro le in these , and soon afterwards spec i f i c promises 
were made to commit larger numbers of American troops to Vietnam, 
Work was commenced upon the construction of immensely strong 
mi l i tary enclaves along the coast l ine, where they could be 
supplied from the sea by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and American 
32 
soldiers were, for the f i r s t time, committed to a f i ght ing r o l e . " 
The war in Vietnam has entered a crusial stage, with both North 
Vietnam and the United States committing more and more soldiers 
on a large scale and are unimaginable now. I t is estimated that 
"the number of American f ight ing men in Vietnam had increased 
tenfold in 1965 - from about 20,000 to nearly 200,000 and to 
more than 255,000 by mid - 1966 - exclusive of personneal on 
naval vessels in and near Vietnamese water." And "there were 
reports that the size of the American mil i tary forces in Vietnam 33 
would be neir ly doubled before 1967." Now President Nixon and 
before him President Johnson had throv/n various peace proposals 
for peaceful settlements but the Viet Minh, i t seems, have 
doubts about the American's seriousness because the Geneva Accords 
of 1954 c lear ly established that the Indo-Chinese States would 
be neutral and the p leb isc i te would be held in 1966 but South 
Vietnam backed by United States refused f o r th is . This is not 
true. But the North Vietnam is to be balmed, "In 1962, the 
International control commission reported that "armed and un-
armed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been 
32. I b id . , p, 32. 
29. Vandev bosch and Butwell, op.cit., p. 383. 
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sent from the Zone in the North (North Vietnam) to the Zone is 
the South (South Vietnam) with the object of supporting, orga-
nising, and carrying out host i le a c t i v i t i e s , including armed 
34 
attacks." 
It: is also reported that in Vietnam -war, there were twenty 
nine countries which are a l l i e s to the United States are giving 
aid to South Vietnam along the United States. Australia 
Newzealand and South Korea had contributed combat forces and 
are act ive ly part ic ipating with the Americana. According to 
Vanden-bosh and Butwell, "The most l i k e l y ultimate out come 
is some kind of negotiated settlement. Total v ic tory by e i ther 
side is hardly possible. The question so fa r , however, has 
partly concerned the problem of which participants in the con-
f l i c t s should be the negotaitors. The Americans has opposed 
negotiations with the VietcQng . Yet the Vietcang have been 
the heart of the opposition to the Saigon Government, Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk, however, has said that Hanoi could include 
35 
the Vietcong within any negotiating delegation i t might form." 
Therefore, the United States wanted to prevent, such a communist 
state from absorbing adjacent Laos and Combodia and posci'^ly 
other nations . I t is accoptcd that i t can not be done by the 
American's alone and in the post the United Stated had t r i ed 
to create some sorts of system to check communist expansion in 
34. Special Report to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference 
on Indo Chaina, June 2, 1962. 
35, Vanden bosch and Butwell. op.cit., p. 395 
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the region but the Americans would not have succooded ye t . 
Though there are many American's committments in the region 
but there are not very strong and sound , Now i t is c lear 
that the advance of communism cannot be checked by mi l i tary 
means alone in South-East Asia. The mi l i tary and economic -"-ids 
can not solve a l l the social and po l i t i c a l problems. The chief 
danger, hov'/ever, is not direct attack but i n f i l t r a t i o n and 
subversion, with Moscow and Peking using local Chinese and 
indigenous persons to spear head the trouble making. I t has 
been Vietnamese who are either communists or support the 
communists who have challenged the successive Saigon — 
government — not Chinese invaders. Like wise the comm.unist 
threat in Malaysia and now-separated Singapore has came from 
local Chinese whose loya l ty lay with Peking or Mao rather than 
the exist ing government arrangements and the values and soci'^ty 
36 
they represented, Vanden bosch and Butwell r i ght ly observe, 
"Southeast Asia is not going to be saved from communism unless 
i t s peoples and governments have the desire and the w i l l to be 
saved.. Th is 'w i l l at the moment does not seem to be strong in 
some lands. But even desire and w i l l are not su f f i c i en t ; a 
nation must have the capabi l i ty to defend i t s e l f from communism, 
both internal ly and external ly . The region must be capable of 37 
defending i t s s e l f . " But Professor Buss observes, "The American 
record in South east Asia was an uneven record of accomplishment 
36. I b i d . , p. 397-98. 
22. Ibid,, p. 134, 
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and f a i l u r e . I t accepted the truism that Americans could not 
lead the good l i f e at home with out concern for the events 
of Asia and that American interests in Asia were best 
promoted by the growth of strong, prosperous, and enlightened 
Asian States, Americans repeated times and again that they 
harbored no aggressive designs against any one and that they 
acted uniquely according to the demands of se l f -de fence . 
Only Asians could determine fo r themselves what they wanted in 
their struggle f o r improved wel l -being. Americans were often 
over-eager to assist and were the unwilling of the i r own better 
impulses. They learned b i t t e r l y that mi l i tary strength in 
i t s e l f was powerless to prevent the capture of the sparkling 
ideas of freedom and prosperity by a concerous ideology. They 
wore shovm that economic assistance contained within i t s e l f 
the seeds of misunderstanding as wel l as the promise of 
fr iendship. Asians cherished sp i r i tua l and cultural values in 
the turmoil of Kaleidoscopic changes, and they sought new 
guidance from those who manifested a fundamental disposit ion 
of understanding and respect. Asian believed that present 
events v;ere transitory and impermament and that the e v i l would 
disappear and the good remain. They interpreted the history 
of the i r distinguished part as the prelude to a glorious future'; 
In the i r own philosophy they challenged the United States to 
demonstrate i t s ovm unswering f a i th in i t s e l f as the dream of 
38 
youth and the hope of tomorrow." 
38. Buss, op.cit.. p. 719-20. 
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C H A P T E R IV 
IHS CHINESE PHANTOM 
EXPANSION VERSUS CONTAINMENT 
I t has already been explained that South East Asia i s a 
vast region embracing both the mainland bulge o f the Asiat ic 
continent and adjacent island archipelagos extending well into 
the Pac i f i c Ocean and almost to Australia. I ts t o ta l area exceeds 
1,700,000 square miles, ''"with a combined population exceeding 
"•225,000,000."' Its natural resources are so varied and valuable 
that i t i s one o f the richest areas on the globe, 
S(5'.ul3h?Sia^ t Asia i s s t ra teg i ca l l y situated on the main 
sea route between India and China and therefore, i s much influenced 
by fear of i t s big and immediate neighbour, China internal ly 
in such areas as freedom of movement and speech as wel l as in 
fore ign policy decisions involving such alternat ive as alignment 
or non-alignment. The easfe o f access to South East Asia provided 
by the very waters which separate the region from i t s neighbours 
on three sides i s a constant threat to area as witnessed by i t s 
recent history of prolonged external subjection. There are three 
times as many people in China as in a l l the South East Asian 
countries combined. And a l l the South East Asian countries are 
i t s southern neighbours. The Chinese constitutes a largest 
minority in the region. The Chinese exceeds 14,000,000 and is 
scattered over the whole of South East Asia. China being the 
world's most populous country (exceeding 700,000,000 people, 
has t rad i t iona l ly sought to influence i t s southern neighbours, 
and can apparently count on the support o f large numbers o f over 
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seas Chinese who s t i l l regard themselves as more Chinese than 
members of the societ ies in which they lliae . Therefore, 
the i r loyal ty is doubtable. They are an in f luent ia l but 
unassimilated part of the economic, p o l i t i c a l , and cultural, 
l i f e of such countries as Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Phil ippines. Each of 
these countries must deal with the vexing problem of Chinese 
dual national i ty, f o r the government in China, theEod® as wel l 
the ir predecessors, has maintained that, "a Chinese remains 
Chinese wherever he may be domiciled." No matter what the 
legal nationality of a Chinese, China regards him as her c i t i z en . 
Today, many of these over seas Chinese look to Formosa as the i r 
sp ir i tual home. But i f Red China is admitted to the United 
Nations and thus elevated to a posit ion of international 
respectabi l i ty , i t is reasonable to expect that the loya l ty of 
the over seas Chinese w i l l be redirected toward Peking. 
Professor Hall r ight ly observes, "This new world of South 
East Asia, created through the ttauiqpla of nationalism against 
foreign domination, was i t s e l f in a new set t ing. North-west-
wards of i t were the newly independent states of India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon, North wards, lay communist China, with 
a strength and an awareness of the outside world such as i t 
had not shown since the early Mink period. In South-East Asia, 
the Chinese question mark was beginning to over shadow every 
other issue and complicate the internal a f f a i r s of the newly 
independent States. " 
1. Hall , D.G.E., The History of South East Asia, N.Y. 1966, p.82Ct 
- 217 -
The Chinese penetration of South East Asia is not new. 
It is the result of centuries. They started to migrate 
mainly from the Southern Chinese provinces of K wantung, 
Fukien, and Kwangsi to this region. In the words of Victor 
Purcell, "the of their climate made it easier for 
2 
the immigrants to survive the conditions when they arived." 
The laws of the Ch'ing (M^naiiu) dynasty - laid down that all 
who clandestiiiBij*:^  proceed to sea to trade or who move to 
foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating 
them, shall be punished according to the law of communicating 
with rebells and enemies, and consequently suffer death by 
being beheaded. Chinese religion, too, condemned those who 
deserted the graves of their ancestors as "unfilial". However, 
the pressure of economic necessity and the hope for gain were 
tdo^ppwerffill to be over come either by the fear of punishment 
or the demands of ancestor worship, and the Chinese went 
abroad in large numbers. The comming of the West to Asia 
greatly stimulated this emigration for the Portuguese, the 
Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French in their turn 
created the conditions of order that were so necessary for 3 
successful trading. The Chinese came into this region in 
search of their livelihood. Therefore, they took very little 
interest in local politics. They worked as labourers in mines 
2. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in South oast Asia. 
Lennox A. Mills and Associates, The New World of South east 
Asia, p. 273.-
27. Ibid., p. 378-79. 
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and to lesser extent for a State, and some preferred employ-
ment of more lucrative kinds. On the whole they were the 
middle men and the retail traders, providing the medium of 
economic intercourse between the Europeans and the natives of 
the South East Asian countries. In Thailand, too, they 
occupied a leading place in trade, which has never been under 
western domination. In the words of Victor Purcell, "The 
Chinese Revolution of 1911 produced in the long run a great 
change in the attitude of the over Seas Chinese. From being 
conscious only of their family, clan or tribe they became 
aware that they belonged to the Chinese nation, divided 
politically though it was. The Chinese nationalist Party, 
the Kuomintang, received great support from the Chinese of 
South east Asia, as nationals of China according to the Jus 
Sanguinis, was the source of much friction between Chinese 
immigrants and the local governments. Communism too, after 
Chiang Kai-Shek had, in 1927, purged the Kuomintang of its 
leftist elements, sf gained more and more adherents among 
the over seas Chinese, especially among school teachers and 
4 
the labouring classes." In 1949, Mao Tse Tung succeeded in 
carving out communist state in China which is known as 
People's Republic of China. Professor Mills rightly observes, 
"During 1950 there have been disquieting indications that the 
Chinese have given up their former support of Chiang-Kai-Shek 
4. Mills and Associates, op.cit., p. 274. 
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and are inclined to veer toward Mao Tse Tung. The very large 
majority are anti-communist, but they fear that communism will 
gain control of South east Asia, and they feel that it is 
expedient to make their peace with coming ruler. They realise 
too their unpopularity with the peoples of South east Asia 
and hope that communist China will protect their vested 
interests. They could be a dangerous fifth column and a 
formidable obstacle Lo the western policy of holding the line 
against communism in South east Asia. As yet they are un-
decided and are likely to support which ever side seems the 
5 
more certain to win." 
There are two most significant facts to be remembered 
about China, in addition to her economic ideology, are the 
tremendous territory she covers and the massive size of 
her population. Geographically, she occupies a dominant 
position in east central Asia. Chinese expansionism is nothing 
new, for historically every Chinese regime has sought to 
expand its frontiers whenever it had the necessary mili tary 
power. From ancient times, the Chinese, through pressure 
of population on their limited and under developed resources 
have been pressing South-ward in search of food and shelter. 
The coastal and couthern provinces have a long history of 
emigration, sometimes in violent hordes and sometim.os peacefully, 
As merchants or money changers, peasants or petty shopkeepers, 
the Chinese have penetrated into every country that would 
receive them, and have successfully taken over a segement of 
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their hosts trade and commerce . The results of the expansion 
can be seen in the unassimilated Chinese minorities all over 
South East Asia — veritable States within States. According 
to Prof. Hall, "South East Asia's fears of China acrose 
largely from three sources; China's traditional claims to 
overlordship and her more recent claims ta^rohtiei?—territoPi-es^^ 
communism and the potential threat to independence of the 
millions of Chinese living in SouLh East Asian countries. 
From very early days, as we have seen, South East Asian rulers 
have been encouraged to send missions to Peking and to seek 
recognition of the emperor. The Chinese records shov7 this 
relationship as one of the overlord-vassal, but such was not 
the view of the rulers themselves, one of whose aims was the 
establishment of profitable trade with China. In modern times 
Chinese overlordship was really a myth with China of the 
Ch'ing period cultivated, along with her excessive cultural 
pride, inresponse to the great changes brought by the Western 
impact upon Asia. It may have influence the outlook of the 
early Kuomintang leaders, but communist China does not seem 
to have paid much attention to it so far. On the other hand 
China's historic concern hos been over the security of her 
frontiers and maintenance of stabel conditions beyond. Hence 
the posibility of her military intervention has caused acute 
6 
apprehension in South East Asia." H^ goes on to say that 
6. Hall, op_j_ci-U, p. 821. 
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"South East Asia was a key theatre of the Cold Wa 
communist China's aim was by subversion to secure 
Vi/illing to pursue policies v^ /hich she approved. One note-
worthy change in her tactics was to drop propaganda l ine 
of concorn for the welfare of the over seas Chinese, and to 
all appearances to throw their interests over board in seeking 
to allay the fears of the local governments regarding her 
7 
intentions." 
Communism is not merely an ideology in South East Asia 
any more than it is any where on the face of the globe. It 
is organized imperialism allied with an explosive idea. It 
is a vjell organized apparatus and an international conspiracy 
8 '' 
as- well as an ideology. It is said, that, the real and 
fundamental difference between communist societies and 
democratic countries lies in the area of human freedom 
the people's right to choose and change their own economic, 
political, and social systems as they like, to elect those vi/ho 
shall govern them within the framework of those systems, and 
to enjoy within that same framework , the civil liberties 
which r e l i eve them of the fear of arbitrary in just ice , 
permit them to practice freedom of the mind, and enable them 
to walk with their heads up. Therefore, the basic ideological 
7. 2bid_j_, p. 822. 
8. King, John Kerry, South East Asia in Perspective, N.Y. 1959, 
p. 74. 
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issue before Asia is a struggle not between Capitalism and 
Socialism but between freedom and totalitarianism. The worker • 
in the Soviet Union or China has no freedom, nor does he enjoy 
in return for the loss of his freedom, a higher level of 
living than the workers in many "capitalist" countries. 
Under democratic Capitalism both abundance and freedom are 
9 
possible. About the over seas Chinese, Professor Hall 
observes "The figures themselves are significant, biiit less 
so than the fact that the Chinese occupied and still 
key positions in the economies of these countries, with a 
measure of control over internal trade and industry quite 
dispropotionate to their numbers. They had all along l i v ed 
as a community apart, especially in the Islamic countries 
where intermarriage was rare, but also in the Budhist 
countries, where religion imposed no bar to assimilation and 
even in Vietnam with its Chinese type civilization. Their 
economic importance and cultural unassimilability had led 
King Vajiravudh of Siam (Thailand) to call them the Jev/s of the 
East." Their contempt for the culture of the Southern barbarians 
was increased by the Chinese Revolution of 1911; and when after 
the communist victory of 1949, China's position in the World 
became in-comparably stronger. Pride was deeply stirred. Thus 
upsurge of national sentiment among the over seas Chinese 
coincided with an equally strong nationalistic phase in the 
9. Chandra Sekhar, Communist China Today, Bombay, 1965, p. 
p. 207-8. 
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history of the South East Asians, and of the world war I I 
conflict of nationalism were extremely b i t ter -
Hence, with the Communist victory in China every country 
of South East Asia became uneasily aware of the presence 
of a potential Chinese ' f i f t h column' in i t s midst. 
Professor Buss rightly observes that "the communists 
pledged themselves to the protection and promotion of the 
legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad. 
They CO iBerDmiS,e4 with capitalism in the stage of the New 
Democracy ^jiJfealMr to the wealthy successful Chinese l iving 
overseas. The Chinese rather than the Russains, assumed the 
directorship of the communist heirarcjiy in East Asia. The 
communist set up a National Commission on over seas Chinese 
Af fa i rs within the government structure and induced some 
of the wealthiest Chinese abroad to serve as members. They 
organised local associations in Fukien and Kwangtung for 
service and assistance to over seas Chinese. The head quarters 
doubled as places for good fellowship and centres for pro-
paganda control. The Peking government encouraged tstiidejit 
exchanges and goodwill tours and exploited every means to 
multiply emigrants remittances and investments in Chinese 
industries. It tailored propagenda programs to over seas 
Chinese and without doubt explored ways and means to convert 
10. Hall op.cit., p.823. 
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them into successful f i f t h columns for possible mov®ments 
of crisis."^^ 
The Chinese are sizeable number in the region and 
therefore South-Bast Asia i s a major objective of communist 
penetration and can thus be considered together from that aspectt 
it has neither geographical nor historical unity, consisting 
as it does of several well-marked areas with l i t t l e innately in 
12 
common. In the words of Dr. Vlugt, "Paradoxical though it 
may appear, the Communist compaign in Southeast Asia has been 
greatly furthered by Japanese imperialian* Prom the turn of 
the last century, the rising power of Imperial Japan nurtured 
the grandiose dream of dominating the entire Far East. That 
dream led Japan to challenge the Western Powers in the late 
war, during which Japanese armies temporarily conquered the 
whole of Southeast Asia. Although tfeipan eventually collapsed 
in utter defeat, those occupations has inf l icted terr ib le 
material d'anmge shattered western prestige, and l e f t behind 
chaotic situations which greatly favoured both native 
13 
nationalist movements and communist penetration." According 
to Professor Buss, "when the Chinese communists took over 
the direction of their nation's foreign policies, they 
represented the merging of two boiling streams of thought* 
11. Buss, Claude A. "The Par East", A History of Recent and 
Contemporary Internation Relation in East A3ia. o«534. 
12. Vlugt, Ebed Van Der. "Asia Aflame" Communist in the East.p. 128. 
13. Ibid.p. 129. 
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They inherited the qualities of the Chinese race and a 
Confucian pol i t ica l idealogy which had persisted from the time 
of Christ. In addition they adhered to the philosophy and 
techniques of international dommunisin. They saw no conflict 
between the ideology of the movement and the legacy of China's 
past l iving in their own people, in place of an e f fete imperial 
bureaucracy. Instead of limiting themselves to the achronistic 
Universalism of Confucius coiJ'e2sniirDUS'*--with China, they embraced 
an anthoritarian doctrine which they hoped to make the basis 
H 
of a radically — reconstructed world." About the nature of 
the Chinese, Vlugt declares, " i f Communist activity has already 
made notable progress in Southeast Asia, it i s easy to imagine 
what it w i l l be l ike i f the resident Chinese communities are 
marshalled and directed for the Communist cause by a Communist 
mother country as China has bgcoffiS* To be sure, the wealthy 
upper-class Chinese normally tend to be conservative and anti -
Communist. But the expatriate Chinese are everywhere opportunists, 15 
bowing to the prevailing wind." Therefore, the Chinese minorities 
in the region have the abi l i ty of the united Chinese element to 
disrupt the economic l i f e of these countries and thereby foster 
native unrest on Peking's w i l l . No doubt, the Chinese economic 
grip is strongest in Malaysia and it i s eveArhere considerable. 
H . Buss, op. c i t . , p.540 
15. Vlugt. op. c i t . , p.131 
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In Thailand, the Chinese probably handle nine-tenths of the 
country's every day business. In Philippines they control 
about f i f t y per cent of the retai l trade. Indonesia and 
even in Burma they were likewise economically prominant before 
the mass upsurge against them. In Combodia in Java and in 
Vietnam ailso they have been predominant even pol i t ica l ly* 
Therefore, nownere in Southeast A,sia are the Chinese a negligible 
factor. Prior 1949 the Communists in the region looked Soviet 
Union for guidance. Moscow was considered as spir itual home. 
Russia was directing Communist movements in Southeast Asia. 
But when Communist China came into being in 1949, the Communists 
who are predominantly hailing from China in this region, consider 
Peking as their spiritual home. Russia and Communist China 
are now no more on friendly terms. Vandenbosch and Butwell 
rightly observe, "unless relations between China andRussia 
improved greatly, Russia could get no advantages from communist 
gains in Southeast Asia, for this region i s China's sphere, 
and whatever the Communist harvest there might be, i t would be 
16 
reaped by China." The Communist China is s t i l l assisting as 
iQost promised in the past, the a l l l iberation movements in this 
region and the war in Vietnam is the recent example. Professor 
Buss rightly points out, that communist China's determination 
to assert i ts leadership in theASliiii region followed and expanded 
17 the classic pattern of the strong dynasties of the pasta 
16. Vandenbosch and Butwell. op. c i t . , ]p.182 
17. Buss. op .c i t . , p.55t> 
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Communist China took number of ste^s for the leadership in 
the Asian region. The Chinese took the init iat ive in assembling 
a major international conference of the trade unions of Asia and 
Australasian countries in Peking in December, 1949. They set up 
an Asian-Australian Laison Bureau of the world Federation of 
Trade Unions, which served as an ef fective propaganda sounding 
years an 
board. Three/later they called /liA^iaiarPacific Peace Conference, 
with almost 400 delegates and observers from thirty-seven countries. 
That conference passed resolutions against the rebirth of Japanese 
militarism, for a ;just and reasonable settlement in Korea, for 
support to Asian national independence movements, and for the 
promotion of close economic and cultural relations anong the 
Asian and Pacif ic peoples. It also established a permanent 
Peace Liason Committee which, with a Liason Bureau of the 
MFTU, constituted a kind of Asia com in form. Biesei organisations 
did not spread dogmas of Sta l in 's socialism but the teachings 
of Peking's democratic united front, the thought of Mao Tse-Tung. 
The '•^Aaia-Cojmlnfbrtt" together with the central Bureau of overseas 
Af fa i rs and the Far East Committee for People's Revolutionary 
Af fa i rs made effective organizational structure for the implementa-
18 
tion of China's leadership in the Asian region. But soon Communist 
China took advantages of recently formed institutidns and Southeast 
Asia received f i r s t priority in the determination of China's 
real interests. The communists made their cause the cause of 
18. Ibid. p.556 
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Southeast A3ia and assumed the right to meddle in internal 
a f f a i r s of the "Asian Balkans" - Indoohina(now Combodia» 
Laos and Vietnam - North and South) Thailand, I^lay^ (now 
Malaysia), and Burma* The Viet Mlnh'i Communist leader 
Hochi Minh, led the underground resistance to Japan during 
the war and established the independent Republic of Vietnam 
(Democratic Republic of Vietnam) in Septanber, 1944» just after 
the Japanese surrender. As war broke out between the Viet Minh 
and France, it seemed to be just another colonial skirmish unti l 
the communists came to power in Peking. Then in 1950 the Chinese 
communists and the Viet Minh regime exchanged recognition and 
together joined the camp oi" freedom and democracy led by the 
Soviet Union. "The Chinese sent advisers and tons of supplies and 
equipment to the Reds in Indochina and through their support 
converted a local colonial skirmish into a major front between 
the free world and i ts enemies. In other areas the Chinese 
communists remained in the background. In Burma they exacerbated 
the arguments between the government and the Chinese Nationalist 
gueri l las and in Malaya (now Malaysia) they undoubtedly extend 
sympathy and perhaps some money to the Chinese communist bands 
fighting in the jungles. In Thailand they worked among the 
students and labourers and exploited the anti-Chinese nationalistic 
legislation of the Thai government. In a l l areas they f i l l e d the 
air waves and the colums of newspapers with propaganda and they 
fomented strikes or other troubles wherever they coUld embarass 
19. Ibid, p.558 
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the government, or take the p ro f i t s out of cap i ta l i s t i c 
enterprises. They sought support among the overseas Chinese 
who o f f e red themselves as potential f i f t h columnists. The 
communist took i t for granted that they would dominate 
Southeast Asia as the United States dominated the American 
continent, as Russia dominated Eastern Europe, and as India 
was determined to dominate Indian Ocean. However, the western 
powers warned China that they vrould treat aggression in South 
east Asia "with grave concern"' and they intimated the possibi-
20 
l i t i e s of "'massive r e t a l i a t i on . " I t 'is pointed out that, 
Communist strategy and tact ics fol lowed customary l ines . The 
f i r s t move was to inflame loca l nationalist movements, encouraging 
their leaders to seek not merely absolute p o l i t i c a l independence 
by a thorough-going ouster o f the western colonial authorities 
but also the confiscation of western capita l holdings and the 
breaking of a l l economic t i es v/ith the west. Therefore, i t was 
Communist plan to exploit the native people and i t s regime 
against the west. The communists also f e l t that, newly estab-
l ished native regime would be too unstable, i n e f f i c i e n t , s e l f -
seeking and corrupt either to handle such gigantic problems or 
to maintain the ir authority over hungry and desperate populations. 
In such an atmosphere o f Aeeperuflng chaos and demoralization, the 
way would be clear for discipl ined, fomentical commumst minorit i -
es to overthrow the nationalist regimes and gain d ic ta tor ia l power, 
27. Ibid., p. 378-79. 
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Southeast Asia woiild thereby become another segment o f the 
mighty communist Empire. The world revo lut ion v/ould have 
21 
taken another giant step toward f i n a l r ea l i z a t i on . I t has been 
the communist plan o f conquest f o r Southeast Asia, According 
to Vlugt, "Natural ly , i t has been notably furthered by the 
southward sweep of communism in China and by the opening 
o f a vigorous communist o f f ens i v e in India, But the factor 
which probably decided tfoscov/ to in tens i f y communist a c t i v i t y 
since 1948 was a heightened determination to paralyse the 
reg ion 's economic r ev i va l So as to compromise the European 
Recovery Programme by depriving the western world o f the supplies 
of rubber, t in , and other regional products so badly needed 
in western lands. P o l i t i c a l l y and s t ra t eg i ca l l y , a major 
explosion in Southeast Asia would l ikewise serve as a d ivers ion 
o f western at tent ion and energy concentrated in Europe to check 
aggression on that continent. This i s a f ami l i e r communist 
method to sh i f t suddenly from one sector to another, thereby 22 
tending to confuse opponents and throw them o f f balance. 
Now Communist China i s playing the same ro l e as Soviet 
Union did about two decade ago. The Korean cr ises , the 
invasion on India, in 1962 and more recently Vietnam problems 
are the l i v i n g signs o f communists att i tude to the various 
problems. Professor Buss c l ear ly states, "The v ictory o f 
Mao Tse-Tung in China and the spread of internal communism 
to the ir t e r r i t o r i e s turned the minds o f the leaders o f 
21. Vlugt, o p . c i t . , p, 134, 
22. Ibid,, p. 134, 
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Southeast Asia more than ever from the luxuries of berating 
the imperialists and dreaming of the future to the rea l i t i es 
of the responsibi l it ies of freedom. They did not share the 
same distrust and fear of communist which existed in the 
United States and Western Europe. Southern Asia had no actual 
experience with communist dictatroship and discounted the 
stories which were told about i t . On the otherhand, Asian had 
personal contact with the western powers and reacted violently 
against them. Asian were obliged to recast their estimates of 
their own security, to determine whether the remnants of western 
imperialism or Russian and Chinese communist imperii ism 
constituted the greater threat to their own independence and 
freedom. They were not immunized from the oold war and they 
could not find safety or ccxnfort in pol ic ies of neutralism 
or isolation. They carped at the imperialistic sins of the 
west, but they needed the assistance of the :;west to expand 
their social services and improve their levels of livings* 
Fundamentally they needed the protection of the West to hold 
the line against the communist while they themselves labored 
to make their states and societies proof against the attacks 
of new aggressors from without and of seductive ideologies from 
23 
within." But Vandenbosch and Butwell state, " The decline 
in western influence and the increase in China's position in 
Southeast Asia represent a historical process s t i l l being 
23. Buss. op. cit . , p.586 
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acted out. That i s it presumably wi l l continue at least 
a l i t t l e longer unti l some new, more stable pattern of 
international relations involving Southeast Asia w i l l have been 
established. Neither the United States nor the United Nations 
under existing circtamstanoes can prevent tiie laltimajie draninance 
of Southeast Asia by the Chinese. Effectives/among the South-
east Asian states might limit the opportunities for China's 
influence to be f e l t - as might genuine partnerships between 
states of the region and outsider (such as Philippines and 
the United States) or pol icies both strengthening the United 
Nations and a country's identification with the U.N's main 
proclaimed purposes (which i s actually the opposite of the 
effect of Indonesia's withdrawl in 1965)* Even so, however, 
geography and China's potential powers and intentions remain 
important l ikely determinants of the future relationship 
between the world's most populous nation and i t s less 
24 
formidable southern neighbours." I t , therefore, follows 
that Communist China poses to be a constant danger to 
this region. Moreover the local communists in the countries 
of Southeast Asia look towards Peking for guidance, Peking 
in turn i s prop%ating i t s ideology through the Chains of 
Communist institutions. Bach country of Southeast Asia 
has taken strong actions against the communists in the past 
and North Vietnam is the only exception. But the influence 
of the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asiai countries can not 
24. Vandenbosch and Butwell. op.cit . p.332. 
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be ignored while thevestern influence is declining. I f 
western influence is indeed declining in Southeast Asia and 
probably w i l l crontinue to do so J^ x^r some time to come (and 
i f it is also true that the -vracuum le f t by the decline of 
European power in the area has yet to be f i l l e d ) , i t is 
d'ifficultyto see how Chinese influence can be prevented from 
growing - perhaps gradually and possibly even peacefully. 
This point, however, seems to be missed by many, although 
not, significantly, by Cambodia's Prince Tfero^ia Sihano'tik"-
or. Indonesia's longtime President Sukarno. Cambodia is 
apparently endeavouring to be China's friend in order to assure 
its continued independence. Indonesia has made a bid for 
dominance in the area i t s e l f , possibly partly to serve as a 
counter weight to Peking. Either of these two policies m^^ be 
more sensible thao a standsti l l attitude toward revision of 
SEATO seemingly endless Anerican aid to the Saigon government 
(which is no longer the same as South Vietnan) or Burma's 
faith» That China w i l l ultimately respect i ts genuine 
neutrality. 
In Malaysia and Thailand, the Communist situation is 
unique.Trom the beginning in these countries communism has 
been geared almost entirely to the large overseas Chinese 
groups, which in Southeast Asia are by no means a l l communist 
or sympathetic to Communism but rather f a l l in each country 
into small groups, one communist, one anti-communist, plus 
the large majority uncommitted to either group. In Southeast 
-234-
Asia most overseas Chinese would prefer to ignore the 
issue of communism and can centrate wholly on their economic 
activities. In 1927 they split along the lines of the 
Kuomintang - communist split in China and eversince both 
factions have been represented in Southeast Asia. However, 
it is self-evident that communist or not, many overseas Chinese 
have been strongly influenced in recent years by the increased 
international prestige and power of Communist China. They 
have not assimilated to any marked degree into the cultures 
where they have been chosen to reside, especially since the 
beginning of the Chinese revolution and the upsurge of Chinese 
nationalism which accompanied it. In Southeast Asia the 
overseas Chinese often hawe been marked as victims of discrimina-
tory legislation and antagonism, more economic than racial 
and, as a result, have looked to China, whatever that country*s 
25 
political complexion, for diplomatic support and protection. 
The development of Communism among the Chinese living in Thailand 
and Malaya (now Malaysia) as well as as elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia, hais proved a mixed blessing for the communists. While the 
communists anong the overseas Chinese have provided a valuable 
fifth column for communism, the antagonism snd distrust evoked by 
the Chinese anong the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia hawe 
tended to minimise the appeal of communism to the non-Chinese 
majority groups. In Thailand and Malaysia especially, 
communism is regarded as essentially a Chinese phenomenan, and 
25. King op. ext., p.79 
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that seems to be sufficient reaigon for the indigenous population 
26 
to oppose it« C!ommunist activity in Southeast Asia was started 
more than thirty five years ago when the Communist parties were 
formed almost in every country of the region but Ho Chi Minh 
played a key role as a cummuniigt leader in Southeast i^isia though 
he hailed from Indochina but from 1926 to 1930, he travelled about 
Southeast jJisia recruiting and training men for local communist 
leadership. 
The Communist parties of Southeast Asia emerged from the 
Second World War stronger,more popular, andwith greater prestige 
and following than they had ever before enjoyed. Unlike nationalism, 
Communist in Southeast Asia failed to arise as a great national 
movement but did emerge as a strong and highly organized force 
in an excellent position to seize control of the authentic nationalist 
27 
movements and to domminate the newly established governments. Since 
Second Morld War, each state of Southeast Asia had experienced 
communist uprising but the communist failed in their aims except 
Nort Vietnam which is totally coimnunist dominated country led 
by the Hochi Minh. 
In the structure and function of the new government, the 
communists have faithfully copied Russia. In both countries^ 
the'-^: democratic facade is more eleborate and complete than in 
26. Ibid. p.80 
27. Ibid, p.87 
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a real democracy. There are elections and voting. There is 
Parliament and debate. There are the President and Ministers 
and Governors. There are courts, judges, and law* Therefore, 
all these rituals are faniliar to students of contemporary 
communist countries. But China has made a special point of 
her elections and boasts universal adult franchise for all except 
counter revolutionaries, unreformed capitalists and landlords^ aid 
political "criminals''^ No matter who does or does not vo-te^ f the 
results are a forgone conclusion* Communist elections, as, Attlee 
pointed out bng ago, are like a race with one horse. The communist 
party the only party — chooses the only candidates for election. 
The word "election" loses its meaning when applied to this elaborate 
28 
o^i^ cS^ . The major political objectives of communist Chinese ideology 
and practice are peace and co-existence on the one hand - and 
territorial expansion on the other. And the Chinese see nothing 
psiradoxical about this. 
Communist Chine' is perhaps the best example in the world 
today of communist "double talks" and "djuble-think" policy. 
Visitors to China and students of her literature know that everyone, 
from Mao to the man in the street, talks about peace. The people, 
the press, the loudspeakers, the entire propaganda machine screen 
incessantly about peace. The Chinese want peace on the mainland, 
peace in Asia, and peace in the whole world. Obviously it was 
"in pursuit of peace" that the communist fought a bloody thirty 
28. Chandrasekhar. op. cit.,p.202. 
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years civil war* In pursuit of the same objective, they faught 
in Korea, and are fighting for the offshore islands, not to speak 
of Taiwan* Only to promote "peace" they annexed Tibet* The 
current border disputes with India, Burma, Nepal, and Bhutan, 
we are solemnly assured, are also directed toward the same supreme 
29 
ideal. Privately, the leaders dismiss the possibility of peace or 
peaceful co-existence as so much nonsense* They manufacture atomic 
weapons, increase the size of their armed forces, and equip thflm 
with the latest weapons - all in the same of resisting the much 
publicizing impending, jlmericai aggression* But to the world 
outside, China poses as the living champion of peace. As an original 
signatory to ?unch-Sheela, China swears by co-existence ( lulling 
the suspecting India into believing her for nearly a decade) and 
pleads along with the Soviet Union against the manufacture, testing, 
and storage of atomic weapons as well as conventional armaments. 
There is an other contradiction in Chinese policy. Peaceful 
co-existence, as spelled out in the Bsmdung iigreement, means the 
repudiation of violence andiw^r-as-a-means-oli-settll-)^ 
disagreements spd controversial political Isssues, the renunciation 
of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and 
the peaceful competition of rival socio-economic systems. But 
the Chinese Struch the first blow against co-existence when they 
invaded Tibet, and now they maintain that war is inevitable as long 
as capitalism continues to exist anywhere in the world. 
29. Ibid. p.202. 
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There is another paradox in their policy. The Communists 
are now turning their attention to their second objective — 
ideologioal-cum-territorial expansioia. The realization of this 
second objective is sought through prfipaganda, subversion, and, 
if necessary, military aid acid intervention in.^sia* Communist 
China undennines trust in existing non-communist regimes, fans 
tensions between communists and other parties, and promotes the 
creation of "people* s democracies" in other countries. Ultimately 
she hopes to build a satellite empire in Asia as the Soviet Union 
has done in Eastern Europe. 
It seems that China* s policy is based on expansionism. 
Communist China has not forgotten the old routes of Chinese 
expansion. The road is faniliar - Tibet, Indochina, and Himalayan 
border lands. Even before she had begun to better her own standard 
of living, China started on her imperialist .. journey - North Korea, 
Tibet, North Vietnam, Ladakh, Laos etc. The planned attack goes 
on without any effective opposition. It is an unfortunate thing 
that the Asians outside commxanist orbit have made no progress 
to unite against the common enemy, the China which is a constant 
danger to war Id peace. It is because of her deeds that have 
produced strain and tension, trouble and discord in areas wtere 
peace has prevailed for countless centuries. From northern 
Kashmir to South Korea, along a line of more than 6,000 miles, 
the Chinese communist have promoted ideological disaffection 
and subvers ion, m i l i t a r y aggression and conquest. 
30. Ibid.p.203 
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The fact that the Southeast Asian countries have been 
known so far less for co-operation than for fighting ajnong 
themselves is a major tragedy. As soon often has been the case 
in the past, this has, made the area vulnerable once again to 
external exploitation of division within the region. The amount 
of co-operation that has been attempted is indeed surprising given 
the extent of ideological differences and traditional animosities 
among these countries* 
There may in fact be more than one way to maintain the 
independence of the several Southeast Asian states. On the other 
hand, there may be canditions under which it is impossible to 
do so. Unfortunately, only limited progress has been made over 
past two decades in bringing the various countries of the area 
closer together in new patterns of military, ecobomic, political, 
and social cooperation. The process could accelerate, of course, 
as the need to cooperate becomes appairent, but there is l i t t le 
immediate likelihood of this happening. The consequent power 
vacuum thus remains highly attractive to v/arious outsiders'^ 
31. Vandenbosch and Butwell. op.cit.,p.232. 
C H A P I E R V 
imik AND SOUTEUEAST ASIA 
Eie problem of Security 
C H A P T E R V 
INDIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
THE PROBLEM OF SEGURITy 
As has been mentioned b e f o r e and maintained throughout 
the f o rgo ing chapters the postwar pe r i od marks the resurgence 
o f As ia as a f a c t o r i n wor ld p o l i t i c s . The A l l i e d Powers who 
were the v i c t o r s became v ict ims j u s t a f t e r the Second World 
War. They were cons ide rab ly weakened and exhausted s p e c i a l l y 
the i m p e r i a l i s t pov;er o f B r i t a i n and France . I t l e d to , 
the weakning o f European powers a l so the l oosen ing of t he i r 
s t r a n g l e hold over c o l o n i a l possess ions i n As i a and l a t t e r i n 
A f r i c a . The post-v/ar pe r i od saw the va r i ous n a t i o n a l i s t move-
ments i n As i an count r i e s come to a s u c c e s s f u l c l o s e with the 
r i s e o'fi independent sove re i gn s t a t e s . P r o f e s s o r Ho l l and 
r i g h t l y obse rves , " ' I t must never be f o r g o t t e n tha t the Japanese 
p layed an immense c a t a l y t i c r o l e i n ene rg i z ing and a c c e l e r a t i n g 
movements which might o ther w i se have remained weak and un-
s u c c e s s f u l f o r many years to come. The Japanese occupat ion o f 
Southeast As i a and t h e i r a t tacks on the eastern ' f r o n t i e r s o f 
Ind ia antomat ica l ly advanced the cause o f va r i ous n a t i o n a l i s t 
movements by des t roy ing the author i ty and p r e s t i g e o f the 
wes te rn c o l o n i a l admin i s t r a t i ons . In add i t i on , the Japanese, as 
a d e l i b e r a t e par t o f t h e i r a n t i - w e s t e r n p o l i c y , u t i l i z e d and 
encouraged maiy o f the n a t i o r e l i s t l e a d e r s and o c c a s i o n a l l y gave 
them at l e a s t the appearance o f e xe r c i s i ng au tho r i t y i n the 
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admin i s t r a t i on o f t h e i r countries}^*^ But accord ing to Mr.Hugh 
Tinker, "^During the l a t e 1940's a r e v o l u t i o n began i n Southeast 
2 
A s i a . T h e r e f o r e , i t inaugra ted a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t age f o r 
s e v e r a l As ian s o c i e t i e s . Ind ia , Burma, Ceylon and a l i t t l e 
l a t e r Malaya (nov; M a l a y s i a ) were f r e e d from B r i t i s h domination. 
A f t e r a p ro t rac ted s t r u g g l e the Dutch were compel led to r e t r e a t 
from Indonesia . The Indo-Chinese s t a t e s a l so became f r e e from 
J^'rench tu t e l a ge by 1954. There fore , i n South-East As i a a lone , 
w i t h i n a dozen yea r s a f t e r second wor ld war, some nine s o v e r e i g n 
s t a t e s emerged f r e e from c o l o n i a l t u t e l a g e . The P h i l i p p i n s 
a l so acquired freedom from United S ta tes . The n a t i o n a l i s t 
s t r u g g l e l en t a spur ious unity to As ia , what uni ted them was 
the ideo logy o f nat iona l i sm. But once these count r i e s became 
f r e e , t h e i r own n a t i o n a l i s t , r e g i o n a l and h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t 
determined t h e i r f u t u r e courses o f ac t ion , and very o f t e n the 
i n t e r e s t s o f the newly emerged sove re i gn s t a t e s o f As i a were 
opposed to one another. Anyhow, the l a t e r pa r t o f the twen^ 
t i e t h century may w e l l be c a l l e d as an As i an epoch. ' In s p i t e " 
o f va r ious e f f o r t s to c r ea t e a s e -ns s^o f s o l i d a r i t y among the 
A s i an count r i e s , i n s p i t e o f mar(y v o c i f e r o u s v e r b a l claims to 
1, Hol land, Wi l l i am, L. " A s i a n Nat ional ism And the West*",p.4, 
N.Z. 1953. 
2, Hugh Tinker, B a l l o t Box and Bayonet - People and Government 
i n Emergent As ian Countr ies , p .2 . (Roya l ) I n s t i t u t e o f 
I n t e rna t i ona l A f f a i r s , Ox ford Un ivers i ty . P r e s s , London, 
1964. 
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an 'Asian outlook' and 'Asian one vrarid', Asia is basically 
a geographical expression - a vast continent with diverse 
ciiltures, religions and customs, different parts and different 
hopes for the futui'e. 
Asia today represents a xootley crowd, a number of them 
at cross-purposes with one another. From West Asia to the 
States of Indo-China, Malaysia and Indonesia, there were un-
happy relations among the states. The leaders of nationalist 
struggles for independence incline to be more suspicious of 
the West than of the communist bloc. 'Eiey considered the West 
as their greatest enemy. In the words of Professor Fifield, 
•^Ob many South-East Asian leaders nationalism is practically 
synorymous with anti-colonialism, for, intensely absorbed in 
the revolutionary period, they have not been able to adjust to 
3 
a new political environment.** K^ ny of the leaders have been 
taken in by the Soviet union's posture of being the champion 
of unfree peoples exploited by the imperialist-capitalist coun-
tries of the West, Therefor©, they have been too quick to blame 
the west and too restrained to condemn the Soviet Union when-
over the occasion, has called for it. That is why 'neutralist 
leaders' of Asia were in reality biased infavour of the commii-
nist world. 
3, Russell, H.Fifield. ^Southeast Asia in United States 
Policy, p. 10. 
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India began her maiden Journey i n the rea lm o f f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s under Mr. Nehru 's l e a d e r s h i p with a dec l a r ed d e s i r e 
to keep out , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , o f the sphere o f i n f l uence o f 
the two Power B locs , known as American and Russ ian . I t i s , 
never the less , tjc-ue^tkat^dCndlaia f o r e i g n p o l i c y has developed i n 
response to events and s i t u a t i o n s as t h ^ presented themselves 
to Ind ian statesman and p o l i c y makers. N a t u r a l l y , the g reat 
c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s of Ind ia as w e l l as her geo-
« 
g r aph i c a l p o s i t i o n are f a c t o r s tha t determine the f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
o f the government. There a re evidences i n the past that Ind ia 
took keen i n t e r e s t s i n f o r e i g n count r i e s . I t has been po inted 
out that I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t i n f o r e i g n count r i e s can be t r aced 
to decades b e f o r e independence. In 1904, the l e a d e r s o f con-
g re s s Party dep lored the T ibetan adventure o f the B r i t i s h 
government, which threatened ".tbs- i nvo l ve India i n f o r e i g n 
4 
entanglement, '* Ind ian l e a d e r s took d i r e c t i n t e r e s t on Turkish 
K h i l a f a t quest ion aga ins t the a t t i t u d e o f the B r i t i s h , Mr, Nehru 
attended Brusse l s congress a ga in s t Imper ia l i sm i n 1927 and v ^ y 
sympathetic towards Russ ia , the Sov iet Union. P ro f e s so r Bimia 
Prasad has r i g h t l y po inted o u t that th i s congress , "'which went 
such a long way i n f a v o u r a b l y i n c l i n i n g Nehru towards the 
Sov ie t Union a lso made him f o r the f i r s t time f e a r the r i s e o f 
4 . The Background o f I n d i a ' s Fo re i gn Po l i c y , A l l India Congress 
Cominittee, New De lh i (1962) , p .4 . 
5, iDid., p,6. 
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American Imper ia l i sm and i t s a l l i a n c e with B r i t i s h imper ia l i sm, 
an g 
f o r the c r e a t i o n of /An^lo,®-Saxon bloc to dominate the world.*'" 
The Congress i n i t s Ca lcut ta s e s s i on o f 1928 emphasized the 
need to develop contacts wi th other count r i e s . There was an 
i dea of "Pan A s i a t i c Federation.*^ A f t e r 1930, t he r e was a 
s e n s e s o f unity o f common aims began to be deve loped among 
As ians and the As ian l e a d e r s were th inking on the l i n e o f A s i an 
Federa t ion , In h i s autobiography Mr, Nehru env isaged a f e d e r a -
t i o n inc lud ing China, Ind ia , Burma, Ceylon and i n h i s "The Unity 
o f India*^ (1940) , he speaks of a p o s s i b i l i t y o f an Eastern 
Federat ion comprising China, Ind ia , Burma, Ceylon, Nepal , 
7 
A fghan is tan , Malaya as w e l l as Siam and I ran . The ''^Quit I n d i a " 
r e s o l u t i o n o f the congress a s s e r t ed , '•^ The Freedom o f India must 
be the symbol o f and pre lude to the freedom o f a l l other A s i a t i c 
nat ions under f o r e i g n domination, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, 
Dutch East Ind ies , I ran , I r aq must a l so a t i a i n t h e i r complete 
freedom. I t must be c l e a r l y understood that such o f these 
Countr ies as are under Japanese con t ro l now must not consequently g 
be p laced under the r o l e o r cont ro l o f any o the r c o l o n i a l power , " 
In 1948 sess ion , the congress r e s o l u t i o n a s s e r t ed , the f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y of Ind ia must n e c e s s a r i l y be based on the p r i n c i p l e s that 
6 , Bimla Prasad, The O r i g i n s of Ind ia Fo re i gn P o l i c y , Bookland 
p r i v a t e L t d . , Ca lcut ta (1962) , p. 95, 
7, Ton That Thien, Ind ia and South East As ia 1947-1S60, 
LibraiJ?!® Dro z. Geneva (1963) , p. 61, 
8, Quoted, Bimla Prasad, o p . c i t , , p. 328, 
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have guided the congress i n past y ea r s . Hie p r i n c i p l e s are 
the promotion o f wor ld peace, the freedom o f a l l nat ions , r a c i a l 
e q u a l i t y and ending o f imper ia l i sm and c o l o n i a l i s m . In p a r t i -
c u l a r , the congress i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the freedom o f the nat ions 
and races o f As ia and A f r i c a who have s u f f e r e d under va r ious 
9 
forms o f co lon ia l i sm f o r many decades.^^ Mr. Nehru seemed to 
have accepted almost u n c r i t i c a l l y Lenlr!^ dictum o f Imper ia l i sm 
be ing the l a s t s tage o f c a p i t a l i s m . He could not have imagined 
that a s o c i a l i s t s t a t e might ever be expans ion i s t . On every 
such occas ion he t r i e d to ove r look Russ ia * s des i gns o r even 
exp la ined them away. 
South East As i a spans more than 3000 mi l es from east to 
West and over 2000 mi les from north to South, I t has a popula -
t i o n o f more than 226 m i l l i o n peop les^^ and i t s peop le a re f r a g -
mented e l ihnica l ly , c u l t u r a l l y , r e l i g i o u s l y , and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y ; 
they a re d i v i ded p o l i t i c a l l y ^ ^ There fo re , ' t h e r e g i o n , a t 
p resent , i s c l a s s i f i e d as under -deve loped , but i t i s p o t e n t i a l l y 
a r i c h reg ion . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , i t has been the ' r i c e bowl o f 
A s i a ; ' 90 per cent o f the w o r l d ' s product ion o f na tu r a l rubber , 
and 60 per cent o f the w o r l d ' s product ion o f t i n take p l ace i n 
t h i s area . I t s economic p o t e n t i a l and s t r a t e g i c impcfi-rtance 
9, The Background o f I n d i a ' s Fo re i gn Po l i c y , op. c i t . , p. 96. y 
10» Vandenbosch and Butwe l l t The Changing Face o f Southeast 
As i a , p .6 , 
11, Fifleld, op. cit., p. 3, 
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combined with p o l i t i c a l f r agmenta t ion make i t , v u l n e r a b l e to 
the menace o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the 
over -pDpu lated , l and hungry, s t a rved o f r i c e , m i l i t a n t China, 
The 226 m i l l i o n "South-East As ians ( d i v i d ed and weak) w i th the 
popu la t i on r i s i n g at 2«0 per cent f a c e the prospect o f meeting 
the cha l l enge o f some 700 m i l l i o n Chinese wi th a popu l a t i on 
r i s i n g 2 ,3 per cent annua l ly . There i s ro i l l u s i o n , a f t e r the 
Chinese a gg r e s s i on i n 1962 ove r Ind ia , concerning Chinese expan-
s i o n i s t p o l i c y . Never the less , the importance of t h i s r e g i o n -
p o l i t i c a l l y , econDmically and s t r a t e g i c a l l y - i n the arena o f 
wo r l d p o l i t i c s can hard ly be exaggerated . P o l i t i c a l l y , the end 
o f western hegemony i n t h i s a rea has c rea ted a power vacuum, 
making i t h i gh ly vu lne r ab l e to pressures from wi thout . I t has 
been ap t l y desc r i bed as " a s ec to r o f demographic p ressure 
between the Chinese and Ind ian a n t - h i l l s I n f a c t , the immi-
grant populat ions of Ind ia and China have posed acute p o l i t i c a l 
problems f o r t h i s r e g i o n and shaped i t s a t t i t u d e s to these two 
populous neighbours . The communist China has upset the ba lance 
o f power i n t h i s area and her shadow looms l a r g e h e r e . * The 
Western powers are only i n a p o s i t i o n to p ro tec t the r e g i o n 
a ga in the f a t e of becoming satellite o f China. Mareover, inde -
pendence i n the r e g i o n has not brought peace and s t a b i l i t y and 
t h e r e f o r e , i t s s ecur i ty needs to be under w r i t t e n by powers on 
i t s oute r r ims. 
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South East Asia, economically -^ is one of the key areas 
in world econoxoy. It is a major producer of rice and rubber, 
tin ore and sugar, copra, coconut, abaca and quinine. There-
fore, its resources have yet to be fully tapp'ed, and its po-
tential wealth is Vast. 
/ 
Mareover, the region is of strategic significance to 
Asia. Dr. Thein observes, "It lies a thwart the world's 
\ 
most important lines of sea and air communications, and contains 
some of the capital land routes leading northwards into China, 
12 
or southwards from China towards the Indian Ocean.** It has 
been pointed out that the control of the Mekdng Valley route 
by the Vietnamese was a major contributory cause of the French 
disaster at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. 
Mr. Badr-ud-Din ?yabji, who functioned lately as Indian 
ambassador to Indonesia and Japan, authentically points out, 
"South-East Asia to us -Indian, looked at some what nastalegi-
cally, through over Greater-India tinted glasses,bears such a 
strong impress of Indian and Chinese influences,over laid sub-
sequently by aliin French and British infusions. In fact, the 
ingredients of this mixture,^and especially their respective 
strength and proportions, have greatly changed with the yearsj 
and continue to change with some speed. The French have with-
drawn, the British are withdrawing} the Chinese are trying to 
12, Thein, op.cit,, p, 20. 
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s tage a come-back. What India is doing i s not very c l e a r i n 
the reg ion ; and I suspect i s not so, even i n the minds o f many 
o f the w r t h y persons who guide the dec i s i ons o f the Ind ian 
Government i n these matters , and at l e a s t of the ma jo r i t y o f 
13 
the people i n I n d i a , T h e power vacuum i s c rea ted i n th i s 
r e g i o n and the growing menace o f China which has i n e v i t a b l y 
made the two super-powers the U .S .A . and U. S .S .R . take 
i n t e r e s t and get invo lved i n South-East As i an p o l i t i c s . Never-
the l e s s i n the long run South-East A s i a ' s dest iny i s l i k e l y 
to be i n f l uenced more by India and China than by these powers. 
The secur i ty and s t a b i l i t y o f Ind ia l a r g e l y depends on the 
s e c u r i t y o f South-East Asia»SoiJipulsion'of geography a lone 
determine I n d i a ' s need to be concerned w i th the r eg ion , 
India as a champion o f a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m has been 
nece s sa r i l y concerned with South-East A s i a . Dr. Ton That Thein 
has argued that I n d i a ' s ov;n s u c c e s s f u l s t r u g g l e f o r freedom 
has been an i n s p i r a t i o n to Southeast A s i a . ' " ' India ' s emergence 
as a respected member o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community," he says, 
•""was o f s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e to Southeast A s i a . I t speeded 
up the l i b e r a t i o n o f the Southeast As ian c o u n t r i e s . " He f u r t h e r 
po in t s out , ''^3ut Ind ia gained a lso something from t h i s process 
13. Badr -ud -Din Tyab j i s Ind ia , The Major Powers and Secur i ty 
o f South-East A s i a . Seminar on Problems o f S t a b i l i t y and 
Secur i ty i n South-East As i a , 1969 March. Ind i an School 
o f I n t e rna t i ona l S tud ies , New De lh i . 
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o f l i b e r a t i o n . Once Southeast As i a has been f r e e d , i t cou ld 
s t rengthen I n d i a ' s p o s i t i o n and inc rea se I n d i a ' s weight i n the 
wor ld counc i l s -- prov ided both Ind ia and Southeast As i a itnoved 
14 
i n the same d i r e c t i o n . " ' 
influences 
South-East As ia bore the imprint o f Indian/much, b e f o r e 
the western impact, I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t i n the r e g i on a lso r e s t s 
on c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l grounds. I n f l u e n c e o f Islam and 
o f Indian c u l t u r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i s s t i l l ev ident i n the s o c i a l 
and c u l t u r a l l i f e o f most of the countr ies o f Southeast A s i a , 
S r i v i j a y a , Sa i l end ra and Majapahi t , Funnan, Champa, Khmer and 
Kambuja, these kingdoms o f the past were ' I n d i a n i z e d ' p r i n c i -
p a l i t i e s . Angkor i n Cambodia and sorobudur i n Indonesia a r e 
g i g a n t i c monuments o f Indian i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s a rea . Three 
p r i n c i p a l r e l i g i o n s o f the area - Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Is lam - came from Ind i a . o f the p o l i t i c a l and governmen-
t a l dev ices , the court s t ruc tu r e and l e g a l procedures , e t c . , 
15 
were der ived from Ind i a . 
There i s a l so cons ide rab l e economic i n t e r e s t o f Ind ia 
i n t h i s r eg ion . She has been a major economic power i n t h i s 
r eg ion be fo r e the B r i t i s h conquest and South-East As i a p rov ided 
a b i g ge s t t r a d i n g market. There fo re , the economies o f the two 
14. Thein, o p . c i t . , p. 18« 
16. Richard Butwe l l , Southeast As ia Tbday-and Tbmorrow, 
Praegei^, ^ew l o r k (1961) , p. 11, 
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a re inter -dependent and complimentary and not competitime. 
More over , the r e g i o n i s v i t a l f o r I n d i a ' s de fense 'From the 
po int o f view o f the p r e - r e q u i s i t e s o f war, Southeast A s i a , the 
r i c h e s t area i n the World, i s one un i t . I t produce what Ind ia 
l a cks f o r the de fense o f the Indian Ocean zone we have 
v;hat they need and we need what they have. I f 2X)t f o r ar^y 
f a c t o r e l s e i n sheer s e l f - i n t e r e s t we must c u l t i v a t e a c l o s e 
f r i e n d s h i p with a l l these count r i e s , 
I n d i a ' s f r i e n d s h i p and r e l a t i o n s w i th the r e g i on i s a l so 
due to the l a r g e immigrant popu la t i on o f Ind i an o r i g i n r e s i d i n g 
i n the countr ies o f t h i s a rea . Many Indians a r e businessmen 
and have occupied key p o s i t i o n s i n the economy o f these coun-
t r i e s . As long as the c o l o n i a l r u l e l a s t e d , immigrat ion from 
one country to another was not d i f f i c u l t . But w i th the c o l l a p s e 
o f western hegemony, many o f the As i an count r i e s began to look 
with susp ic ion and ha t r ed at t h e ' f o r e i g n ' minor i ty groups. 
According to Thein, ''^Fears were roused i n those countr ies o f 
being swamped r a c i a l l y and dominated economical ly g ty the 
Ind ian immigrants. To those count r i e s , now the na t i ona l i nde -
pendence had been ga ined the danger was not the whi te man, but 
16 
the brown man, not the B r i t i s h but the I n d i a n . " Burma was to 
p rov ide a very d i f f i c u l t problem to India i n t h i s r e spec t . 
16, Thein, op.cit,, 76-77. 
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S t r a t e g i c a l l y , South-East As i a i s most v i t a l . The 
Japanese f o r c e s advance i n the r e g i o n i n the Second World War 
and the immediate throat they posed to Ind ia c l e a r l y r e vea l ed 
that the s e cu r i t y o f Ind ia was dependent on the s ecu r i t y o f 
t h i s r eg ion . 
Neverthe less , i t i s t rue tha t Ind ian f o r e i g n p o l i c y has 
developed i n response to events and s i t u a t i o n s as they p resen -
ted themselves to Ind ian statesmen. There fore , i t i s the 
a t t i t u d e o f mind developed as a r e a c t i o n o f co ldwar . One can 
a l so see that there i s B r i t i s h impact on ou r p o l i c y , Ind ia 
has adopted more o r l e s s B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n s i n so f a r as l i b e r a , 
l i s m i s concerned. Ind ia has a l so adopted p rog re s s i veness i n 
her f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . Ind ia opposed and c r i t i c i z e s South A f r i c a 
of her po l i cy o f r a c i a l d i s c r im ina t i on . I nd i a accepts ttiited 
Nations char te r and b e l i e v e s i n wor ld peace and supports Human 
r i g h t s . There fore , Ind ian p o l i c y i s a n t i - c o l o n i a l and a n t i -
i m p e r i a l i s t . When the Dutch Forces attacked the newly born 
Indonesian Republ ic with the cyn i ca l aim o f r e s t o r i n g the 
c o l o n i a l regime. Ind ia c r i t i c i z e d t h i s a t t i t u d e . The notab le 
inc ident which s t a r t e d the c h a n c e l l o r i e s o f the wor ld was when 
i n January I960 India i n v i t e d f i f t e e n count r i e s to discuss the 
grave s i t u a t i o n i n Indonesia when the Dutch s t a r t e d t h e i r 
second m i l i t a r y ac t i on . Both the U.S.A. and U.K. were g r e a t l y 
d i s tu rbed at th i s sudden Indian i n i t i a t i v e ; the Kremlin was 
a l so upset. At the conference , Mr, Nehru took s p e c i a l ca re to 
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e x p l a i n that the De lh i Conference was not convened i n s p i r i t 
o f h o s t i l i t y to any nat ion o r group o f SiW n a t i a n s ' , i t was 
meeting because the p a r t i c i p a n t s were convinced that a wrong 
had been done and must be r i gh t ed . The purpose o f the con-
f e r ence was to f ocus the p u b l i c op in i on of the wor ld i n th i s 
wrong and br ing to bear upon i t the moral p r e s su re of wor ld 
op in ion . There was an other i nc iden t o f a s i m i l a r nature . I t 
happened when on 17 November 1962 the Ind ian d e l e g a t i o n i n t r o -
duced a r e s o l u t i o n i n the U.N. General Assembly on the compl i -
cated quest ion o f exchange of the Korean War p r i s o n e r s . The 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s development was not on ly that i t he lped 
to e s t a b l i s h a c e a s e - f i r e i n Korea, but that i t r evea l ed the 
u t i l i t y o f I n d i a ' s much misunderstood r e f u s a l to commit 
has enabled Ind ia to act with great success i n i t s ex te rna l 
r e l a t i o n s . I t i s to be noted that Ind ia adopted the p o l i c i e s 
as the occas ions a rose . When no c l e a r d e c i s i o n had to be 
taken, Ind ia g e n e r a l l y went a long wi th the weste rn Powers. This 
i s c l ea r i n the case o f Ind ian Po l i cy towards Germar^r. Thus, 
o u t s i d e o f As i a , there were vast areas where the f o r e i g n po l i cy 
o f Ind ia simply f o l l o w e d that of the Western Powers. 
India , t h e r e f o r e , had to play an important r o l e when 
there occui'ed Indo-Chinese c r i s i s . The c i v i l war that raged 
there between the communist l e d N a t i o n a l i s t t roops and French 
Forces r e s u l t e d f i n a l l y i n a s e r i e s o f d e f e a t s f o r the French 
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Forces . The United States o f America was unv/i l l ing to see the 
conquest o f Indo-China by a communist f o r c e s and threatened 
armed in t e rven t i on . On the o the r^ i de , the Sov ie t Union was 
unw i l l i ng to r i s k a wor ld war and i t was anxious to prove i t s 
reasonab leness i n reaching compromises wi th non-communist wor ld . 
There fore , the American backed French Forces s u f f e r e d a g r e a t 
de f e a t at Dein Bien Phu i n Vietnam and that time the United 
States was bea r ing about a t h i r d o f the cost o f the war by 
1963. I t happened i n A p r i l 1964 with the v i c t o r y f o r the V i e t 
Minh. Ihe r e s u l t was the Geneva conference o f 1964 which 
hammered out a s o l u t i o n f o r Indo-China* The re fo re , three s t a t e s 
were created, one was Cambodia the o the r were Laos and Vietnam, 
There v/ere no s e r i ous matters about Cambodia and Laos. But 
Vietnam was d i v i d e d into t\^ ro pa r t s a t about 17th p a r a l l e l . 
North Vietnam was under communist r u l e and the South under 
pro -Western Government. I t was decided tha t f r e e e l e c t i on s 
would be he ld throughout Vietnam to dec ide the f u t u r e o f the 
country . The po int i s that Ind ia was the key members as the 
Chairman o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l cont ro l commission which was to 
make sure that the terms o f the Geneva confe rence were c a r r i e d 
out . The I n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l commission, composed o f Canada, 
Poland and Ind ia , with a l a t t e r as Chairman was e s t a b l i s h e d to 
supe rv i s e the execut ion o f the accords . The commission set i n 
New Delh i from August 1 to August 6, 1964 and was inaugrated 
by Mr. Nehru to p l a n the admin i s t r a t i v e work o f the commission. 
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The commission achieved some success i n the beginning and. 
c r i t i c i s e d both the p a r t i e s i n t h e i r ways o f implementing the 
democratic freedoms aspect of the c e a s e - f i r e agreement, espe -
c i a l l y i n the case o f f a i l u r e to e s t a b l i s h i n c e r t a i n a reas 
a s t a b l e admin i s t r a t i on i n South Vietnam and f a i l u r e to i n s u r e 
freedom o f movement i n North Vietnam. From December 1964 to 
January 1956, f i v e inter im r epo r t s were prepared . Some of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s were hammered ou t . But i n f i f t h inter im repor t 
there was ro unanimity among the members o f commission. 
P r o f e s s o r F i f i e l d po ints out , s t r e s s e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
occas ioned by the a t t i t u d e o f the Saigon government toward the 
Geneva Settlement and once more showed the cleavage between 
17 
Ind ia and Poland on the one hand and Canada on the o t h e r , " A 
s i x t h report was a l s o prepared i n September 9, 1956, d e sc r i b ed 
the development from December 11, 1966, to July 31, 1966. Ihere 
occured a change o f a t t i t u d e towards the Geneva Accords between 
Doth the p a r t i e s , ^forth Vietnam and South Vietnam. North 
Vietnam's l e a de r Ho Chi Minh v i s i t e d comymunist China and the 
Sov ie t Union i n June and July 1966 and i n South Vietnam Ngo Dinh 
Fiem became head o f S ta te backed by the United Sta tes was not 
f u l l y agree with Geneva Accords. In the meanv/hlle, the V ie tcong 
f o r c e s began to adopt a v i o l e n t means a ga in s t the prowest 
South Vietnam government and the V ie tcongs were a l so g e t t i n g 
17. F i f i e l d , Russe l l H. **The Diplomacy o f Southeast As ia s 
1946-1968, New York, Harper & Brothers , New York. 
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support from communist China through Iforth Vietnam which was 
pro-comiiTiunist Government. Gradua l l y , Vietnam took a grave tu rn 
and I t was very d i f f i u c l t to car ryout the bus iness . There fore , 
p l e b i s c i t e was never he ld and t h i s was not the f a u l t o f I nd i a . 
Mr. M.R.Masani obse rves , "A cursory examination o f the 
background o f the war i n Vietnam would make i t c l e a r that i t 
i s a de f ens i ve war f o r South Vietnam aga ins t the unprovoked 
attack o f the V i e t Minh government supported by the Chinese. 
The f a c t s are that i n 1964, a Geneva Agrement o f Accord was 
made by which a l l concerned agreed to r e spec t the sovere ignty , 
independence, unity and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f a l l countr ies 
invo lved and to;:rrj0ffa-t-3a from any i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l 
a f f a i r s , ' I t i s now ev ident that ha rd ly had the ink, d r i ed on 
the document when the communist regime i n North Vietnam the 
w i l l i n g s a t e l l i t e o f communist China, s t a r t e d v i o l a t i n g the 
agreement o f 1964. Their instrument i n South Vietnam was the 
V i e t Cong as i n Laos i t was the Pathet Lao. In both these 
count r i e s they have waged a new kind o f war, one may c a l l i t 
18 
• agg r e s s i on by p r o x y , ' 
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l cont ro l commission, which had been 
se t up by the Geneva Accord o f 1964 and o f which Ind ia i s the 
Chairman, came to c e r t a i n conc lus ions i n i t s Lega l committee 
18. M.R.Masanl, '"'The f b l e o f Ind ia i n South-East As i a , p. 149. 
Vietnam, Seen from East and West - Edited>5 by S lbnarayan 
Ray, 1966, Manaktalas - Bombay, 
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i n June 1962, The l e g a l sub-committee o f the I . C .C . found 
of 
Hanoi g u i l t y o f v io lat ions/o. fo iarr c lauses o f the p rov i s i ons 
o f the Geneva Accord o f 1964. I t s t a ted in^ i t s r epo r t . 
There was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to show beyond reasonab le doubt 
that Ifcrth Vietnam had sent men and arms into South Vietnam to 
subvert and over throw the l e g a l government o f the country. 
' S ince then, o ther evidence has come to l i g h t . I t l is now 
estimated that betx^reen 1969-1964, atDout f o r t y thousand g u e r r i l a s 
t r a i ned i n the North (Vietnam) had entered South Vietnam to 
pursue war aga ins t that country. According to Masani, "On 
16 February 1965 a Iforth Vietnamese v e s s e l was sunk o f f the 
coast o f South Vietnam because i t was suspected o f c a r ry ing 
arms. The members o f the I . C .C . were invited>I to v i s i t the 
ship, and they d i scovered a Cargo o f 100 tons o f weapons and 
ammunition o f Chinese, Czechoslovak^ East German and Sov i e t 
manufacture. I t i s m wonder that Marsha l l Chen Yi s a id 
recent ly that China and Iferth Vietnam go toge ther l i k e tee th 
20 
and lips. ' 
While c r i t i c i s i n g I n d i a ' s r o l e as a chairman; i n I . C . C . , 
Mr. Masani says , "'The o f f i c i a l stand o f the Government o f Ind ia 
e n the quest ion o f Vietnam i s that there should be another 
19, Masani, I b i d . , p. 149. 
20, Masani, Ibid,, p. 149. 
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Geneva conference and that the f o r e i g n armies should be w i th 
drawn from that r e g i o n . There has a l r eady been two Geneva 
conferences and i t has been conc lus i ve l y proved that no a g r e e -
ment i s sacred to the communists. I t seems naive f o r Ind ia , 
to say the l e a s t , to demand a t h i r d Geneva conference . Secondly, 
when Indians ask the Americans and the South Vietnamese to 
negot i a te they ha rd ly i nd i c a t e , one, w i th whom to negot i a te 
and, secondly, how the nego t i a t i ons should be c a r r i e d on. The 
r e a l party with whom the Americans and the South Vietnamese are 
asked to negot i a te i s the same one which t reachous ly destroyed 
T ibet , shamelessly broke her promises to Ind i a and committed 
21 
wanton agg r e s s i on aga ins t her."" 
He f u r t h e r c r i t i c i s e d , "The Ind ian r o l e i n the I , C.C. 
1:o0 has not been a very honourable one. I t has been to s i t on 
the f ense between the Canadians and the Po l e s , On 13 February 
1966, the I ,C .C . sent a s p e c i a l message to the co-chairmen, 
B r i t a i n and Russ ia . I t was an in te r im r e p o r t , promising a f u l l 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , but meantime r e l a y i n g the communiques o f a l l e g a -
t i ons o f both s i de s , North and South, The r epo r t went f u r t h e r 
i t blamed both s ides equa l l y ; the aggressor was he l d as respon-
s i b l e as the v ic t im. The Canadian member o f the I . C .C . i n h i s 
note reminded the co-chairmen o f the commission* s r epo r t of 
June 1962, to which r e f e r ence has been made e a r l i e r , that the 
21, Masani, Ibid., p, 160, 
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Lega l committee o f the I .G .G . had found North Vietnam g u i l t y 
o f ag ress ion , India turned a b l i nd eye to v;hat was going on, 
and by equating the agg resso r with the v ic t im and by j o i n i n g 
the Po le aga ins t the Canadian, Ind ia i n f a c t gave a i d and com-
f o r t to her enemies. The a t t i t u d e o f North Vietnam towards 
22 
Ind ia , on the other hand, has been o f contempt, and d i s g u s t , " 
But i t i s f a c t , that Ind ian f o r e i g n po l i cy has developed i n 
response to events and s i t u a t i o n s as they presented themselves 
to the po l i cy makers. I t i s the a t t i t u d e o f mind developed as 
a r e a c t i o n o f Power p o l i t i c s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and 
moreover Ind ia has alv/ays t r i e d to keep as f a r as ou t as p o s s i b l e 
o f Power p o l i t i c s . 
Indonesia , s t r a t e g i c a l l y , occupies a v i t a l p o s i t i o n i n 
t h i s r e g i on wi th i t s vas t popu l a t i on and p o l i t i c a l wea l th and 
power. Geog raph ica l l y , i t s p o s i t i o n and s i t u a t i o n makes the 
l i n ch p in i n the de f ense o f t h i s reg ion . Dr. Thien r i g h t l y 
obse rves , " Indones ia under the con t ro l o f a h o s t i l e power can 
th rea ten the s e c u r i t y o f Ind ia , bar I n d i a ' s access to the 
P a c i f i c and A u s t r a l i a , g r e a t l y h inder I n d i a ' s communications 
w i th Europe and A f r i c a , cut o f f I n d i a ' s soui'ces o f supp l i e s o f 
23 
f ood and raw m a t e r i a l s , choke o f f I n d i a ' s s ea - bo rne t rade , 
22. Masani, I b i d . , pp. 150-151, 
23, Thien, op, c i t . , p, 87. 
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He po ints out that I n d i a ' s po l i cy towards Indonesia presented 
f o u r f e a t u r e s i n the ea r l y years o f Indo - Indones ian r e l a t i o n s , 
Indonesia provided Ind ia with an opportun i ty to make'a spec ta -
cu l a r entry on the wor ld scene ' a s the champion o f As ian nat ion -
a l i s t s t r u g g l e f o r freedom and o p p o s i t i o n to co l on i a l i sm i n the 
chambers o f wor ld bod ies . Secondly Indonesia was the f i r s t 
instance o f I n d i a ' s po l i cy o f unreserved support f o r As ian 
freedom movements l e d by n a t i o n a l i s t s as was Sukarno's 
Indonesian Republ ic i n cont ras t to her t ep id support f o r 
As i an na t i ona l freedom movements whose l e a d e r s h i p was communist 
24 
as was Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republ ic o f V ie tnam. ' Th i rd l y , 
Indonesia a long with Burma was a major As i an country support ing 
\ 
I n d i a ' s po l i cy o f non-al ignment and Panch Shee l . And Indonesian 
f r i e n d s h i p w i th her vas t Muslim popu la t i on (p robab ly the l a r g e s t 
i n the w o r l d ) was a source o f p o l i t i c a l advantage to Ind ia f o r 
the could c a p i t a l i s e on i t i n her r e l a t i o n s w i th o ther Arab 
countr ies to j u s t i f y her claims o f secu la r i sm and r e f u t e 
25 
P a k i s t a n ' s charge o f I n d i a ' s being a Hindu s t a t e . " India has 
a l so p layed an important r o l e i n the Indonesian s t r u g g l e a g a in s t 
the Dutch and supported Indones i a ' s cause i n the wor ld bod ies . 
24. Thien - Quoted by V .K.S inha , " I n d i a and Southeast A s i a " 
Edi ted Shah A . B . , " I n d i a ' s Defense And Fo r e i gn P o l i c i e s . " 
1966, Manaktalas, Bombay, 
26. Sinha, V .K . , I b i d . , p. 106. 
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There was a c lose c o l l a b o r a t i o n between Ind ia and 
Indonesia not on ly i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l matters but a lso i n e x t e r -
na l as w e l l . A c u l t u r a l agreement was concluded i n 1955 to 
b r ing about c l o s e r - coopera t ion between the two As ian count r i e s 
i n the f i e l d o f a r t s , sc ience and l i t e r ^ i tu r e which was cons i -
dered as the f i r s t b i l a t e r a l agreement ever s igned by Ind i a , 
There was j o i n t e xe r c i s e s o f the Indian navy w i th i t s counter 
pa r t i n Indonesia i n Ji^y I960. In ex t e rna l f i e l d , both the 
countr ies had common aims l i k e co l on i a l i sm non-al ignment, Panch 
Sheel and SEATO. f h o u ^ there were some d i f f e r e n c e s between the 
two countr ies but o n major i s s u e s these count r i e s cooperated 
each o the r . But Indonesia d id not support Ind ia on Tibet 
aga ins t the Chinese and on border c o n f l i c t w i th China Ind ia got 
ne i ther support nor sympathy from Indones ia . When the i n f l u -
ence o f P . K . I , inc reased i n Indonesia , the r e l a t i o n s between 
the two countr ies continued to d e t e r i o r a t e . Indonesia d id not 
condemn Chinese a g g r e s s i o n aga ins t Ind ia i n 1962 wh i l e more 
than f o r t y countr ies o f the wor ld were wi th Ind ia . Indonesiafe 
• con f r on ta t i on ' p o l i c y aga ins t Ma lays ia a f t e r i t s fo rmat ion i n 
1963 was to a l i e n a t e aofli Ind ia s t i l l f u r t h e r . F i n a l l y , Indo-
nes i a came out wi th open support o f Pak i s tan i n the Indo-
Pak i s t an c o n f l i c t . There fore , China and Indones ia came c l o s e r 
because o f the i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u e n c e o f P,K. I , ove r the govern^ 
ment. I t i s cons idered that one o f the primary causes o f 
Indones i a ' s disenchantment w i th India has been the d i s a s t r ous 
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f a i l u r e o f Ind ia to meet the Chinese a gg r e s s i on i n 1962. The 
exposure o f I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r y weakness l e d Indonesia to take 
a prudent course o f c l o s e r t i e s w i th China. There came a change 
i n Indonesia i n 1965 and the communists l o s t t h e i r ho ld . New 
l e a d e r s h i p appeared on the scene and there every l i k e l i h o o d 
and opportunity to r e v i v e the o l d e r t i e s , 
Burma i s a l s o another country which i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
very important of d i r e c t concern to Ind ia and i s an immediate 
neighbour, A h o s t i l e Burma could r o t only be a sp r ing board 
f o r Chinese a g g r e s s i o n (Burma con t ro l s one o f the most important 
South v/ard l and route from China ) but a l so p rov ide a sanctuary 
f o r h o s t i l e Wagas and o ther h i l l t r i b a l s . Ind ian immigrants 
posed a g rea t problem to Burmese government and the government 
took strong measures aga ins t the Ind ian who were economical ly 
ve iy strong and con t ro l the t rade and business p r o p o r t i o n a l l y 
on l a r g e s c a l e . The Burmese were h o s t i l e not on ly to the B r i t i s h 
r u l e r s but a l so to the Indians whom they rega rded as f o r e i g n e r s 
e x p l o i t i n g the Burmese poor. A f t e r Independence i n 1948, 
"Burma began to take d r a s t i c measures to weaken Ind ian ho ld over 
the Burmese econimy and severe immigrat ion laws were enacted. 
Late r , under the s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e o f n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , Ind ian 
l o s t much o f t h e i r property , business i n t e r e s t s and commercial 
establ ishment i n Burma. 
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But the r e l a t i o n s w i th Burma have been most c o r d i a l . 
Though Burmese government took severe measures aga ins t Ind ian 
immigrants but Ind ia gave her cons iderab le he lp , f i n a n c i a l l y , 
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y . Burma had to f a c e armed communist up r i s i ng 
and Karens r e v o l t soon a f t e r Independence, Iherefore, I n d i a ' s 
a t t i t u d e towards Burma was sympathetic and he lped f i n a n c i a l l y 
when India purchased r i c e a t a p r i c e f a v o u r a b l e to Burma, India 
a l so gave to Burma some arms and ammunitions to f a c e a n t i -
government r e v o l t s . A t r ea ty o f f r i e n d s h i p was s igned i n 1957, 
Both the count r i e s p ro f e s sed soc i a l i sm, non-al ignment and 
adherence to Panch Sheel . 'Ihere occured change i n governments 
i n Burma but the r e l a t i o n s remained c o r d i a l . In March 1962, 
Ne Win dec l a red the government po l i cy as ' p o s i t i v e n e u t r a l i t y ' 
and the b e l i e f that i t best serves the i n t e r e s t o f both Burma 
and the wor ld . At the time o f Chinese a g g r e s s i o n and Indo-
Pak i s tan i c o n f l i c t s , Burma adhered to her n e u t r a l i t y and d id 
not take s ide with any party , Burma came nearer to China 
a f t e r 1962 and made with her some boundary adjustment, I n d i a ' s 
poor response to Chinese a gg r e s s i on i n 1962 was na tu r a l l y cons-
t rued by the m i l i t a r y government o f overwhelming evidence o f 
Ch ina ' s immense s u p e r i o r i t y i n armed s t rength over a i^ o the r 
A s i a n qountry. There fo re I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s wi th Burma must be 
Ca l cu l a ted to keep her from f a l l i n g a l t o g e t h e r into China ' s 
camp. 
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Malaysia i s a key f a c t o r i n the s t e r l i n g area, and 
stands c l o se s t to India a f t e r Burma, and i n s t r a t e g i c and 
economic Importance, next to Indonesia, with which India i s 
deeply invo lved . I t i s also one o f the most important t rade 
centres i n the wor ld . I n d i a ' s c lose t i e s with Malaysia a lso 
spr ing from the f a c t that Indian immigrants cons t i tu te an 
important element i n Malaysian p o l i t i c s and economy. I t i s the 
only country where national ism came l a t e as a potent f o r c e 
f o r s oc i a l and p o l i t i c a l change<j Sherefore, i t has been the 
product of Japanese occupation. " " India ' s a t t i t u d e to the 
B r i t i s h au tho r i t i e s , act ion aga inst the communist armed rebe -
l l i o n i n Malaya was i n sharp contrast to her a t t i tude to the 
French ac t i on i n Indo-China aga ins t the Vietnamese r e b e l l i o n . 
Communist i n sp i r ed ter ror i sm i n Malaya was rot only d i rec ted 
aga ins t the B r i t i s h , but a lso aga inst Indians. India 
was quick to denounce the r e b e l l s whom she considered to be 
communist ra ther than n a t i o n a l i s t s , I n d i a ' s a t t i t ude to the 
Ma l ay -B r i t i sh t rea ty o f mater i a l defense a lso presents a sharp 
contrast to her usual a t t i tude i n regard to the presence o f 
f o r e i g n troops i n an As ian country. In A p r i l 1956, Mr. Nehru 
dec lared , "^every country has the r i gh t to defend i t s e l f . A 
country newly independent, or s t r i v i n g f o r independence, might 
very we l l f e a r i t s ^ i n a b i l i t y to stand alone, and consequently, 
wish to conclude a de fens ive a l l i a n c e . That tos would be a 
d i f f e r e n t matter. An agreement f o r de fense might we l l be a 
26 
necessary stage i n the evolut ionary process o f independence. 
26, Quoted, Thien, op. c i t . , p. 245, 
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The r e l a t i o n s with Malays ia have been c o r d i a l though 
the country has been a c t i v e l y a l i g n e d with the west and a n t i -
communist, has r e f u s ed to r ecogn i se communist Qhina and wi th 
South Vietnam has e s t a b l i s h e d d ip lomat ic r e l a t i o n s and has 
g iven modest m i l i t a r y supp l i e s to f i g h t the communist subve r -
s i on i n s p i r e d by the V i e t Mirih. Prime M in i s t e r o f Malaya, 
Tungku Abdul Rahman dec la red , " the Ind ia , i d e a l o f deuBCracy 
a l l o w s f o r a c t i v e to l e rance o f a l l p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s and credos 
i nc lud ing those p r a c t i s ed by the communists, but we i n Malaya 
can never be neut ra l because b i t t e r exper iences have t o l d us 
that g iven a chance communist w i l l destroy ovei* i d e a l o f 
27 
democracy.^' At the time o f Chinese a g g r e s s i o n i n 1962, the 
Prime M in i s t e r o f Malaysia condemned China on i t s a g g r e s s i o n 
des i gn and h i s a t t i t u d e was sympathetic towards Ind ia , and 
f o u n d a t i j n has been l a i d f o r g r e a t e r cooperat ion and a l l i a n c e 
between the two count r i e s . The recent v i s i t s o f l a t e P r e s i d e n t 
Zak i r Husain, Prime M in i s t e r Indra Gandhi and deputy Prime 
Min i s t e r 14orarji Desai have g r e a t l y improved the r e l a t i o n s , 
Thai land has been depply i n f l u e n c e d c u l t u r a l l y by Ind ia 
i n the pas t . The Thais not on ly took over Budhism but a l so 
c e r t a i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e a t u r e s o f government from Ind ia . 
Thia land gained cons ide rab l e importance f o r Ind ia dur ing the 
27, Quoted, Thien, p. 248. 
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second -world war when i t was acute ly r e a l i s e d that i n Thailandfe 
s ecu r i t y l a y the secur i ty o f Ind i a . This f a c t v;as r ecogn i sed ' 
28 
i n the t r i p a r t i t e agreement o f January 1, 1946, A f t e r i n d e -
pendence Ind ia improved i t s r e l a t i o n s w i th the Thais on 
commercial l e v e l . In February 1947, the Government o f Ind ia 
gave Thailand a l o an o f Rs. f i v e crores - the f i r s t l o a n made 
to ary f o r e i g n country by Ind ia . I t was obvious that th i s 
loan^made at a time when Ind ia h e r s e l f was under severe f i n a n -
c i a l s t r a i n^ se r ved not only econDmic but a lso p o l i t i c a l ends. 
The Finance Member o f Interim Government, Mr, L iaquat A l l Khan, 
w h i l e e xp l a in ing the reasons f o r g i v ing th i s l o a n to Thai land 
a l so mentioned the need to e s t a b l i s h c l o se t rade r e l a t i o n s 
between the two countr ies and to a s s i s t the ea r l y rehabi l i ta j - . : 
29 
t l o n o f Thai land. A f t e r independence, the r e l a t i o n s w i th 
Thai land continued to mainta in c o r d i a l though Thai land con-
cluded an agreement, with U.S.A. i n I960 f o r m i l i t a r y a s s i s -
tance and then j o ined SEATO. Thai land a lso opposed I n d i a ' s 
stand on SEATO at the Bandung conference . Now Thai land i s i n 
constant danger of communist China o r i t s s a t e l l i t e North 
Vietnam. Tha i l and ' s need to have her s ecu r i ty guaranteed by 
a major power i s imperat ive d f she i s not to come w i th in the 
'Chinese sphere o f i n f l u e n c e . ' 
28. Sinha, op. c i t . , p. 115. 
29. Ibid., p. 115. 
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Ihe P h i l i p p i n e s , though remotest from Ind ia i n c u l t u r a l 
and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s but s t r a t e g i c a l l y l a a l s o important 
f o r I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y . The P h i l i p p i n e s i s an a l l y o f the west 
and member o f SEATO and pursues a d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y i f fee 
compare i t v/ith Ind ia . The P h i l i p p i n e s attended A l l As ian 
Conference i n i t i a t e d by Ind ia . Mr. Nehru was keen on deve lop -
ing I ndo -Ph i l i pp ine M f r i e n d s h i p and succeeded i n concluding 
f r i e n d s h i p t r ea ty with the P h i l i p p i n e s . In l a t e 1950's , the 
P h i l i p p i n e s r e a l i s e d the importance o f b u i l d i n g c l o s e r r e l a t i -
ons with t h e i r As i an neighbours . The P h i l i p p i n e s have been 
a lso taking the i n i t i a t i v e i n b u i l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y c l o s e r 
r e l a t i o n s among the South East AsianjzJ count r i e s . With Ind i a , 
the P h i l i p p i n e s has been c o r d i a l , and was among the f i r s t to 
sympathize with her p l i g h t a t the time o f the Chinese a g g r e s s -
ion . There i s immense good v/111 and r ega rd f o r Ind ia i n the 
P h i l i p p i n e s . And there i s c o n s i d e r a b l e scope f o r h inder c o l l a -
b o r a t i o n between the P h i l i p p i n e s and Ind ia . Now our govern-
ment i s tak ing i n i t i a t i v e towards t h i s r e g i on and the recent 
v i s i t s o f the government's p e r s o n a l i t i e s to t h i s a rea a r e the 
hea l thy s i gns . 
The Indo-China gave b i r t h new s t a t e s namely North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. I t i s a r e a l t r o u b l e 
spot i n South-East As i a . These count r i e s f e l l under the most 
v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t between na t iona l i sm and communism i s
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p l ace . •'^ 'Ihe c o n f l i c t has not yet been s e t t l e d , and today one 
o f the inost savage s t r u g g l e i s on i n South Vietnam to save 
i t from a communist t ake -ove r . Iforth Vietnam has turned 
communist, South Vietnam has been i n p o l i t i c a l tur jooi l s ince 
the f a l l o f P re s ident Diem i n 1963, Cambodia has moved c l o s e r 
to China^and Laos maintains a p recar ious w e s t - o r i e n t e d neu-
t r a l i t y . The v i o l e n t upheavals and tens ions i n t h i s reg ion , 
i f not r e so l ved soon, th rea ten to engul f the whole o f South 
East As i a . And i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y here that India has f a i l e d 
30 
to p lay an e f f e c t i v e role,^" 
I n d i a ' s c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e i s immense i n Cambodia and 
Laos wh i l e Ch ina ' s i n f l u e n c e i s on Vietnam. I n d i a ' s connection 
wi th these s ta tes were not q u i t e good i n the past except 
Vietnam and moreover. Ho Chi Minh claimed to speak on beha l f 
o f whole Indo-China and the Lao t i an and Cambodian n a t i o n a l i s t s 
were ye t too s o f t to be not iced by the o u t s i d e wor ld . I n d i a ' s 
membership o f I . C.C. provided a b e t t e r i n s i g h t into the 
problems o f these reg ions and a b e t t e r understanding o f 
Cambodia, Laos and o f V i e t Minh ambit ions and t a c t i c s . I t i s 
out 
po inted/that , "'an examination o f the events i n Laos and 
Cambodia a f t e r the second wor l d war, and p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 
the Geneva Accords o f 1954 - the r e b e l l i o n o f the V i e t Minh -
30. Sinha, op.cit., p. 116. 
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supported insurgents (P|thet L ao ) i n Laos, the c o n f l i c t 
between Cambodia and Thai land, and that between Cambodia and 
South Vietnam - r e v e a l a p e c u l i a r a t t i t u d e o f he lp l e s snes s on 
the pa r t o f Ind ia to i n f l u e n c e the events he re . I n d i a ' s 
anx iety r ega rd ing Chinese 
communxsm was ecjually o f f s e t by the 
su sp i c i on o f Western ' c o l o n i a l i s m ' . I n d i a ' s stand o f ' n e u t r a -
l i t y ' l o s t her the goodwi l l o f both Laos and Cambodia, More-
ove r , India was unable to extend r e a l l y e f f e c t i v e support i n 
the i r c o n f l i c t s with the i r ne ighbours . This l e d Cambodia to 
look to communist China f o r e f f e c t i v e he lp and Laos turned to 
31 
the United States f o r a id and l a t e r on adopted ' n e u t r a l i t y . ' 
C u l t u r a l l y , the whole Vietnam be longs to the Chinese 
wor ld . Moreover, s p e c i a l l y North Vietnam was governed by 
the Chinese f o r near ly a whole mi l lenium. There are peoples 
i n Jbrth Vietnam who do not l i k e the dojnination o f the Chinese 
that 
ove r the country. But Mr. Honey obse rve s/ the re i s , ' 'a f e e l i n g 
o f Kinship w i th the Chinese and a genuine respect f o r Chinese 
c u l t u r a l achievements. The Vietnamese f e e l more a t home w i th 32 
the Chinese than with any o the r f o re i gne r s . * * 
31, Sinha, I b i d . , p. 117. 
32. Honey, P . J . , Comiriunism i n North Vietnam, Ampersand L t d . , 
London, 1965, p. 13, 
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For the s ecu r i ty o f South East As i a , Vietnam i s v i t a l 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y . S i r Anthony Eden thinks that i t i s a " ' p rotect -
ing pad" f o r South-East As i a and any a g g r e s s i v e power i n con-
t r o l o f i t could with l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y ove r whelm the e n t i r e 
reg ion , Ind ia seve re ly c i r i t i c i z e d the French des i gn a f t e r 
the Japanese wi thdrawa l dur ing 1945-1954. Mr, Nehru showed 
sympathy with the Vietnamese and s p e c i a l l y Indo-Ghina b e f o r e 
Independence. In December 1946, he dec l a r ed that '*our hear t s 
a r e with the peop le o f Indo-China. The attempt to c u r t ^ the 
s p i r i t o f freedom i n Indo-Ghina laras deeply moved the Indian 
33 
p e o p l e , " In the As ian conference i n March 1947, Ind ia adopted 
a very sympathetic a t t i t u d e w i th the problem o f Indo-Ghina. 
But a c t u a l l y , Ind ia put h e r s e l f a l oo f from the i n t e r n a l deve-
lopment o f Indo-Ghina. Ind ia p layed^ a u s e f u l r o l e i n b r ing ing 
about agreements at Geneva and India was chosen the Ghaitman 
o f I .G .G , i n Vietnam, Gambodia and Laos. In the beginning 
Ind i a was very much sympathetic towards Ho Ghi Minh govern-
ment o f f b r t h Vietnam, But a f t e r 1956, Ind ia came c l o se r to 
South Vietnam and g rea te r cooperat ion began to take p l a ce 
between India and South Vietnam^ Gommeecial t i e s were improved. 
P res ident Radhakrishnan ( then V i ce P r e s i d e n t ) v i s i t e d Sa igon 
i n September 1957 and Pres ident Diem v i s i t e d Ind ia i n November 
1957. Now our government a f t e r a decade i s th inking on the 
33. Thien, Quoted, op. c i t . , p . 122, 
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renewal o f o l d commercial t i e s with t h i s r eg ion . A f t e r the 
Chinese a g g r e s s i o n i n 1862, i t became ev ident that i n the 
i n t e r e s t s o f s e cu r i t y , Ind ia should seek b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i th 
South Vietnam. Now i t i s suggested that the 17th p a r a l l e l 
i n Vietnaiffi-.asl'iiidi^'s . s t rgteg lc - 'd^ fe i ice h l i n e i n South 
East A s i a and Ind i a should cons ider t h i s th ing . 
One i s inc l ined , to agree w i th Mr. l y a b j i when he 
suggests that Ind ia should cons ider the importance o f South-
East As ia and fo rmulate i t s po l i cy i n the l i g h t o f present 
c ircumstances. The Super Powers and communist China a r e there 
and the s t r u g g l e f o r power i s going on, "The Americans a re 
i n Japan, the P h i l i p p i n e s , Formosa, South Korea, South Vietnam, 
and Thai land, i n cons ide rab l e f o r c e - m i l i t a r i l y and otherv ; ise . 
The Sov ie t Union i s i n Korth Korea, North Vietnam, and Indo-
nes ia , and i s extending i t s i n f l u e n c e i n Japan, and w i l l do 
34 
so soon i n Ma lays ia and Singapore.*^ The main problem, that 
f a ce s a l l the South-East count r i e s , 2x>t except ing Ind ia , Japan, 
o r going f u r t h e r , even China, i s one o f na t iona l s e cu r i t y , 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e cogn i t i on o f n a t i o n a l - a c c e p t a b l e boundaries 
35 
and o f n a t i ona l l y - chosen forms o f government. 
34, l y a b j i , B .D , , op, c i t . , p . 2. 
39, lyabji. Ibid,, p. 13, 
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I t I s po inted that " ' I n d i a ' s major f a i l u r e i n th i s 
r e g i on has l a i n i n under -est imat ing the the r o l e o f i d e o l o -
g i c a l p o l i t i c s i n th i s area . She tended to view the co ld 
war l a r g e l y as a con f r on ta t i on between the U.S.A. and the 
U .S .S .R . I t was l i t t l e r e a l i s e d that with the emergence o f 
communist China i n 1949 a n i d e o l o g i c a l war had become i n e v i t a -
b l e i n As i a . I t i s not as i f Ind ian l e a d e r s h i p was unaware 
o f the danger posed by the r i s e o f communism i n China. There 
i s ample evidence of the f e a r s and a n x i e t i e s expressed ty 
Ind ian l e a d e r s , inc lud ing Mr. Nehru, r ega rd ing Pek ing ' s 
ambit ions . The f a i l u r e was due not to ingnorance but to 
w i s h f u l a n d ' i d e a l i s t » notions o f the Ind ian leadership.^" 
A f t e r 1962, i t i s obvious that China has expans ion i s t aim 
a 
and i s /Co-nstaKt'. danger to p e a c e - l o v i n g countr ies i n the 
r eg ion . I t i s suggested that , Ind ia has f a i l e d to p rov ide 
f o r South-East As i a as w e l l as f o r h e r s e l f a g r e a t e r sense 
o f s ecu r i t y aga ins t the growing Chinese menace. There i s a 
p e r c e p t i b l e f e e l i n g of i n s e cu r i t y among South -Sast As ian 
count r i e s , a sense o f h e l p l e s s n e s s , a ga in s t the r i s i n g 
Chinese " m i l i t a i y power. I t i s i n t h i s task o f promoting 
c o l l e c t i v e s ecu r i t y that Ind ia has f a i l e d , and i t i s i n th i s 
area that she w i l l have to make e f f o r t s tii r e f o rmu la te her 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . ^ fler f i r s t and most important task i n 
South East As i a now i s to take the i n i t i a t i v e i n b r ing ing 
the BDn-communist countr ies into c l o s e r c o l l a b o r a t i o n with a 
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View o f c r e a t ing a counter weight to China. Now China has 
entered into a nuclear arena, i t i s the need to s t rengthen 
the cause o f peace not by pious statements but by concrete 
measures of s e c u r i t y . 
Now at t h i s nuclear age, the s ecu r i t y i s a primS*-
na t i ona l I n t e r e s t . Mr. l y a b j i r i g h t l y po ints out , that ' " India 
w i l l , however, f i r s t have to demonstrate by her act ions that 
the p o s i t i v e element o f her non -a l i gned po l i cy does not become 
ac t i ve only when her own immediate i n t e r e s t s are invo lved o r 
threatened, as at the time o f the Chinese attack on her , o r 
Chinese p ressure on her over f r o n t i e r s . She has to prove by 
her p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the s o l u t i o n o f the secur i ty 
problems o f the r e g i o n - w i thout i d e o l o g i c a l i n h i b i t i o n s o f 
p r o j ud i c e s - i n the t rue s p i r i t o f no Dr. a l ignment that po l i cy 
and a t t i t u d e towards China i s based on cons ide ra t i ons , not on ly 
o f her own s e l f - i n t e r e s t but that o f a l l p eace - l ov ing , m n -
36 
expans ion i s t , count r ies o f the r e g i o n . " Being a b i gges t and 
l e a d i n g democracy i n the area , i t i s I n d i a ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
to l e a d i n bu i l d ing up a system o f c o l l e c t i v e secur i ty w i th 
i t s neighbours and a l so i n v i t e Japan to share i t s r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t i e s which i s a c t u a l l y a p o t e n t i a l power o f the r e g i o n 
and without Japan the system w i l l not be sound and e f f e c t i v e 
39, lyabji. Ibid,, p. 13, 
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which can counter weight China Mr. Chester Bowles ( then the 
American Ambassador to I n d i a ) i n an address b e f o r e the con-
f e rence o f As i a and P a c i f i c Accountants on 2 December 1965 
sa id , "The United S ta te i s keenly aware that i n the long run 
Free As ia cannot be developed and defended by f o r e i g n e r s . The 
37 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e s t s with the people o f A s i a themse lves , " 
Ind ia , Indones ia and Japan a re most p o t e n t i a l count r ies 
which can play- important r o l e i n r e g i o n a l coopera t ion and 
secu r i ty problems i n South-East A s i a . Though "Eas t Pakis tan -
a lso f a l l s w i t h i n the reg ion , and has almost the same eiaims 
as India , a r i s i n g i n i t s cur rent e v o l u t i o n , " but "East P a k i s -
t an has had l i t t l e i n f l u ence on Pak i s ta r i ^^ fo re i gn policy,** 
I t w i l l m t be proper to put i t a s i d e because Pak i s t an has 
some i n f l u ence on Indonesia , Ma lays ia which have preponderent 
Muslim p o p u l a t i o n and even i n others , - t » tehere there a re 
Muslim mino r i t i e s i n some s t rength . There fore , Ind ia has a 
g rea t task d i p l o m a t i c a l l y to show the g r e a t e s t danger o f the 
present time and to b r ing them, i n c l o s e c o l l a b o r a t i o n a ga in s t 
the Chinese phantom i n South-East A s i a . Tyab j i po ints ou t , 
" I n d i a has a bas i c stake i n South-East As i a , r o t on ly because 
i t i n d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s her na t i ona l s e c u r i t y , but because i t 
d i r e c t l y impinges on her hundreds o f yea r s o l d involvements 
38. Quoted, Masani, op. c i t . , p. 146, 
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i n the reg ion . Her investments there are not an ly ma te r i a l , 
but o f l i v e s , c u l t u r e , and c l o se r a c i a l and r e l i g i o u s p rop in -
qu i ty . The on ly o ther country that has a s im i l a r involvements 
i s China. The two may not u n f a i r l y , be c a l l e d the twin l/jother-
count r i e s o f the r eg ion . At the same time, one should not 
f o r g e t that there have a lso been a success ion o f f o s t e r -
/ 
mothers who have weaned i t subsequent ly , when i t s r e a l mother 
38 
were pre -occup ied w i th t h e i r o the r proger^y e l s ewhe re . " He 
f u r t h e r s ta tes that I n d i a ' s po l i cy towards t h i s r e g i o n i s rot 
very much c l e a r and sound. " I t i s much more d i f f i c u l t to 
understand our post 1962 p o l i c i e s i n r ega rd to Southeast 
A s i a our response to the th rea t to the s ecu r i ty o f i t s 
m u l t i - r a c i a l and mult i na t i ona l character , p a r t i c u l a r l y from 
China; and the type o f communism that i t propagates , e s p e c i a l l y 
i n view o f the forthcoming complete wi thdrawal o f B r i t i s h 
39 
power from the r e g i o n , " 
Japan has r e a l i s e d the importance and has made ' g ene -
rous war r epa ra t i ons sett lement agreements w i th most o f the 
countr ies concerned, and sponsored r e g i o n a l economic and 
p o l i t i c a l groupings, " ' A n o t h e r step was the As i an and South 
P a c i f i c count r i e s conference (ASPAC) on l a r g e s c a l e r e g i o n a l 
grouping, "Th i s was to dea l w i th s e cu r i t y , c u l t u r a l and other 
38, Tyab j i , o p . c i t , , p, 11. 
39, lyabji. Ibid,, p. 13, 
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r e g i o n a l problems, but to eschew con t rove r s i e s over p o l i t i c a l 
i d e o l o g i e s , as f a r as p o s s i b l e . A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, and 
o f course Taiwan, were inc luded i n i t . Ind ia too was i n v i -
ted p r e s s i n g l y by South K o r e a ( i n whose c a p i t a l , Seoul , 
the f i r s t meeting was to be h e l d ) and w i l l i n g l y , though not 
o v e r - e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y by Japan, as i t knew o f ouj' a l l e r g y to 
Taiwan. V/e turned dov/n the i n v i t a t i o n unceremoniously. We 
d id not de i gn even to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the pre l iminary d i s -
40 
cuss ions about i t o r to send an ob se rve r to the con f e r ence . " 
Ind ian government should reshape i t s p o l i c y i n the present 
circumstances and t r e a t Taiwan at l e a s t as w e l l as we do the 
German Democratic Republ ic and exp lo re t rade r e l a t i o n s and 
d i scuss matters o f comxnon concern which deserve same cons i -
d e r a t i o n and sympathy. Moreover, there i s s h i f t i n Sov ie t 
Union 's a t t i t u d e towards wor ld problems and i s coming c l o s e r 
w i th Japan, Pak i s tan and I r a n which a re the western a l l y i n 
de f ens i ve arrangements and Ind ia should a d j u s t i t s e l f i n 
present cond i t ions . 
In the words o f T y a b j i , " I t i s c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , that 
the shying o f f o f Ind ia from a q y - r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n that 
concerns i t s e l f v/ith quest ions o f s ecur i ty the i n t e g r i t y 
o f na t i ona l f r o n t i e r s , the p revent ion o f i n f i l t r a t i o n and 
40. Ibid,, p. 14, 
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subvers ion quest ions which are ever present i n her mind 
when i t concerns Kashmir o r N.E.F.A e f f e c t i v e l y p re -
vents her from p l ay ing any p o s i t i v e r o l e i n the reg ion . India's 
economic resources are not o f magnitude that she can, unaided, 
do very much f o r : t h e r ap id development o f the r eg ion . She 
i s hard ly i n a p o s i t i o n to be ab l e to add to i t s i n t e r n a l 
s t rength (as f o r instance , the U . S .A . , and the U .S .S .R . a re 
doing i n I n d i a ) i n such a massive way that i t could be r e f -
l e c t e d p o s i t i v e l y i n the r e g i o n i capac i ty to o r g a n i s e i t s own 
de fense through " i n t e r n a l " s t rength , as we a re fbnds-
o f c a l l i n g upon i t to do and y e t l e a v e s u f f i c i e n t 
41 
resources to spare f o r i t s economic development. 
Whiile drawing the a t t e n t i o n to r e g i o n a l arrangement, 
Tyab j i r i g h t l y obse rves , "The r e g i o n a l s ecu r i ty - understand-
ing , to beg in with , should be among those count r i e s o f the 
r e g i o n that stand f o r the maintenance o f peace and s t a b i l i t y 
i n the area, and the sett lement o f lA^atever d i sputes may a r i s e 
i n regard to t h e i r na t i ona l boundar ies and t e r r i t o r i a l c la ims, 
by peace fu l methods o f n e g o t i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n without 
invoking the a id o f ou t s i d e Powers, unless that i s a l so done 
42 
by mutual consent.'^ 
41. I b i d . , p. 16,16. 
42. Ibid., p. 17. 
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Almost a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a r e th ink ing on these 
l i n e s . And i t i s the necess i ty o f the time and the present 
circumstances a re a such that Ind ia should come fo rward and 
share the burden o f l i k e d minded nations i n the r e g i o n o t h e r -
w i se the C h i n e s e — Phantom w i l l d i s t u r b peace and s ecu r i t y 
o f the reg ion , Xyab j i b e a u t i f u l l y sums up, "^ I^t i s obv ious 
tha t the Super Powers can not be kept out o f the a r ea en t i r e l y , 
This i s ne i ther d e s i r a b l e nor p o s s i b l e . Their a i d and a s s i s t -
ance i s v i t a l f o r i t s w e l f a r e , e s p e c i a l l y i n the economic 
f i e l d , and f o r containing China, which though a major Power 
be long ing to the a rea , c ons t i t u t e s at p resent , i t s p r i n c i p a l 
th rea t , and w i l l remain so u n t i l i t chooses to change i t s 
na t i ona l i deo logy , o f which there are a t p re sent no v i s i b l e 
s i gns . I t should, however, be onei?-of the prime o b j e c t i v e s 
o f the secur i ty arrangement, o r ra ther understanding, between 
the peace - l ov ing major Powers o f the area to ensure that t h e i r 
d e a l i n g s with the Super-powers i n a l l de fence matters a f f e c t -
ing e i the r t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l s e cu r i t y , o r o f the area , 
should be only on a j o i n t b a s i s through r e g u l a r channels e s t a -
b l i shed j o i n t l y by them, which would p lace r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s 
above the pure ly na t iona l one o f any i n d i v i d u a l country i n 
the r e g i o n . By th i s means, i t should be p o s s i b l e , w h i l e g e t t i n g 
support from the Super-Powers f o r r e g i ona l purposes, s e cu r i t y 
and p rog res s , to avoid c r ea t ing imbalances between the r e spec -
t i v e countr ies w i th in the r eg ion , or uneasiness among t h e i r 
43 
neighbours/^ 
43. Tyab j i , I b i d . , p. 17. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
C O N C L U S I O N 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y speaking the r e g i o n known as South-East 
A s i a has remained i n the backyard o f I n t e rna t i ona l P o l i t i c s , 
The countr ies be long ing to t h i s r e g i o n remained n o n - s e l f -
governing and good prospect ing ground f o r the economic r e sources 
e s s e n t i a l f o r the development o f the i n d u s t r i e s i n the East as 
w e l l as the West. With the urge f o r independence and an e f f o r t 
to reshape t h e i r d e s t i n i e s accord ing to t h e i r own choice , these 
s t a t e s s t a r t e d th inking i n terms o f mutual c o - o p e r a t i o n f o r 
r e g i o n a l s e cu r i t y a ga in s t the e x i s t i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n and p r o s -
pec t i v e incurs ions by the nore advanced nations p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the ' b i g ' powers. 
This th inking was not who l ly naw. Steps were taken e a r l i e r 
a l s o . P re s ident Manuel Que2Dn o f P h i l i p p i n e s suggested a 
Malay Qnion'^ o f B r i t i s h Malaya, the Dutch East Indies 
(Now Indones i a ) and the P h i l i p p i n e s which went almost un-
not iced . Tan 14alaka proposed '*Aslia '* l i r i c ing A u s t r a l i a and 
South-East As i a but th i s a l so v/as unsucces s fu l . During the 
Second World War, there deve loped s t rong r e g i o n a l f e e l i n g s i n 
t h i s a rea . A United South-East A s i a command o f A l l i e s under 
Admira l Lord Louis MDuntbatten i n 1943 popu l a r i zed the concept 
o f the a rea as an i n t e r - r e l a t e d whole . There fo re , the Japanese 
occupat ion army f u r t h e r encouraged the concept and i t was the 
Japanese who brought s t rong r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l consciousness 
by in t roduc ing va r ious South-East As i an n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s 
c l o s e r to one another . P re s ident Jose .P .Loure l o f the Ph i l i pp ineB , 
Prime M in i s t e r Ba Maw o f Burma and Pr ince Wan Waithayakow 
- 296 -
o f Thai land, r ep resent ing Premier Phibun attended the Assembly 
o f Greater East A s i a t i c Nations h e l d i n Ibkyo i n November 1943. 
This was the f i r s t meeting o f i t s k ind o f the l e a d e r s o f t h i s 
r e g i o n . 
There were s eve ra l p lans f o r c l o s e r p o l i t i c a l c o l l a -
b o r a t i o n among the peoples o f proposed by indigenous l e a d e r s 
a f t e r the Second World War, But a l l attempts were u n s u c c e s s f u l 
because the s t r u g g l e f o r independence was the most dominant 
i n g r e d i e n t at that time. In September 1947, an u n o f f i c i a l 
South-East A s i a League was formed i n Bangkok but th i s was, 
i n f a c t , a f r o n t o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r the Vietnamese communist and 
inc luded among i t s a c t i v i t i e s gun-running i n support o f the 
Ho Chi Mirih - l e d g u e r r i l l a f i l t e r s a g a in s t the French, The 
prominent a c t i v e members were P r ince Souphanou Vong and some 
prominent Thais l i k e P r i d i Banonyong and Thamrang Nawasawat, 
The League was p ro sc r i b ed when Phibun returned to power s h o r t l y 
a f t e r i t s fo rmat ion , 
South-East As ian p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s advanced ambit ious 
p l ans f o r c l o s e r r e g i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and General Aung San o f 
Burma c a l l e d f o r an As ian "'Potsdam-Conference*® i n 1946, He 
expanded t h i s i dea i n a b r o a d - c a s t i n New De lh i i n January 
1947, f o r the format ion o f an As i an Common-Wealth which would 
c o n s t i t u t e a United As i an f r o n t a g a i n s t the i m p e r i a l i s t powers 
i n A s i a , He proposed the f o rmat ion o f a b i g union i n c l u d i n g 
Ind ia , China and the count r i e s o f South-East A s i a a g a i n s t the 
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f o r e i g n e r s . The Burmese l e a d e r , l a t e r on, c a l l e d f o r r e g i o n a l 
c o - o p e r a t i o n and the f o rmat ion o f a South-East As i an Economic 
Union c o n s i s t i n g o f Burma, Indones ia , Thai land, Malaya (Now 
M a l a y s i a ) , and Indo-China (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) . But 
i t a l so d i d not bear f r u i t because o f Aung San ' s t r a g i c a s s a -
s s i n a t i o n i n July 1947. In the same month Thai land, a longwi th 
France, came fo rward with a p l a n o f the f o rmat ion o f Pan^ 
South-East A s i an Union o f Tha i land , Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 
tha t would l a t e r be expanded to embrace o the r s t a t e s . But i t 
f e l l through because o f i n t e r n a l development i n Thai land. 
Genera l Ca r l o s P Eomulo o f P h i l i p p i n e s p layed a l e a d i n g p a r t 
to draw the country to the nat ions o f th i s p a r t o f the w o r l d 
nearer each o the r . Follovj-ing the New De lh i conference o f 
1949, Eomulo began working f o r an anti-communist South and 
South-East As i an b loc which would inc lude Ind ia , Pak is tan , 
Ceylon, A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand as w e l l as the count r i e s o f 
to 
South-East A s i a . But mary o f these nat ions d id not w i s h / a l i g n 
themselves with e i the r s i de between the ISiited Sta tes and the 
Sov i e t Union, and the Baguio Conference convened by the 
P h i l i p p i n e s i n 195o d id r o t c o n t r i b u t e much i n t h i s f i e l d . 
P r e s i den t E l p i d i o Quirino o f P h i l i p p i n e s a l so advocated a l l 
these years va r i ous types o f coopera t ion f o r the count r i e s o f 
t h i s r e g i o n but o f nD a v a i l . 
Indonesia was l e a s t i n t e r e s t e d i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
coopera t ion , among the s eve r a l A s i an S ta t e s , was probably the 
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c h i e f o b s t a c l e to r e g i o n a l c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n t h i s r e g i o n dur ing 
a l l these y e a r s , Indonesia adhered to a c t i v e n e u t r a l i t y and 
^ d i d not want to a l i g n i t s e l f w i th e i t h e r cTf the b locs . There 
were s e v e r a l suggest ions from d i f f e r e n t quar te r s dur ing f i r s t 
h a l f o f 196o's f o r r e g i o n a l g roup ings . The p a r t i t i o n o f V i e t -
nam on 17th p a r a l l e l and the c r e a t i o n o f communist North V i e t -
nam i n 1954 changed the s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n i n South-East A s i a , 
The United S ta tes proposed a r e g i o n a l de fense pact to check 
communist expansion i n th i s r e g i o n and the P h i l i p p i n e s and 
Thai land, both o f whom shared the American f e a r o f f u t u r e 
communist a g g r e s s i o n e lsewhere i n the a r i a , s t r ong l y endorsed 
the American move. Pakistan , A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, B r i t a i n 
and France a l so s igned the Manila Pact , the S e l e c t i v e Secu r i t y 
agreement which r e s u l t e d from a September 1954 conference i n 
the P h i l i p p i n e s which i s now to be known as the South-East 
A s i a Treaty Organ iza t ion , SEATO. Only two o f i t s e ight members 
a r e o f South -East As i a ( the P h i l i p p i n e s and T h a i l a n d ) , a l though 
a t l e a s t two o the r s are not very c l o s e neighbours ( P ak i s t an 
and A u s t r a l i a ) , South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos might a l s o 
have j o i n e d SEATO a t the s t a r t i f they had not been prevented 
from doing so by the terms o f the 1954 Geneva Agreements, 
Indonesia and Burma the o the r e l i g i b l e members w i t h i n the 
r e g i o n had a l ready assumed t h e i r n e u t r a l i s t postures at the 
time o f Mani la Conference wh i l e Malaya was y e t to ga in i t s 
independence. 
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Moreover, SEATO may iiot have f u l f i l l e d a l l the expecta -
t i o n s o f i t s As ian members and do not con t r i bu te to the f u r t h e r 
p o p u l a r i z a t i o n o f the idea o f South-East As i a as an i n t e g r a l 
u n i t o r r e g i o n i n -world p o l i t i c s . In raid 1961, Thai land, 
P h i l i p p i n e s and Malaya launched the A s s o c i a t i o n o f South-East 
A s i a (ASA) f o r meaningful coope ra t i on o f i t s members i n the 
r e g i o n because SEATO did not f u l f i l l the purpose. The aVo¥e'd 
purpose o f A .S .A . was economic and s o c i a l coope ra t i on among 
i t s three members. But Malays ia P l an i n 1963 h a l t e d i t s p r o -
g ress because o f the c l a sh o f i n t e r e s t s o f the members o f A . S .A . 
I n 1966, e f f o r t s were made to resume c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w i th 
Ma lays ia but much o f the momentum, may have been l o s t by t h i s 
t ime. And i n 1963, there was '^'Maphilindo'^ p l a n f o r the coopera -
t i o n i n matters o f Secur i ty , economic development and s o c i a l 
and c u l t u r a l a f f a i r s w i t h i n a l o o s e c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangement, 
s igned by heads o f s t a t e s o f Malaya the P h i l i p p i n e s and 
Indonesia a t Manila i n August 1963. The three count r i e s p l edged 
themselves to use "'Maphilindo*^, formed from the f i r s t few 
l e t t e r s o f t h e i r names f o r the purpose o f ""frequent and r e g u l a r 
c onsu l t a t i ons a t a l l l e v e l s . ' " '"Maphilindo"' a cco rd ing ly never 
got o f f the ground because o f Ma lays ia p l an i n 1963. I n June 
1966, a t Bangkok peace t a l k s , Indones ian Fo r e i gn M in i s t e r Adam 
Malik d i scussed new e f f o r t s towards r e g i o n a l coopera t ion among 
the f ou r "ASA" and *'Maphilindo™ s t a t e s , Indones ia , Ma lays ia , 
the P h i l i p p i n e s and Thai land. 
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And there has a l so been the a t t r a c t i o n o f broader 
coope ra t i on on an As i a -w ide b a s i s and i n a word '"Pan-
Asianism." ' The idea can be t r aced to Russian convened congress 
o f the Nations o f the Or ient at Baku i n 1920, the Nagasaki . 
Panp-Asiatic Conference o f 1926, and the 1934 P a n - A s i a t i c 
Labour conference h e l d i n Ceylon sponsored by Mr.Nehru, 
The u r o f f i c i a l As i an Re l a t i ons Conference i n New De lh i 
i n March -Apr i l 1947, was h a i l e d by maiiy as the beg inning o f 
the estab l i shment o f some k ind o f A s i a n Union. A l l South-
East As i an count r i e s sent t h e i r r ep re sen ta t i ve ' , to th i s 
h i s t o r i c conference , f i r s t o f i t s k ind and represented by 
t h i r t y - o n e count r i e s . The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the South-East 
A s i a n count r i e s seemed very much concerned with i n t e g r a t i o n 
w i t h i n ar^y A s i a » » w i d e b loc would be a t the expense o f some 
o f t h e i r newly won p o l i t i c a l independence. I n January 1949, 
the s eve r a l A s i a n governments p a r t i c i p a t e d i n A l l - A s i a 
Conference which was convened by Ind i a to c a l l upon the Un i t ed 
Nat ions Secur i ty Counci l to a r range f o r the t r a n s f e r o f power 
from Hol land to Indonesia . There were s e v e r a l suggest ions 
p r i o r to 1956 f o r r e g i o n a l coope ra t i on and c o l l a b o r a t i o n 
among the count r i e s of t h i s r e g i o n but i t d i d not take a 
conccete shape. Moreover, there has been even l e s s i n t e r e s t 
among the South-East As ian count r i e s i n the past i n an A s i an 
comckDn market than i n an A l l A s i an o r P a n - P a c i f i c S e l e c t i v e 
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Secur i ty Organ !2at ion , There fo re , the United Nat ions Economic 
Commission f o r As i a and the Far East has brought r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s o f p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the governments o f A s i a together and 
has rendered va r i ous s e r v i c e s , but i t has not supplanted the 
a c t i v i t i e s o f o rd ina ry na t i ona l governments i n any way. And 
there was a l so a danger o f i n d u s t r i a l i s e d Japan ' s domination 
ove r the under -deve loped count r i e s o f the r eg ion . Though 
Japan encouraged some so r t o f r e g i o n a l coopera t ion among the 
count r i e s o f South-East As i a but i t has not been s u c c e s s f u l . 
There came a conference o f Colombo Powers f o r broader A f r o -
A s i an coopera t ion i n December 1954 but i t was a l so s l i o r t l i v e d . 
In 1964, Commonwealth count r i e s f e l t the need o f p o l i t i c a l 
and Economic coopera t i on i n the form o f Colombo Plan, **to 
r a i s e the standard o f l i v i n g by a c c e l e r a t i n g the pace and 
widening the scope o f economic development i n the countr ies 
o f South and South-East A s i a by a coope ra t i ve approach to 
t h e i r problems with spec i a l emphasis on the p roduct ion o f 
food,*^ And i n A p r i l 1966, there was Bandung Conference which 
heard three vo i ce s , one from group which was f r i e n d l y to the 
West; second that o f the s o f t spoken Chinese communist 
C h o u - E n - l a i j and t h i r d was that o f the s o c a l l e d n e u t r a l i s t s . 
I t d id not p rov ide a un i ted f r o n t . In November 1965, the 
A l g i e r s A f r o - A s i a n Conference a l so f a i l e d because o f the 
absence o f the United f r o n t . The communist Ch ina ' s entrance 
i n the nuc lear f i e l d and the e x p l o s i o n o f an atomic dev ice 
i n 1964 opened up a new ground o f th ink ing , A new k ind o f 
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b i - p o l a r i z a t i o n seemed to be tak ing p l a ce the revolut ionary-
minded communist China a g a i n s t the p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s o f 
I nd i a , the United S ta te s , Japan and p o s s i b l y the Sov i e t Union, 
ffow South-East A s i a i s the most Important r e g i o n i n 
the w r l d p o l i t i c s . I t i s f u l l o f r esources and raw m a t e r i a l s 
and above a l l has become s t r a t e g i c a l l y very important i n the 
wor ld to day. A l l the b i g powers o f the wor ld a r e I n t e r e s t e d 
i n th i s r eg i on . The Super-Powers and the Communist China a r e 
a t l o gge r -heads there and the s t r u g g l e f o r Power i s going on. 
The r e a l problem i s one o f na t i ona l s e cu r i t y and n a t i o n a l l y 
chosen forms o f gove rment . A l l the count r i e s o f t h i s r e g i o n 
a r e f a c i n g t h i s problem and Ind ia i s not i n an except ion . 
Ind ia has a b a s i c stake i n South-East A s i a , not on ly because 
i t i n d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s her na t i ona l s e c u r i t y , but because i t 
d i r e c t l y impinges on her hundreds o f yea r s o f t r a d i t i o n a l , 
c u l t u r a l , r e l i g i o u s and r a c i a l a f f i n i t y and mutual ly 
advantageous economic and p o l i t i c a l I n t e r e s t s , The on ly o t h e r 
country that has a s i m i l a r involvement i s China, the main 
d i f f e r e n c e be ing that China i s e xpans i on i s t wh i l e Ind ia i s 
not, MDreover, there i s s t r u g g l e f o r power on I d e o l o g i c a l 
grounds between the communism and the f r e e wor ld , I nd i a i s 
the b i g ge s t and most s t a b l e democracy i n the a rea and i t i s 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f Ind ia to l e a d i n b u i l d i n g up p o l i t i c a l 
s t a b i l i t y and economic cooperat ions w i th i t s neighbours and 
a l so i n v i t e a l l i n d u s t r i a l l y developed count r i e s to share t h i s 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A l l the count r i e s o f the r e g i on should be p ro -
v ided p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y w i th sound economic bases and then 
i n t h i s way only t h i s r e g i o n can counter weight China e f f e c -
t i v e l y . There should be l i t t l e h e s i t a t i o n i n g e t t i n g econDinic 
a i d and t echn i ca l a s s i s t ance f o r the development o f t h i s r e g i o n 
both from the communist and c a p i t a l i s t count r i e s . 
In recent time, there a r e va r i ous p roposa l s coming from 
the United S ta te s and the Sov i e t Union f o r the c o l l e c t i v e 
Secu r i t y of the r e g i o n as a l so of the Indian Ocean, They con-
tend that s ecu r i t y arrangements a re r a t i o n a l and l o g i c a l , T h ^ 
do not a r i s e from a s t a te of war-mindedness. Biey are common 
sense sa feguards to ensure peace and s e c u r i t y . The United Sta tes 
proposes a r e g i o n a l s ecur i ty arrangement having h e r hands i n the 
system. The Sov ie t Union v i s u a l i s e s a pure ly A s i an system o f 
C o l l e c t i v e Secur i ty o f As ians by Asians and f o r As ians wlth^ 
* 
out Imper i a l powers o f the West, There fore , unders tandab ly , 
Peking regards aiy move f o r an As i an de fense arrangement under -
w r i t t e n , by Moscow and Washington as a th rea t to enc i rc lement 
d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t China. But I h d i a ' s stand i n t h i s respect ,seems 
q u i t e convinc ing . Ind ia b e l i e v e s i n economic coopera t ion f o r 
the development o f the r e g i o n and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and does 
not b e l i e v e i n the '^'Vacuum Theory"', The countr ies o f the r e g i o n 
should be strong enough to s a f egua rd t h e i r hear ths and homes 
from ex t e rna l as w e l l as i n t e r n a l r eac t i ona ry f o r c e s . The re f o r e , 
p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and sound economy i s the f i r s t and foremost 
need o f the time. 
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The Souti i -East As i an countr ies should b u i l d up t h e i r 
own de f ens i v e p o t e n t i a l to look a f t e r t h e i r s a f e t y . Ind ia and 
Pak i s t an a re the g rea t neighbours and without Ind i a and 
Pak i s t an mo p r o j e c t f o r the s o l i d a r i t y and s t a b i l i t y i n t h i s 
r e g i o n can be o f a i y a v a i l . And i n the absence o f na t i ona l 
r e g i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y and s t a b i l i t y no scheme o f mutual s e c u r i t y 
and r e g i o n a l coopera t ion can succeed. The danger o f communist 
expansionism i n South-East A s i a would seem to come not perhaps 
"from d i r e c t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n by China but from i n t e r n a l 
subvers ion . The answer to i t i s not m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s which 
may l ead to counter m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s , but the s t rengthen ing 
o f the economic and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f the count r i e s . The 
p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f South-East A s i a n countr ies can bes t be 
ensured by b u i l d i n g up t h e i r own d e f e n s i v e p o t e n t i a l and con-
t inuous economic cooperat ion wi th o the r r eg i ons s t r i c t l y f a l l i n g 
w i t h i n the area but a l so count r i e s ad j a cen t to i t , Ind ia has 
been t r y ing to b r ing home t h i s po in t to i t s neighbours i n t h i s 
r eg i on . The recent v i s i t s o f the Prime M in i s t e r and the h i gh 
d i g n a t r i e s to t h i s r e g i on s u f f i c i e n t l y i n d i c a t e s I n d i a ' s d e s i r e 
f o r mutual coopera t ion and adop t i on o f dev ices f o r r e g i o n a l 
s e cu r i t y which w i l l u l t i m a t e l y prove b e n i f i c i a l to a l l concerned, 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
S E L E G T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
1. A l l en , Richard 
2. Brackman, Arno ld^ . 
Brixnmell, J.II. 
4 , B u W e l l , Richard 
6. B a l l , ¥ . M . 
6 . Bhagat, P.S, 
7. Buss, C. A. 
8 . Buss, G.A. 
9. Bimla Prasad 
10. Bone, I b b e r t C. 
11. Gady, John F. 
12. Cady, John F . 
13. C h a t t e r j i , B.R. 
14. Chandra Sekhar 
"^ l^ lays ia , Prospect and Re t ro s -
pect s The Impact and Aftermath 
o f Co l on i a l Rule. London,Oxford 
m i v e r s l t y Press 1968, 
" ' Indonesian Communism : A H i s t o r y , 
New York, P r a ege r 1963. 
Communism i n Southeast As i a : A 
P o l i t i c a l Ana l y s i s , London, 
Ox ford 1969. 
Southeast As i a Tbday and Ibmorrow: 
A P o l i t i c a l Ana l y s i s , N.Y. 2nd 
ed, 1964, 
Nat iona l i sm and Communism i n 
East A s i a Melbourne, 1962, 
Forg ing the Shielitt : A Study o f 
the Defence o f Ind ia and Southeast 
A s i a , Ca l cut ta & New De lh i . The 
Statesman 1966. 
South East As i a and the World 
Today. Pr inceton, N.Y, 1968. 
The Far East , N.Y. I960. 
The O r i g i n s o f Ind ian Fo re i gn 
P o l i c y , Ca l cu t t a 1962. 
Contemporary Southeast A s i a , 
N.Y. 1962, 
The Boots o f French Imper ia l i sm 
i n Ea s t e rn As i a , I thaca , N.Y. 1964, 
Southeast A s i a s I t s H i s t o r i c a l 
Development, McGr»w H i l l , N.Y. 1964, 
Southeast As i a i n T r a n s i t i o n . 
Meenakshi - Meerut 1966. 
Communist China Today. Bombay 
1966, 
16. Durdin, T i l lman Southeast A s i a , N.Y. 1966. 
- 289 -
16. E l s b r e e , w i l l i a r d H, 
17» Emerson, Rupert 
18. EmersotijKupert, M i l l s , . . . . 
Lennox A . , Thompson^Vi^lw^ 
19. E legant , Robert 
20. Enloe, Cynthia Holden 
21. F i f i e l d , R u s s e l l H. 
22. F u r n i v a l l , J . S . 
23, F i t z g e r a l d , C . P . 
24. Freedman, Maur ice (ed . ) . . . 
Japan ' s Roifeo i n Southeast 
As i an N a t i o n a l i s t Movement 
1940-1946 Cambridge,Harvard 
Un i ve r s i t y P ress , 1953. 
Representa t i ve Government i n 
Southeast As i a , Cambridge 1955, 
26. F i f i e l d , R u s s e l l H. 
26. Gorden, Bernard K 
27. G rossho l t z , Jean 
28. G u p t a , S i s i r 
•tfj Mf^ ii i.i.t-a Government and Nat ion -
a l i sm i n Southeast A s i a . 
I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c Re l a t i ons 
N.Y. 1 ^ 2 . 
The Dragons Seed s Peking and 
the ove r seas Chinese, N, Y. 1969. 
Mu l t i -E thn i c P o l i t i c s : m e 
Case o f Ma lays ia C a l i f o r n i a , 
1967. 
Ohe Diplomacy o f Southeast A s i a 
1945-1958, N.Y. 1958. 
The Governance o f Modern Burma 
I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 
N.Y. 1958. 
Ihe Third China s The Chinese 
Communities i n Southeast A s i a 
u n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia 
Columbia, 1966. 
Bie Chinese i n Southeast As i a : 
A l onge r view. London, 1966. 
Southeast As i a i n United Sta tes 
P o l i c y , N.Y. 1966. 
The Dimensions o f C o n f l i c t i n 
Southeast A s i a , New Jersey , 
1966. 
. . . P o l i t i c s i n the P h i l i p p i n e s . 
Boston and Toronto, 1964. 
. . . Ind ia and Reg iona l I n t e g r a t i o n 
• i n A s i a , A s i a Pub l i sh ing House, 
Bombay 1964. 
- 290 -
29, Greene, F red 
30. H a l l j D . G . E . 
31, H a l l , D . G . E . 
32. H a l l j D . G . E . 
33, Har r i son , B r i an 
34, Hanna, A W i l i a r d 
36. Hugh Tinker 
36, Ho l l and ,W i l l i am L. 
( e d . ) 
37, Hammar, E l i a n J. 
38, Jones jF .C . 
39, Jain, G i r i l a l 
40, Jenkins, S h i r l e y 
41, Kahin,George M. 
42, Karunakaran,K.P. 
43, ff 
U . S . P o l i c y and the Secur i ty o f 
As i a , N.Y. 1968. 
A His tory o f South-East As i a , 
London, 1965, 
A H is to ry o f South-East As i a , 
2nd ed. N.Y. 1966, 
A H i s to ry o f South-East A s i a , 3 r d 
ed. London, 1968. 
Southeast A s i a : A Short H i s to ry 
3rd ed. London, 1966, 
E ight Nat ion Makers s Southeast 
A s i a ' s Chr lsmat ic Statesmen, N. Y. 
1964, 
B a l l a t Box and Bayonet - People 
and Government i n Emergent As i an 
countr ies ( i toya l ) I n s t i t u t e o f 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Ox ford , 
London, 1964. 
As i an Nat iona l i sm and the West, 
N.Y. 1963. 
Vietnam Yesterday and Today, N.Y. 
1966, 
j a p a n ' s New o r d e r i n As ia : I t s 
R i se and F a l l , 1937-1945,Oxford, 
London, 1964. 
Panchsheel and A f t e r , Bombay, 1960, 
" "Ph i l i pp ines " Bo s i nge r , Lawrencek 
and Assoc i a t e s "B i e S ta tes o f A s i a " 
N.Y. 1961, 
""Government and P o l i t i c s o f Sotith-
east Asia . " " N.Y. 1964, 
""India i n World A f f a i r s , A u g . 1947-
j an . I960, Ca l cu t ta , 1962. 
Ind ia i n World A f f a i r s , Feb. 195o 
Dec. 1963, Ca l cu t ta , 1968. 
- 291 -
44, 
46. Kahin,George Mc T. 
46, KaviCjLorne J, 
47, Kennedy, D.E, 
48, Kunstadter , peter 
49, King, John Kerry 
60. M i l l s , Lennox A 
61, Mi lne, R.S, 
62.. Marathe,D.S. 
63. Mende, T i l r o r 
64. Mahaj an i , Usha 
66. MasanijM. R. 
66. Melbourne, F.W. 
67. M i l l s , Lennox A and 
Assoc ia tes 
68. Nehru, J . L . 
. . . " O u t s i d e the Contes t " , New D e l h i , 
1963. 
' " Indonesian P o l i t i c s and Nat iona -
l ism"' , Ho l l and ,W i l l i am L. ( e d i t e d ) 
**Asian Nat iona l i sm and the West** 
MacMil lan, N.Y. 1963. 
. . . " I n d i a ' s Quest f o r Secur i ty : 
Defence P o l i c i e s , 1947-1966, 
Dehra Dun, 1967. 
. . . **Bie Secur i t y o f Southern A s i a , 
London, 1966. 
. . . "Southeast As ian Tr ibes ,Mi r tor i -
t i e s and Nat ions ' * ,Pr inceton , 1967. 
. Southeast As i a i n Pe r spec t i ve 
MacMil lan, N.Y. 1969. 
. . . Southeast A s i a : I l l u s i o n and 
R e a l i t y i n P o l i t i c s and Economics 
Minneapo l i s , 1964. 
. . . Government and P o l i t i c s i n 
Ma lays ia , Boston, 1967, 
. . . ' ' I n d i a and Her. Ne ighbours . " 
Bombay, 196®. 
. . . South East As ia Between two 
Wor lds . London 1966. 
. . . " T h e Role of the Ind ian M i m r i t i e s 
i n Burma and Malaya",Bombay, I960. 
. . . The Role o f Ind ia i n South East 
As i a , S ibnarayan Ray, "Vietnam 
seen from East and Wes t . " 
Bombay 1966. 
, . . Southeast As ia : Past and Present 
Cheshire , 1966. 
. . . " T h e World of South East A s i a " 
London, I960, 
, . . " J a w a h a r l a l Nehru 's Speeches" 
Sept . 1967 - A p r i l 1963, V o l . I V 
New De lh i P u b l i c a t i o n D i v i s i o n 
New De lh i , 1964, 
- 292 -
69. Panikkar,K.M. 
60, Peaslee,Amos J. 
61, P u r c e l l , V i c t o r 
62, P u r c e l l , V i c t o r 
63, i y e , L u c i a n ¥. 
64, JFye,Lucian W. 
65, Pye ,Luc ian W. 
66, P u r c e l l , V i c t o r 
67 , P e p l a i j S . L , ( e d . ) 
68, Rat nam, K. J. 
69, Rose, Soul 
70, Rosinger ,Lawrence K, 
71, Raj Kumar, N.V. 
72, S c a f f , A l v i n 
« • « 
• • • 
• • • 
"•The Future o f South East A s i a : 
An Ind ian View, MacMil lan, K.Y, 
1943, 
" 'Const i tut ions o f Nations"^ 2nd ed, 
N i j h o f f , The Haque, 1956. 
**Golonial Pe r i od i n Southeast 
As i a : An H i s t o r i c a l Sketch, 
I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 
N.Y. 1953, 
"®The Revo lu t ion i n Southeast A s i a " 
London 1962, 
Southeast A s i a ' s P o l i t i c a l Systems 
Pr inceton , N . J , , 1967. 
P o l i t i c s , P e r s o n a l i t y and Na t ion 
B u i l d i n g : Burma's search f o r 
i d e n t i t y . New Haven, Ya le Un ive r -
s i t y P ress , 1962, 
Some ob se rva t i ons on the P o l i t i c a l 
Behaviour o f overseas Chinese -
1964. 
The Chinese i n Southeast A s i a , 
Oxford , London. 
" 'Asia and A f r i c a i n the Modern 
Vfor ld.^, Bombay 1955, 
•^Communism and the P o l i t i c a l 
Process i n Malaya"*, U n i v e r s i t y o f 
Malaya Press , Kuala Lumpur, 1965, 
•^Pol i t ics i n Southern Asia** 
MacMil lan, London, 1963, 
**The S ta tes o f A s i a i A contempo-
ra ry survey*', A K r o ^ f f , N.Y.1951, 
Indians o u t s i d e Ind ia s A Genera l 
Survey, A. I . C . C . New Delh i 1951, 
The P h i l i p p i n e Ahswer to Communi-
sm. S t an fo rd U n i v e r s i t y P re s s , 
S t an fo rd , 1955, 
- 293 -
73. Smith,Robert A u r d 
74, Simoniya,N. 
75. Skirmer,G, Wi l l i ams 
76. S i l cock , T.H. , and 
Az iz , laigk, Abdul , 
77. S iEha,V.K. 
78. Ta r l i ng , Nicholas 
79. Thayer, P. W. 
80, ThierijTon That 
81. B iompson,Vi rg in ia and 
A d o I f f , R i c h a r d 
82. Thompson,Virginia and 
Ado I f f , R ichard 
83. Trager ,Frank N. 
Y" 
84. Vandenbo sch, h f m and 
Bu twe l l ,R i cha rd 
86. Vander Mehden,Fred R 
. . . ^ P h i l i p p i n e Freedom 1946-1958, 
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P ress , 1958. 
Overseas Chinese i n Southeast 
As ia (A Russ ian S tudy ) ,N .Y . 1961. 
. . . ^ R e p o r t on the Chinese i n South-
eas t Asia"", N.Y. 1961. 
. . . ' "Nat ional ism i n Malaya» Ho l l and , 
W i l l i am L. ' 'As ian Nat iona l i sm and 
the West®, N.Y. 1953, 
• ' " India and South-East Asia® 
Shah, A .B. ""Indian's Defence and 
F o r e i g n Po l i t ics*^ , Manaktalas, 
^ m b a y , 1966. 
. . . " P i r a c y and P o l i t i c s i n the 
Malaya World : A Study o f B r i t i s h 
Imper ia l i sm i n Nineteenth Century 
Southeast A s i a . Melbourne, F.W, 
CheshiTfe, 1963. 
. , . "South East A s i a i n the coming 
World**, John Hopkins Press , 
Ba l t imore , 1953. 
. . . " I n d i a and Southeast As i a : 1947-
1960®, Geneva, 1963. 
. . . Minor i ty Problems i n Southeast 
A s i a " S t an fo rd Un i ve r s i t y P r e s s , 
S t an fo rd , 1956, 
. . . "Ma laya" , Ros inger , Lawrence and 
As soc i a t e s , "Ohe States o f A s i a " 
N,Y. 1951, 
. . . "Why Vietnam'^, N.Y. 1966. 
. . . '"The Changing Face o f Southeast 
A s i a " Lexington, U n i v e r s i t y o f 
Kentucky P ress , Lexington, 1966. 
. . . " R e l i g i o n and Nat iona l i sm i n 
Southeast As i a j Burma, Indones ia , 
The P h i l i p p i n e s " , U n i v e r s i t y o f 
Wiscons in P ress , Madison, 1963. 
- -
86# V i c t o r P u r c e l l 
87. V l ug t jEbed Van Der 
88, W i l l i am ,Lea E« 
89, Young, Kenneth T. Jr . 
. . . "Olie Chinese i n South East Asia** 
M i l l s , Lennox, A.and Assoc i a tes® , 
Ihe New World o f Southeast A s i a , ^ 
• •• ""Asia Aflame'* "Communist i n the 
East"*. 
. . . **The Future o f Overseas Chinese 
i n Southeast Asia® MoGraw H i l l 
New York, 1966, 
**The Southeast A s i an Cr is is* " 
(Background papers and Proceedings 
o f the E ight Hammer S k j o l d Forum) 
Oceana P u b l i c a t i o n s , N.Y. 1966. 
r t i c 1 Q s 
1, Acharya, G.N, 
2, Appl e to n, Sh e l do n 
3 . Barita, Hem. 
4 , Brecher , Nachael 
Bu.Ghan.^ALstalr 
**Indians I b l e i n South East A s i a : 
A Review o f Ind ian Fo re i gn P b l i c y , 
1948-61**, 48 page s p e c i a l s upp l e -
ment on ' A s i ans Image o f I n d i a * , 
Fa r Eas te rn Economic Review^33(12^ 
September 21, 1861 : 555-63, 
**Communism and the Chinese i n the 
Phi l ipp ines* * , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 
3 2 ( 4 ) t December 1959 : 376-91, 
**31he Neg lect o f South East A s i a 
i n Government Policy**, Janata^ 
20 ( 1 3 ) : A p r i l 16, 1965 : 3 - 4 . 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Re l a t i ons and 
As i an Stud ies : The s u b o r d i m t e 
S ta te system o f Southern Asia**, 
World P o l i t i c s 15 January 1963 : 
213-35. 
*"An As i an Balance o f Power**. The 
A u s t r a l i a n Journal o f P o l i t i c s 
and History^ 1 2 ( 2 ) August 1966s 
271.81. 
- 295 -
6 . Bad r - ud -D in Tayab;)! 
7 . Bouvens, J .C . 
8* Bad r - ud -D in Tayab j i 
9 Pt. 
9. C h a t t e r j i j B . R . 
10. C a r n e l l , F r a n c i s G. 
Ind ia , South East As i a and Japan 
(Haree A r t i c l e s ) The Ind ian 
Express ( D e l h i ) 8 ,12 ,13 Dec.1968. 
• . . " ' Impress ions on the I n d o - M i m r i t y 
Problem i n Indonesia**, Indones ian 
A f f a i r ST 3 ( 8 ) s August 1953,71-72, 
. . . ""India, the Major PDvrers And the 
Secu r i t y o f South East Asia''", 
Seminar on Problems o f S t a b i l i t y 
and Secu r i t y i n South East A s i a 
(10-12 March 1969). Ind ian School 
o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies F e r o z e -
Shah ft) ad, New D e l h i - 1 , 
- - S p e c i a l r e p o r t to the Co-Chairmen 
o f the Geneva Conference on 
Indo-China June 2,1962. 
. . . ""The Ro le o f the Armed Forces i n 
P o l i t i c s i n Southeast Asia*®*, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies^ 2 ( 3 ) , 
January 1961 ; 221-33, 
"'Communalism and Communism i n 
Malaya«,•• P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 2 6 ( 2 ) 
June 1953: 99-117. 
11. DaSjP .K. '"Looking a t South East Ssia"®, 
>;[ainstre§jnT 3 ( 6 o ) ; August 16, 
1965 s 14. 
12. Dave ,Rohit 
13, Dickson Crave ,Robe r t 
14, Frank, Wo I f gang 
15, Freedman, Mavrice 
" Sou th -Eas t As i a and Overselves*^, 
Freedom F i r s t ^ 149,Oct. 1964:4, 
, . . 1, ""South-East A s i a ; R e v o l u t i -
onary R e g i n r a l i s m " . 
2, "-The Balkans o f Asia'*^ S u r v i v a l 
i e ( 9 ) : September 1968,285-93, 
**Some Problems o f Chinese Schools 
and Educat ion i n Southeast A s i a 
i n p a r t i c u l a r Ma lays ia and S inga -
pore**, Journal o f South -East A s i a 
and the Far East 1 (1968 ) , 108-13, 
. . . **Chinese Communities i n South-
e a s t A s i a : A Review Ar t i c l e * * , 
P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 3 1 ( 3 ) September 
1958 : 300^04. 
- 296 -
16. H a r r i s o n , S e l i q S. 
17. Kh-oman, Thamat 
18, Krishna MDorthy,K. 
19. Krishna Mirthy, S. 
20. Krishna Murthy, S. 
21. Means, Go rdar P. 
22. MacDonald, Malcolm 
23. KadhokjB. 
24. M i l l e r , T . B . 
26. 
26. Nihal S ingh,S, 
27. 
. . . ""Troubled India and Her Ne igh -
tours*", F o r e i g n A f f a i r s T 4 3 ( 2 ) i 
January 1965 : 312-30. 
. . . "'Which Boad For South-East A s i a « 
Fo re i gn A f f a i r s ^ 4 2 ( 4 ) : Ju ly , 
1964 : 628-39. 
. . . "'South As i an Image o f India**, 
EconDmic Weekly, 13 July 27-29, 
1961 ; 1043, 1046. 
. . . ""India and South East A s i a , " 
Mainstream 2 ( 3 ) September 2,1963 
18. 
. . . ® Ind ia , China and South-East 
• Asia"^', Un i ted A s i a 1 6 ( 1 1 ) : 
Nov. 1963 t 766-68. 
. . . "^Malaysia - A New F e d e r a t i o n i n 
Southeast Asia™, P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 
3 6 ( 2 ) J Summar 1963 : 138-69. 
. . . " ' India and the As i an Scene" , 
A s i a n Review^ 67(210)s A p r i l 
1961 i 114-22, 
. . . **India Must Play Her Role as 
Natura l Leader o f South East 
A s i a " , Organizer^ 17 (48 ) s 
June 29,1964 t 6. 
. . . " I n d i a , J a p a n , A u s t r a l i a and the 
Secur i ty o f A s i a ' ^ A u s t r a l i a n 
Quarter ly^ 39 Sept , 1967s 7 . 
. . . *"South-East Asia**, Seminar^ 37 
Sept , 1967:37-42 (This i s s u e 
presents a symposium on I n d i a ' s 
r e l a t i o n s w i th countr ies c l o s e 
to her f r o n t i e r s ) . 
. . . ""New De lh i Must Think Anew on 
South-East Asia**, The Statesman 
( D e l h i ) , August 24,1966. 
. . . " "Con f l i c t ing P u l l s i n S . E . A s i a n 
Po l i t i c s * * , The Statesman. 
December 9, 1966. 
- 297 -
28* Parkar , Giiy J. 
29, Pye, Lucia W. 
30, palmer, N.D, 
31, Par lmal Kumar 
32, P e f f e r , N a t h a n i e l 
33. Reso lu t i on 
34. S l n g h a l j D . P . 
36. Shlv S h a s t r l 
36. S ingha l , D.P. 
37. Symposium 
. . . " P o l i t i c a l Doct r ines and P r a c -
t i c a l P o l i t i c s i n Southeast 
A s i a " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 3 5 ( 1 ) 
Spr ing 1962, 3 -10 , 
, . . "The P o l i t i c s o f Southeast 
Asia**, i n G a b r i a l A.Almand and 
James S.Coleman, eds . , The 
P o l i t i c s o f the Developing at 
4 reas , P r inceton , P r ince ton 
U n i v e r s i t y P ress , I960. 
. . . ® I n d l a » s P o s i t i o n i n Asia**, 
Journal o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 
1 7 ( 2 ) i 1963 8 126-41. 
. . . **India,China and South-East 
Asia**, J%nata, I 8 ( 7 ) s March 
3, 1963 s 16. 
. . . **Regional Secur i ty i n Southeast 
Asia**, I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a -
t i o n , 8 ( 3 ) August 1954 : 311-16, 
^ 
. . . " 'Reso lut ion o f the Nat iona l 
Execut ive o f the Swatantra 
Par ty on I n d i a ' s A t t i t ude to 
South -East Asia**, Madras, on 
6 June 1966, Swara.jya^ 9 ( 6 0 ) 
June 12,1965, 26. 
. , . * *Na t i ona l i sm and Communism i n 
Southeast Asia**, Journal o f 
Southeast A s i a n H i s to ry . 3 ( 1 ) : 
March 1962 s 66-66. 
. . . * * Ind ia ' s Ro le i n S.E.Asia** , 
Hie Ind ian Express^ June 6, 
1968, 
. . . **Indian Po l i cy i n South East 
Asia**, A u s t r a l i a n Journal o f 
P o l i t i c s and History^ 1 2 ( 2 ) : 
August 1966: 258-70. 
. . . **Future o f Asia**, A symposium 
on the Prospects and pe r spec -
t i v e s f a c i n g a r eg ion ,geminar 
104, A p r i l 19,1968. 
- 298 -
38, Varma,Ravindra 
39, V a s i l , R . K . 
40, VexikataramanijM. S. 
41, Verghese, B.G. 
42, V i s h a l Sing 
43, E d i t o r i a l 
44, E d i t o r i a l 
46, E d i t o r i a l 
46, V KSkoii W i J 
47, 
" I nd i an s Diplomacy i n Southeast 
A s i a " , m i t e d A s i a 20 (4 ) s July-
August 1968, 194-201, -
•"India and South-East As ia^ , 
Quest 53 A p r i l - June 1967 $ 
67-63, 
Ind ian Ocean and our S e c u r i t y : 
Impl ica t ions o f B r i t i s h Wi thdra -
wal®, The Times o f I n d i a . F e b . 
1968, 
• • . 
Reassessment o f Ind ian P41icy 
i n As ia®, Ind ia Q u a r t e r l y ^ 1 7 ( 2 ) 
A p r i l - J u n e 1961$ 103-26, 
**India and South East A s i a " , 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies^ 5 ( 4 / 2 ) 
Ju ly -Oct . 1963 s 172-73. , , 
**India and South-East Asia'^, 
The Hindu (Madras ) , 17 June 1966, 
®Asian Regiona l Co-operation*®. 
The Hindustan Times, 16 August 
1967, 
" ' S .E .As ian Rea l i t i es * * , Economic 
and P o l i t i c a l Weekly 3 ( 2 3 ) : 
June 8, 1968 : 868, 
" " Ind ia ,Pak i s tan and South-East 
Asia**, I n t e r n a t i o n a l S tud i e s . 
8 (1/2 ) Ju ly -Get ,1966 : 167-76, 
' ' I n d i a ' s Image i n S.E.Asia** , 
m i t e d Asia^ 1 9 ( 4 ) Ju ly -August 
1967 : 222-24. 
